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Abstract 
 
In 1948 the international community in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust 
sought to eradicate genocide forever by creating the ‘Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.  This Convention criminalised the 
preparation and act of genocide by international law, making all individuals 
accountable irrelevant of status or sovereignty.  But the Convention has not been 
enough to deter the act of genocide from occurring again, and again, and again.  
Worst, the international community has been slow to react to cases of genocide.  The 
problem with preventing and punishing genocide is hindered by the power and right 
of veto held by permanent members of the UNSC.  The UNSC has been given the 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security and is the only entity that 
can mandate an intervention that overrides the principle of non-intervention. The aim 
of this thesis is to show that the veto has been a crucial factor in stopping the 
prevention of genocide, thus it is imperative that the veto change.  This study argues 
that to effectively prevent and punish genocide the veto needs to be barred from use 
in cases of genocide.  It looks at different cases since the Armenian genocide during 
WWI through to the Darfur genocide which is still in process.  The case of Armenia 
is significant because for the first time, members of the international community 
were prepared to hold leaders of another state accountable for their treatment of their 
own citizens.  However the collective will to bring justice to those accountable 
waned coming to an abrupt end in 1923.  The holocaust followed in WWII; six 
million Jews died, and numerous other groups were targeted under the Nazi’s serial 
genocide.  The shock of the holocaust led to the Genocide Convention.  But thirty 
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years later during the Cold War, Cambodia became embroiled in a genocide 
perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.  The international community silently stood by.  
The USSR, China, and the US all had their reasons to stay out of Cambodia, from 
supporting a regime with a likeminded political ideology to war weariness from 
Vietnam.  In the 1990s, genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 
Kosovo) followed.  The former was neglected by the US’s unwillingness to be 
involved in another peacekeeping disaster.  The two genocides in the former 
Yugoslavia were affected by Russia and China’s reluctance to use military force 
even after the clear failure of serial negotiations.  Finally, in 2003 Darfur became the 
latest tragedy of genocide.  Again, Russia and China have been timid of calling the 
conflict genocide thus avoiding any affirmative action to stop it.  These cases all 
show that where one state is unwilling to be involved in stopping genocide, their 
right and power to the veto stops or delays the international community from 
preventing and punishing genocide, regardless of whether the veto is used or merely 
seen as a threat.  Therefore, for future prevention of genocide, the veto needs to be 
changed to prevent its use in times of genocide.                   
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Preface 
 
My interest in genocide comes in large part because of my father’s history.  Born 
1936 in eastern Poland, he and his family were hoarded into cattle trains during 
World War II for a six week journey to Siberia, Russia.  There under the Russians in 
concentration camps they were forced to log trees in the severe weather conditions 
with meagre food, water, and medicinal rations provided.  Many died, including my 
father’s mother and two elder sisters.  When Germany then attacked Russia in 1941, 
the Polish prisoners were freed.  My father was brought to New Zealand along with 
over 700 other Polish children, initially staying in a camp in Pahiatua. Before his 
father eventually found him in New Zealand, my father was fostered out; but because 
he couldn’t speak English, the New Zealand students severely bullied him.  To this 
day he is averse to speaking Polish.  
 
During WWII, six million Poles died from different causes but as a result of the 
same underlying reason they were an ‘inferior race’ – they were Poles.  All my life I 
have tried to come to grips with what happened to my father and his family.  It is a 
reality for me. I have lived not only with the stories, but with a father tormented by 
his past.  Although the extermination of the Poles is not considered genocide in the 
strictest sense, it is a reality that the Poles were targeted because of their location and 
ethnicity.   
 
I don’t believe that I shall ever be able to fully understand genocide.  It is so 
incomprehensible because one does not have the choice to be a target of it or not, 
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they are selected purely because they belong to a certain group; their individual 
worth is never considered.  However, this thesis has helped me understand the 
political realities of genocide.  Thankfully there is still an innocent and idealistic part 
in me that hopes for a better and more peaceful world where genocide ceases to 
exist.   
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Introduction: Prevention of Genocide, One Aspect 
 
As I write this thesis, there is a genocide occurring in Darfur, Sudan.  The United 
Nations Genocide Convention of 1948 has inarguably fallen short of the tacit hope 
within it of ‘never again’.  ‘Never again’ has become somewhat of a horrible joke as 
the world has witnessed genocide, after genocide, after genocide.   One of the biggest 
flaws of the convention is the definition, or the unwillingness of international leaders 
to call a genocide a genocide, seemingly playing out Act II, Scene II from Romeo 
and Juliet:  
 'Tis but thy name that is my enemy; 
 Thou art thyself [a conflict], though not a [genocide]. 
 What's [genocide]? it is nor [death], nor [torture], 
 Nor arm[s], nor [conflict], nor any other part 
 Belonging to a [war]. O, be some other name! 
 What's in a name? that which we call a rose 
 By any other name would smell as sweet; 
 So [genocide] would, were [it] not [genocide] call'd, 
 Retain that [horrible monstrousness] which [war] owes 
 Without that title. [Genocide], doff thy name, 
 And for that name which is no part of thee 
 [We will deny it] all [ourselves].1
 
Unfortunately, by another name, the international legal responsibility does change, 
leaving millions to suffer by the act.  However, this thesis is not intended to 
challenge the legal definition nor is it to challenge the fault of leaders to label 
genocide correctly, instead this thesis aims to look at one aspect of the future 
international prevention of genocide through another major flaw – the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members right to veto. 
 
                                                 
1 William Shakespeare, ‘Romeo and Juliet’, in  Jeremy Hylton, The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare, 1993, http://shakespeare.mit.edu/romeo_juliet/romeo_juliet.2.2.html  (28 February 
2007), Act II, Scene II. 
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The veto power as given to permanent members of the UNSC is a large topic in and 
of itself, but it is important to see the connection it has with genocide prevention and 
punishment.  This thesis argues that future international prevention of genocide can 
be addressed by the reformation of the veto power within the UNSC.  The UNSC has 
been afforded certain responsibilities concerning conflict in the international interest.  
The right for the United Nations (UN) to intervene in a conflict militarily is given to 
the UNSC, but any permanent member of the UNSC can veto or threaten to veto any 
intervention.  This can have, and has had devastating consequences.  The purposes of 
the UNSC, and UN at large, must overcome such major and controversial obstacles 
that only inhibit the progress of preventing and punishing genocide. 
 
This thesis has been divided into three main parts.  Part one, discusses the many 
different, and varied, definitions of genocide, especially the definition given in the 
Genocide Convention which is the basis for all legal international intervention.  It 
also looks at the Armenian genocide demonstrating the failure of the international 
community’s attempts to prevent or punish the then moral crime.  During World War 
II (WWII), genocide occurred again with the holocaust.  This time the world united 
to punish the perpetrators of the crime in the Nuremburg trials, and to prevent similar 
heinous genocides from happening again by creating international law against 
genocide, in the Genocide Convention.  
 
Part two examines four genocides that have occurred since the Convention.  These 
are the Cambodian, Rwandan, former Yugoslavian genocides, and the current case in 
Darfur, Sudan.  Each case shows the international community’s concern, in 
particular that of the UNSC, and subsequent intervention, or lack thereof.   The 
 3
Darfur case is most significant as two permanent member of the UNSC are reluctant 
to support any UN intervention in what is clearly a case of genocide.  The people of 
Darfur are suffering from the choices of these two countries, but this is evidence of 
the strong consequences of the vital mediatory role of the veto. 
 
The history and the responsibilities given to the UNSC, and most importantly the 
veto, are discussed in part three.  It describes the reform discussions past and present 
that have taken place within the UN.  This final part is a conglomeration of parts one 
and two, and considers the advantages and disadvantages of changing the veto power 
for the purpose of preventing and punishing genocide.  It is argued that by changing 
this veto power, it is addressing one aspect that has until now halted and delayed the 
prevention and punishment of genocide.  By changing the veto power the 
international community can more fully achieve the hope of ‘never again’.   
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Part One: Introducing International Law 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
  
The idea of genocide is relatively new, as will be discussed in this section.  Chapter 
two, ‘Defining Genocide’, considers the roots of genocide as a descriptive term.  It is 
important to look at its roots to more fully understand what it was intended to mean.  
Also, this chapter explores a range of different meanings taking a very holistic 
approach from the debates leading up to the Genocide Convention, and opinions 
from a range of scholars.  The Convention is very restricting, for certain reasons 
which will be discussed, but hopefully in the future their will be room for more 
thorough and extensive additions to the Convention; this is because defining 
genocide is vital to life. 
 
‘The Case of Armenia’ is examined for several reasons.  It is the first modern 
genocide which was systematised using the abilities of the industrialised world to 
significantly impact the population of the Armenians in Turkey.  It also gained 
widespread international recognition which in turn resulted in the international 
community’s first attempts to address how to deal with genocide.  Despite this, all 
attempts failed, with Turkey currently denying it ever happened but rather claiming it 
was all part of the common atrocities that occur during a war.1  Armenia has had 
enormous repercussions in the world of genocide as we know it. Had it been 
prevented, or the perpetrators been properly punished, we may never have witnessed 
                                                 
1 European Communities, ‘Bulletin EU 11-2000, Enlargement (2/12): 1.5.2. Parliament Resolution on 
the 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’, 2001, 
http://europa/eu/bulletin/en/2001/p105002.htm  [8 March 2007].  The European Union (EU) is 
pressuring Turkey to change its official position and to recognise the Armenian genocide before 
joining the EU.  
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the holocaust, and subsequently all other genocides that have occurred since.  Even 
the Genocide Convention itself might not have come into existence. 
 
The holocaust is vital to any study of genocide because it was from this that the 
world really learnt the true meaning of what it is, and the extent to which it could go 
on without being checked.  The term was created and the international community 
made sure that this time the perpetrators were held accountable for their moral 
wrongdoing.  Not only that, but the international community came together to ensure 
it never happened again by creating international law against it in the Genocide 
Convention. 
 
Finally this part analyses the Genocide Convention deciphering what it literally 
means at face value.  This has been carefully considered as it determines the 
responsibilities of the international community in cases of genocide.  Moreover, it 
will also be argued as the legal basis for intervention within a sovereign state, after a 
state has done all that it can to prevent genocide.  Each individual case of genocide 
discussed in this thesis will rely on the definition as expressed in the Genocide 
Convention.  Overall, this section conceptualises genocide and grounds it in 
international law. 
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Chapter Two: Defining Genocide 
 
To begin a study of genocide it is first essential to define it and distinguish it from 
other armed conflicts. The term genocide was coined by jurist Raphael Lemkin, a 
Polish Jew, trying to describe the atrocities of the Jewish people during WWII.  
Technically the word ‘genocide’ is a diffusion of both Greek and Latin, with‘the 
Greek word genos, meaning a people or nation, and the Latin suffix of –cide, for 
murder.’1  In simple terms then, genocide literally means ‘murder of a people or 
nation’. However, despite this explicitly simple definition, in the realms of 
international legality the word ‘genocide’ is seen to be far more complex in its 
interpretation.  Over time it has become defined by certain acts and specific groups 
of people which has been the cause of much debate due to the “massacres” which fall 
outside the confined definition.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis I shall use the international legal definition as described 
in the 1948 Genocide Convention, as it is the legal framework to which the UNSC 
works within.  However, due to the deficiencies within this framework I will 
endeavour to discuss the term genocide in great depth to indicate what the 
Convention could or should mean, and to describe its potential.  The Convention 
itself is discussed in depth in a separate chapter.  In general terms, the Convention 
describes genocide as the intent to physically destroy a group, ‘in whole or in part’.  
The Convention limits the groups that are protected to national, ethnical, racial, or 
                                                 
1 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton. Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), p. 8. 
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religious groups.2  It is important to note that original drafts of the Convention 
included ‘political and other groups’.3  Its final definition excludes political, social, 
cultural and other groups thus reducing the protection that the Convention could 
have provided.   
 
Helen Fein includes in the definition of genocide, ‘organised state murder’.4  Modern 
genocide is structured and systematised in a manner that relies on the instruction, or 
at the very least, the non-intervention of the state’s leaders.  Under the creation of the 
modern nation-state, the power to pull together masses of people under the 
jurisdiction of the state government has been a powerful tool in the ‘art’ of modern 
genocide.  The genocides discussed in this thesis demonstrate clearly the power of 
the government as the initial perpetrators, but nonetheless reveals the accountability 
that lies with everyone who participated in the genocides even though they may not 
all be held legally accountable.    
 
Other academics have incorporated other essential factors of genocide, with terms 
such as homicide, democide, politicide, mass murder, ‘one-sided’ ethnic cleansing, 
mass crime, and massacres.5  Massacres are an element of genocide, but as Semelin 
argues, massacres need to be separated from genocide because ‘genocide’ comes 
                                                 
2 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide’. 9 December 1948. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p-genoci.htm  (5 
March 2007), Article II. 
3 Leo Kuper, International Action Against Genocide (Revised) (London: Minority Rights Group, 
1984), p.3. 
4 Ibid, quoted by Helen Fein. 
5 Jacques Semelin, ‘Analysis of a Mass Crime: Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-
1999’, in Robert Gelletely and Ben Kiernan (eds.), The specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.353-354. 
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under international law’.6  However he agrees that ‘genocide always implies one or 
more massacres’, but a massacre does not always imply genocide.7  A massacre is to 
kill a number of people ‘under cruel or atrocious circumstances’.8  Because only 
genocide is covered by international law to confuse the two terms could mean the 
difference in the level of protection that one group is entitled to.   
 
Although genocide has a strong element of ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing being 
the forcing of one ethnic group out of a particular area, it differs because it may or 
may not include the extermination of that group.  An ethnic conflict is between two 
or more sides, each side being from a particular ethnic group.  The roots of the 
conflict may vary from ‘colonial legacy’, to religion, to different levels of 
development, poor leadership’ and so forth.9  The end result is the inability of two or 
more cultural groups to live together, and the best solution may [seem to] be some 
form of separation’.10  Again the conflict’s intent is not to destroy but to separate the 
two groups, unlike genocide which is ‘one-sided’ with the intent to completely 
eradicate the other. 
 
Now that genocide has been defined in and of itself, it is important to note the 
differences between genocide and other armed conflict.  Firstly, the most typical 
conflict is war.  War is generally considered as a conflict between two or more states, 
although since the end of the Cold War, intra-state war has been on the increase.  
                                                 
6 Ibid. p.354.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Frederick C. Mish (ed.), The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster 
Inc, 1989), s.v. massacre.  
9 Stephen Ryan, ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict’, in Brian White, Richard Little, and Michael Smith 
(eds.), Issues in World Politics, 2nd edn, (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.135. 
10 Ibid, pp.134-135. 
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The dictionary defines war as ‘a struggle between two opposing forces for a 
particular end’,11 usually for territory, political power, or independence.  Genocide is 
not war because it is one-sided and against civilians. Its primary intent is to destroy a 
specifically targeted group of people.12  Self-defence from genocide should not be 
confused as an act of genocide.  A civil or internal conflict is fought on two or more 
sides, and depending on the intent of the opposing sides, it may or may not be 
genocide.   
 
Since early Christian times, war has become enshrined in international law and 
morality13 and can be legal in circumstances of self-defence, while genocide remains 
illegal.  War divides the population up into two groups, legal combatants with rights 
and responsibilities, and civilians.  While combatants cannot legally target civilians, 
war does involve the killing of civilians. However, international law states that there 
must be a level of proportionality according to military need.14  When genocide is 
performed, it is one group of people aiming for the extinction of another group, or in 
other words, the intentional killing of civilians. 
 
Other conflicts include terrorist acts, guerrilla warfare, revolutions, revolts, and coup 
d’état.  Maxwell defines terrorism as the use or even threat of violence targeting 
                                                 
11 Mish (ed.), op cit, s.v. war.  
12 Genocide may include the purpose of gaining territory from a targeted group. 
13 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th 
edn, (New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore, Madrid, 
Mexico City, Munich, Paris, Cape Town, Hong Kong, Montreal: Longman, 2003), p.24. 
14 See ‘Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 
August 1949’, ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims if International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977’, and ‘Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977’, in International Committee of the Red 
Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents’, 2005, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView  (8 March 2007). 
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civilians, government officials, or off-duty military forces, ‘… to scare a broad 
audience beyond the actual victims’.15  Their intent is not to destroy a particular 
group of people, like genocide, but rather to impose a political or religious 
ideological change.  Guerrilla warfare, while looked upon as being in the same vein 
as terrorism, is considered, in more favourable light, as ‘freedom fighting’.  Both 
terrorists and guerrilla fighters are usually non-state actors, unlike the perpetrators of 
genocide which tend to be government-led.  Genocide isn’t so much about scare 
tactics as it is about killing tactics, where the end result is extinction not the winning 
of a war. 
 
Revolutions, revolts, and coup d’état are all very similar to each other: a revolution 
being ‘the overthrow . . . of one ruler or government and substitution of another by 
the governed’;16 a revolt, ‘to throw off allegiance to a ruler or government . . . 
rebellion’;17 and a coup d’état, a ‘sudden violent overthrow of a government by a 
small group.18  None of the above intent is prima facie to in any way destroy a group 
of people, but rather to change a way of life, which can lead to genocide but usually 
does not.  There generally will be the inevitable loss of life and certain persons or 
groups will be targeted, but this does not constitute genocide.    
 
It can thus be concluded then that genocide is at the very least the act by one side to 
intentionally destroy in whole or in part a group of any given people, but legally 
                                                 
15 Bruce Maxwell, Terrorism: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2003),  p.xv. 
16 Mish (ed.), op cit, s.v. revolution.  
17 Ibid, s.v. revolt.  
18 Ibid, s.v. coup d’état.  
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restricted to ‘national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups’.19  Victims are innocent 
civilians selected to be raped, persecuted, killed and mutilated because they were 
born of, or belong to a group of which the mere name of may conjure up hatred.  
Genocides predate the holocaust and even the Armenian genocide to that of biblical 
times and certainly were abundant in times of colonisation.20  Modern technology 
has differentiated genocides in the twentieth century from all others through system 
and thoroughness.  The results of genocide are greater than ever before and that is 
why the international community must put prevention and punishment of genocide at 
the forefront of international relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’. 9 December 1948,  loc cit. Article II. 
20 United Nations, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide Prepared By Mr. B. Whitaker, (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985), 
pp.6-7, para. 20. 
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Chapter Three: The Case of Armenia 
 
The first state-driven systematised genocide in modernity occurred last century in 
what is known as the Armenian genocide.  During WWI, more than one and a half 
million1 Armenians died in Turkey’s attempt to create a pan-Turkic identity.   
Although it has little international recognition today as genocide, it is of deep 
importance to this study because it clearly demonstrates the international 
community’s original ability to intervene, even though the outcome was not 
successful.  Again, despite now being unrecognised by the majority of the 
international community, by definition of the Genocide Convention, the Armenian 
tragedy was clearly a case of genocide.  This chapter examines the Armenian 
genocide discussing the intent, methods, and the international response. 
 
The Armenian civilisation has been around since the beginning of world history, and 
was the first country in the world to adopt Christianity as its official state religion in 
A.D. 301.2  They became subject to the expanding Ottoman Empire in the eleventh 
century.3  Under the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians, along with other non-
Muslims, were protected subordinates, but as the Ottoman Empire faded away from 
existence in the nineteenth century, squeezed out by the encroaching Christian 
European powers, the Empire’s struggle turned inward.  In the mid nineteenth 
century Turkey implemented changes to fortify itself.  It sought to become a nation-
                                                 
1 Rouben Paul Adalian, ‘The Armenian Genocide’ in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel 
W. Charny, Century of Genocide. 2nd edn, (New York, London: Routlegde, 2004), p.69.  
2 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), p.3. 
3 Adalian, op cit, p.53. 
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state, and felt homogenising the state to one Turkish population would help 
accomplish this task.4   
  
The Armenians were in a vulnerable position. As they were seen to have a rich and 
solid culture, and were non-conforming to a complete Turkic identity, they were thus 
the target of extreme violence.  Their religion put them in a strong position with the 
European powers enabling them to gain support from their counterparts, such as 
Russia.  Some Armenians came to believe that there was the possibility of 
independence. The likelihood that this support could eventually break the remains of 
the Empire brought fear amongst the Turks.  The reality of the fear was demonstrated 
in massacres claiming over two hundred thousand Armenian lives in 1894-96 and 
19095, which were to prelude the Armenian genocide.  Yet the Armenian massacres 
warranted insignificant intervention from the greater powers.6  Instead it brought a 
chain of genocides that were to occur in the twentieth century.  The Jewish holocaust 
can be directly attributed to the Armenian genocide, and that genocide may never 
have occurred if the massacres had been prevented or stopped in time.  
 
Prior to the genocide, a fundamental factor that led to the genocide was the Young 
Turk revolution in 1908 led by members of the Committee for Union and Progress.  
Initially the reformation was to be of liberation but that was not to last long.  In their 
                                                 
4 Sara Cohan, ‘A Brief History of the Armenian Genocide’, Social Education, Vol. 69, No. 6, 2005, 
pp.333-337.  
5 Vahakhn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to 
Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp.175, 182. 
6 The European powers did make some attempts to stop Armenian injustices, such as the Armenian 
Reform Agreement signed on 8 February 1914, an international agreement ‘to respect and uphold the 
rights of the minority Armenians’.  But, their lack of unity prevented them from actually stopping the 
Turks from attacking and killing the Armenians.  By December 16, 1914 Turkey had cancelled the 
agreement. See  Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from 
World War I to the 21st Century (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 42-43, 68.  
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desire to reform the empire to what it had once been they looked to other European 
states to exemplify.  Nationalism was again brought into the fore.  Weitz says that 
‘[f]rom their imagined view of modern Germany and modern France, the young 
Turks understood nationalism as a key to the creation of a strong, powerful state that 
would be . . . at least the equal of those of western Europe.’7  Germany came to be 
the model state, and even provided military training and support for Turkey.    
 
With the development of Turkey’s relationship with Germany, they joined WWI in 
November 1914 taking Germany’s side, with the promise from Germany that the 
empire would stay intact.  Again the Armenians were to be seen as the internal 
enemy, as any dissension within would compromise Turkey’s position.  This time 
though the massacres had been a template, and under the war situation the possibility 
of diminishing the Armenian population was well established.  Much like the 
holocaust that it preceded, the Armenian genocide was done under the guise of war.  
War provided ‘emergency circumstances’ and heightened fears that made it 
acceptable ‘to carry out extreme measures that they would not [have] dare[d] venture 
in peacetime’.8  By February 1915 the Young Turks began its procedures to 
intentionally exterminate the Armenians.9  
 
The first step into the Armenian Genocide was the official disarming of Armenian 
soldiers and civilians, beginning in February 1915.10  Those serving under the 
Ottoman Empire became road labourers, though most were shot outright.  The arrest 
                                                 
7 Weitz, loc cit.  
8 Ibid, p.4. 
9 Leo Kuper, International Action Against Genocide (Revised) (London: Minority Rights Group, 
1984), p.6. 
10 Ibid. 
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and deportation of Armenian leaders left them leaderless and defenceless.11  Step 
two was the deportation of the general Armenian populous from Turkey to Syria and 
Iraq via cattle trucks or by foot.12  Adalian describes this part as the most thoroughly 
implemented part of the plan’.13  Town and village were cleansed of Armenians. 
They were given only a few days notice to prepare for their long and fateful 
journey.14  Men were separated from women and children, and a great number of the 
men were executed.15
 
Along the way the Armenians were subject to the elements of nature and the abuse of 
Turkish nationals.  The Ottoman government wilfully neglected to provide food and 
shelter, nor did they provide protection from the bands of human enemies.  The 
government was involved in a ‘Special Organisation’ which by late 1914 had begun 
releasing specially selected criminals from prisons; these criminals were given the 
task to lead the Armenians.16  The Armenians were victims of robbing, rape, 
kidnapping, held ransom, and killed by ‘…the killing units …with sword and 
bayonet’.17  It is not hard to imagine that under those terrible conditions only ‘a 
quarter of the deportees’ survived’.18  At their destination, death and despair 
followed with some tens of thousand dying from the extremities in weather 
conditions. They were shot if they attempted to quench their thirst in the Euphrates 
River.  Men, women, and children were abused in the most inhumane ways.19  All in 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Weitz, op cit, pp.4-5. 
13 Adalian, op cit, p.55. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Weitz, op cit, p.5. 
16 Dadrian, op cit, p.236. 
17 Adalian, op cit, p.56. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, p.57. 
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all, around 1.5 million Armenians died, around 800,000 are attributed to direct 
killings.20
 
The international political response was initially of merit, but overtime the interest 
burned out.  Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire at 
the time, is reported to have telegraphed the American Secretary of State describing 
the Turkish actions as “race murder”.21  Following this, the plight of the Armenians 
was in the international public domain receiving a share of media attention.  
International attempts were made to help aid the Armenians.  The allied governments 
warned the Turkish government that they would be held responsible,22 but this was 
ignored as WWI took the limelight.  
 
Turkey was forced to sign the Armistice on 30 October 1918, at the end of war, and 
thus became subject to the victors mercy and justice.23  However, international 
humanitarian law was at that time largely restricted to war crimes and granted near 
complete sovereignty.  Nicolas Politis, Foreign Minister of Greece, proposed to 
expand the laws within war crimes to include the crime of the sovereign state Turkey 
against their own civilians, the Armenians.24  Objections to the proposal kept the 
moral crime under the established international humanitarian law.  The Paris Peace 
Conference Commission final report, 29 March 1919, stated that Turkey was ‘. . . 
                                                 
20 Dadrian, op cit, pp.224-225. 
21 US ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. as quoted in Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: 
America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p.6. 
22 Gary Jonathan Bass, ‘International War Crimes Trials are Necessary’, in Henny H. Kim (ed.), War 
Crimes (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2000), p.131. 
23 Dadrian, op cit, p.303. 
24 Ibid, p.304. 
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guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, [and 
were] liable to criminal prosecution.25   
 
The Committee for Union and Progress disbanded, and the seven top leaders fled the 
country.  Under pressure from the Allied Powers, the new Turkish government in 
1919, arrested and detained scores of remaining accused Turkish nationals, including 
other former wartime leaders.26 They were tried in the Ottoman court in 
Constantinople. Many of those tried were found to be guilty.27  Nevertheless, the 
Turkish trials lost momentum from pressure of Turkey protestors opposed to the 
execution of an accused district commander in April 1919.28  Britain continued its 
push for justice and between May 1919 and August 1920 it had apprehended 118 
Turkish detainees and relocated them to Malta.29  But with dwindling international 
and domestic interest and the taking of British hostages, they were eventually, and 
regrettably, exchanged for British prisoners on 1 November 1921.30      
    
The Peace Treaty of Serves, 10 August 1920, included several articles on the trial 
and punishment of the perpetrators in which Turkey was obliged to allow the Allied 
Powers the right to hold international trials and punish the accused. They were to 
surrender all those individuals accused for that purpose.31  Turkey protested against 
international interference as contrary to its right of Sovereignty.32  By this time 
international support for acting on the treaty was failing due to a dispute between the 
                                                 
25 Ibid, p.305. 
26 Those that had fled the state were tried in absentia.  
27 Dadrian, op cit, p.330. 
28 Ibid, p.307, and Bass, loc cit. 
29 Maogoto, op cit, p.59. 
30 Dadrian, op cit, p.311. 
31 Ibid, p.305. 
32 Maogoto, op cit, pp.58-59. 
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Allies and the secretive courting of the popular Turkish Nationalists by France and 
Italy who sought to appease the Turks.  Turkey and its populous pushed harder for 
sovereignty rights, and thus were reluctant to participate in the prosecutions, or give 
necessary evidence.33   
 
Nothing ever happened to the leaders of the genocide, their verdicts were, in the end, 
annulled.  The international consensus on how to serve justice had been uncertain 
and thus, given time, ‘[t]he initial impulse to seek justice … faded …’34 into national 
ambitions of political and economic gain.  In 1923, the treaty was replaced by the 
Treaty of Lausanne which granted amnesty to Turkish officials.35  The warning from 
Allied governments eight years earlier to hold responsible the perpetrators of the 
genocide proved to be an empty threat. 
 
Not only was the Ottoman Empire let off from their horrendous crime, international 
law kept the gate open allowing other international genocides in the future.  The 
League of Nations was organised at the end of WWI to ‘. . . promote international 
co-operation and to achieve international peace and security’.36  It focused on 
‘external aggression’ between states.37  Despite its efforts for peace, the League of 
Nations was careful not to encroach upon State sovereignty, thus states were left 
                                                 
33 Ibid, and Dadrian, op cit, pp.308-10. 
34 Dadrian, op cit, p.303. 
35 Ibid, p.305, and Maogoto, op cit, p.62. 
36 The Avalon Project, ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’, 1996, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm (5 March 2007), Preamble. 
37 Ibid, Article 10. 
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unaccountable to human rights injustices in their own country.38  This international 
organisation omitted any prevention or punishment of any future genocide.  
 
At the close of WWI, the international community had its chance to punish those 
responsible for the Armenian genocide.  The international community also had the 
opportunity to create law that would prevent and punish future genocide.  But the 
international community at that time failed to do either.  The holocaust began on the 
heels of the Armenian genocide.  However, for the Armenians, the tragedy 
continues.  Since the amnesty was given to Turkey officials, Turkey has repudiated 
any claims that there was genocide in their state.  As Turkey stands as the political 
bridge to the troublesome Middle East, other governments have supported Turkey’s 
claim.  However there has been recent international pressure by some states for 
Turkey to recognise the Armenian genocide.39     
 
The Armenian genocide was a horrible moral crime that should never have occurred, 
or been forgotten.  To this day, the Turkey government and the majority of states 
internationally have failed to recognise it as genocide.  However, all the research 
points to the demise of the Armenian population during WWI in Turkey as the 
intentional genocide.  This case is most notable because of the lack of international 
will-power to prevent or punish, or even to get international consensus that it did 
                                                 
38 Human rights barely existed at this time.  International human rights and humanitarian laws had 
been evolving since the end of the nineteenth century, and more so after WWII.  Sovereignty was thus 
near complete giving States full rights over their own citizens.  The application of human rights 
existed only when a State committed gross crimes against citizens of another State.    
39 Recent developments have seen stronger political pressure for Turkey to allow open debate on the 
genocide.  France has taken the approach of outlawing the denial of the genocide causing much 
tension between Turkey and France.  To a lesser degree, other states within the EU are also pressuring 
Turkey to change its official position and to recognise the Armenian genocide before joining the EU.  
As a collective entity, the EU is also requesting Turkey to change its position, however it is not a 
prerequisite for Turkey’s membership into the EU.  
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actually happen as genocide and not just as war casualties.  This genocide set the 
unfortunate precedent to a century of genocides.  If this genocide had been stopped 
or effectively punished, then we might never have known the holocaust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Chapter Four: The Holocaust of the Jews and Others 
 
The holocaust has been argued as the worst genocide in the world’s history.  The 
technical abilities and the wilful perpetrators together culminated in the genocide of 
millions of innocent civilians.  The tragedy brought about a great international 
response, greater and more determined than the Armenian genocide had gained.  For 
the first time in modern era, Nazi individuals accused of ‘war crimes’ were tried 
before an international tribunal.  The international community determined to prevent 
other genocides by creating the Genocide Convention in order to criminalise 
genocide and authorise the prevention and punishment of the crime by the 
international community.     
 
On August 22, 1939, Adolf Hitler is alleged to have given the charge, 
 
‘Our strength consists in our speed and brutality.  Genghis Khan led millions 
of women and children to slaughter – with premeditation and a happy heart.  
History sees in him solely the founder of a state.  It’s a matter of indifference 
to me what a weak Western European civilisation will say about me.’ 
 
‘. . .Accordingly, I have placed my death-head formations in readiness for the 
present only in the East – with orders to them to send death mercilessly and 
without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish derivation and 
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language.  Only thus shall we gain the living space (lebensraum) which we 
need.  Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?’1
 
Germany and the Soviet Union attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, which led to 
WWII.  Like the Armenian genocide, the genocide of the Jews in Europe and of 
other peoples occurred under the guise of war.  It has been argued that if the 
Armenian genocide had been prevented or effectively punished, the holocaust might 
never have occurred.  The holocaust was in many regards an advanced industrialised 
version of the Armenian genocide. For example, the Nazi’s plan relied heavily on 
railway transportation which had first been used in the Armenian genocide.     
 
Hitler was appointed as the German Chancellor on 30 January 1933.  The holocaust 
could never have been foreseen at this point. However, the psychological 
environment was slowly developed to allow, by the general German public, the 
genocide.  Hitler was pushing and pulling anti-Semitic policies.  The German 
genocide, commonly known as the holocaust, involved the Jews, but it also included 
the “Gypsies” or Sinti and Roma, Poles, Slavs and other eastern Europeans, as well 
as the mentally ill and physically disabled.  The number of groups intended to be 
cleansed or exterminated from Germany, and the proposed conquered lands, has led 
it to be referred to, in part, as a ‘serial genocide’.2
 
                                                 
1 Adolf Hitler as quoted in Louis P. Lochner, What about Germany? (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 
1942), pp.1-4, in  The Genocide Education Project, ‘The Armenian Genocide Resource Library for 
Teachers’, 2004, http://www.teachgenocide.com/bkgrnd/hitler.htm  (5 March 2007).   
2 Robert Gellately, ‘The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide’, in Robert 
Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.241. 
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Hitler was very tactful about his political position, desiring to have a popular 
authoritarian regime, thus he was always working within the boundaries of popular 
German opinion.  His two accomplishments were overcoming the Great Depression 
and releasing Germany from the detested Treaty of Versailles.3  Overtime Hitler was 
able to persuade the nation that there was a need to establish an ethnically pure 
Germany for its future strength.  The German population became convinced that 
there was a ‘Jewish question’, and that according to assumptions on racial 
superiority, there was a need to cleanse Germany of the ‘racially inferior’.  Further, 
even the ethnically German who were physically or mentally disabled were deemed 
inconsistent to ideas of a perfect German people.   
 
Within Hitler’s first six months as Chancellor of Germany, on 14 July 1933, the first 
laws pertaining to racial purity were established under ‘…the Protection of the 
Hereditary Health: the Attempt to Improve the German Aryan Breed’.4  These laws 
sought the sterilisation of the physically and mentally ill5 to avoid affecting the 
descendents of such persons with the “inheritable” diseases.6  On 15 September 
1935, these laws were further developed with the ‘Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship 
and Race’, and again the ‘Law for the Protection of German Blood and German 
Honour’. The first law deemed that most Jews could not be citizens of the Reich and 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Law for the Protection of Hereditary Health: The Attempt to Improve the German Aryan Breed, July 
14, 1933 in The IB Holocaust Project, ‘The Nuremberg Laws’, 2007, 
http://cghs.dade.k12.fl.us/holocaust/laws.htm  (8 March 2007), title.  
5 The law specifically targeted persons with: congenital feeble-mindedness, schizophrenia, manic-
depression, congenital epilepsy, inheritable St. Vitus dance (Huntington’s Chorea), hereditary 
blindness, hereditary deafness, serious inheritable malformations, and chronic alcoholism.   See ibid, 
loc cit, Article 1, paras. 2, 3.    
6 Ibid, loc cit, Article 1, para. 1. 
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therefore could not vote.7  The latter law prohibited marriages and relationships 
‘between Jews and Nationals of German or kindred blood…’.  Further, Jewish 
households were not able to hire female German Nationals or their kindred blood, 
and finally Jews were prohibited from raising the Reich and national flag, or to 
present the colours of the Reich.  It is hard to comprehend exactly what Hitler’s 
plans were as they were always changing and evolving.  Still at the beginning of 
WWII, it is apparent that the answer to the ‘Jewish question’ wasn’t yet their total 
extermination; rather it was to relocate them to parts of conquered Poland.8        
 
Political and social rights were restricted for Jewish citizens; they endured forced 
removal to ghettos and labour camps; businesses and properties were taken away 
from them; there were constant anti-Semitic speeches from leaders; they were forced 
to wear the yellow star in order to differentiate themselves from non-Jews; and 
general ill-treatment from a large minority of non-Jewish Germans was given.  In 
1941, it even became illegal for a German to be seen in public with a Jew.9  It was 
the same year that plans for a “final solution of the Jewish question” were laid out.  
From the start of the war, Jews had been killed in their thousands via Nazi death 
squads10 and mobile gas vans.11  According to Gellately, by March 1942, 75–80 
percent of the Jewish victims who would die in WWII were still alive.12  The method 
of extermination was two-fold: first those healthy enough for slave labour were 
                                                 
7 The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race, September 15, 1935, in The IB Holocaust Project, 
‘The Nuremberg Laws’, 2007, http://cghs.dade.k12.fl.us/holocaust/laws.htm   (8 March 2007), Article 
4, para. 1. 
8 Gellately, op cit, p.248. 
9 Gellately, op cit, p.249. 
10 Michael J. Kelly, Nowhere to Hide: Defeat of the Sovereign Immunity Defense for Crimes of 
Genocide and the Trials of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 
p.18.  Kelly notes that 1.5-2 million Jews were shot by the Einsatzgruppen. 
11 Ibid, and Gellately, op cit, p.251. 
12 Gellately, loc cit. 
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worked to death suffering malnutrition and medical neglect, and second, the rest 
were exterminated in gas chambers or firing squads in concentration camps.13  By 
the end of WWII, six million European Jews had died in the holocaust.14
 
The purification process of Germany went beyond the case of the Jews.  As 
mentioned earlier, Gypsies and others were also included in the genocide, howbeit, 
on a different scale to the Jews.  The Gypsies were intentionally targeted by the 
German authorities because as traditional wanderers they were viewed as non-
conformists to the German nation-state; they were also seen as ‘racially inferior’.  At 
first they were confined to camps but as the war got underway there was a mass 
murder of hundreds of thousands of Gypsies.15  Gellately states that, ‘The death-
book of the “Gypsies” in Auschwitz conveys a sense of systematic murder that looks 
and feels like genocide’.16
 
As the previously cited comments of Hitler reveal, the Polish nation was to be 
intentionally destroyed.  Poland was to be “Germanised” and stripped of Polish 
leaders, polish education, and polish culture, thus leading to a “cultural genocide”.  
They were forced to work as slaves to help the German labour shortages. Like the 
Jews under German control, the Poles who had been removed to Germany were 
forced to wear a purple “P” on all their clothes.17 There were social restrictions put 
in place for the Polish workers, and laws in place to criminalise Polish participants in 
                                                 
13 Donald L. Niewyk, ‘Holocaust: The Genocide of the Jews’, in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, 
and Israel W. Charny (eds.), Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. 2nd edn. 
(New York, London: Routledge, 2004), pp.128-129. 
14 Kelly, op cit, p.21.  
15 Gellately, op cit, p.253.  The exact number of Gypsy deaths is uncertain, figures suggest between 
100,000 and 500,000. 
16 Ibid.  
17 The Polish purple “P” was introduced before the Jewish yellow star. 
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Polish-German sexual relations.18  Debate overhung the non-Jewish Poles as they 
were traditionally assumed to be “racially inferior”.  
 
German authorities had devised a resettlement plan that although changed several 
times, included the resettlement of ten million Germans into conquered land to in the 
East.  The population within the located areas consisted of approximately 45 million 
people, with 31 million declared as “racially undesirable”, to be sent away to Siberia, 
while the rest were to remain as slaves.19  As discussed, the European Jews, 
including the Polish Jews, were gassed, shot, or worked to death.  Non-Jews in 
Poland were similarly worked to death or executed on an “individual basis”.  The 
WWII Polish death toll was six million with a fairly even split between Jews and 
non-Jews.20     
 
At the start of WWII, Germany and the Soviet Union had sided together to attack 
Poland, but soon the Soviets were also on the list of targets.  The Soviet Union had 
two factors that determined it as a target of genocide: it was a communist country, 
and it had a large population of Jews.  Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 
immediately conquering large tracts of land.  Within months, hundreds of thousands 
of Soviets were dead from mass starvation due to the Germans ‘wilful neglect or 
inability to look after them’.21  The war in the Soviet differed from in the West as the 
                                                 
18 Gellately, op cit, p.254. 
19 Ibid, pp.254-56.  The percentages of those who were to be ethnically cleansed from the area were, 
Jews - 100%, Poles – 80-85%, White Russians – 75%, White Ukrainians – 64%.   
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p.250. 
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Soviet was not a signatory state of the 1929 Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War,22 thus the war was with minimal restraints.     
 
The final group, and yet the first to be targeted by the Germans, were the mentally 
and physically disabled.  These human lives were seen as the biological enemies of 
the state with the common phrase attached to their lives as, “lives not worth living”.  
The ‘Euthanasia programme’ of disabled people began in 1939, and officially ended 
in 1941 under intense pressure from within the German public.23   The method of 
killing was to gas the ill and disabled patients in gas chambers24, taken from their 
respective institutions, and then their bodies were cremated.  Ashes were sent back to 
the families in an urn, with fake death certificates indicating arbitrary causes of death 
such as pneumonia or other illnesses.25  More than 200, 000 Germans died from the 
complicity of their very own doctors’, who were meant to be their protectors.26
 
In contrast to the Armenian genocide, the holocaust brought greater international 
rebuke with punishment promising ‘never again’. The inter-war period had seen an 
accumulation of international humanitarian and human-rights laws in which states 
could not kill civilians of other states except in cases of military necessity, but it was 
still not a crime for a government to kill the citizens of their own state. However the 
                                                 
22 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929, in International 
Committee of the Red Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents’, 2005, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/305?OpenDocument (8 March 2007). 
23 Hugh Gregory Gallagher, ‘Holocaust: The Genocide of Disabled Peoples’, in Samuel Totten, 
William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny (eds.), Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and 
Eyewitness Accounts.  2nd edn. (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), p.205. and Gellately, op cit, 
p.245. Gellately points out that the order was given in October 1939, however Hitler backdated the 
order to September, “. . . for the beginning of the “mercy killing operations”, as if the first day of the 
war represented for him a declaration of war against all Germany’s biological  “enemies”.’ 
24 This technique was later used on the Jews. 
25 Gallagher, op cit, p.210. 
26 Ibid, p.205. 
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evolution of these laws had reached a point whereby the international community 
was prepared to overrule state sovereignty and punish the perpetrators of WWII war 
crimes and atrocities.27  In October 1943, the League of Nations Union, an unofficial 
body, ‘proposed the establishment of an international criminal court whose 
jurisdiction was to encompass ‘…crimes in respect of which no national court had 
jurisdiction (e.g. crimes committed against Jews)…’.28  Although the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has only recently come into existence, the Allies did establish 
a temporary International Military Tribunal (IMT) for WWII war criminals. 
 
The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 sanctioned minor Nazi war criminals 
to be tried and punished in their State. Alternatively, major Nazi war criminals were 
to be tried under the Allies.29  Preceding this Declaration was the establishment of 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) in October of the same year, 
which was to keep records of war crimes and criminals.30 Almost two years later, the 
victorious Allies followed through with the Moscow Declaration by establishing the 
IMT under the London Agreement on 8 August 1945.31                
 
The victorious allies, at the conclusion of war, and opting for the judicial process to 
trial the heinous perpetrators of the genocide, was to bring justice not retribution.  
Falk argues that the IMT commonly known as the Nuremburg Tribunal was formed 
                                                 
27 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I 
to the 21st Century (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p.79. 
28 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.30. 
29 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.163, Although 
allegedly Winston Churchill was originally inclined to execute the Nazi criminals, he was otherwise 
dissuaded by the US.  
30 Maogoto, op cit, pp.88-89. 
31 Ratner and Abrams, loc cit. 
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because of mounting public pressure for justice, the guilty conscience of the West 
that not enough had been done to stop the war crimes, and consensus that Germany 
was not to be held collectively responsible and result in another failed Treaty of 
Versailles.32  The IMT charter outlined the ‘jurisdiction, substantive law, and 
procedural principles governing the Nuremburg Tribunal’.33  The Charter stipulated 
that Nazi criminals were to be tried under conspiracy, crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity’ for acts of genocide before or during the war.34  
 
The Nuremburg trials were held from November 20, 1945, to 1949, in Nuremburg, 
Germany.35  Twenty-four major criminals were tried in its first year, convicting 19, 
one in absentia, and serving 12 with death sentences.36   Following the Trial of 
Major War Criminals, around 200 German war crime defendants were tried.37  Those 
found guilty of intentionally participating and planning elements of the genocide 
were punished by death or time in prison.  At the trials it is important to note that 
‘genocide’ was still not an international crime.  The Charter of the Nuremburg 
Tribunal did not include ‘genocide’, however, during the trials the term was used 
expressly against the defendants during proceedings, though it was technically and 
legally still seen as a ‘crime against humanity’.  Because the international 
                                                 
32 Richard Falk, ‘Accountability for War Crimes and the Legacy of Nuremburg’, in Aleksandar Jokic, 
(ed.), War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing: A Reader (Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p.121. 
33 Ratner and Abrams, loc cit. 
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community was prepared to bring to justice the Nazi criminals in the Nuremburg 
trials, and to overstep the principle of sovereignty, the international community was 
able to create new international law for the atrocious crime of genocide: the 
Genocide Convention of 1948.  This was to do away with any future uncertainties.         
 
In conclusion, the large-scale atrocities of WWII brought about the Genocide 
Convention.  Nazi Germany, under Hitler, committed a thorough, systematic, cold-
blooded mass murder of Jews, gypsies, Poles, Slavs, the mentally and physically 
disabled, and other ‘undesirables’.  The holocaust was the epitome of genocide, the 
case most true to the word.  From the depths of arguably the greatest genocide the 
world has ever known, the international community was able to break through the 
chains of sovereignty and punish hundreds of the Nazi criminals.  There was a legacy 
borne that sought to prevent and punish future possible genocides.  Within the 
memory of the holocaust and the establishment of the Genocide Convention, the 
world implicitly hoped for ‘never again’.                  
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Chapter Five: Birth of the Genocide Convention 
 
In almost sixty years of its existence, the Convention has clearly demonstrated 
limitations and as Ratner argues ‘. . . it is long overdue for the law of genocide to 
evolve beyond its 1940s roots to more closely reflect the values and political 
landscape of [today]’.1  On the other hand though, the Genocide Convention is the 
international legal definition; therefore, it is imperative to give a thorough 
explanation of it.  This chapter discusses the significant parts of the Convention by 
looking at its literal meaning.  Included are the terms that remain in the final copy of 
the Convention, the discussion of some of its changes over the drafting period, and 
its place within international law.  This chapter is for the sole purpose of making the 
meaning of and obligations of the Genocide Convention, for the international 
community, absolutely clear.  
 
War crimes, as in crimes between combatants, had been acknowledged prior to WWI 
and WWII. International human rights law even developed in great strides in the 
inter-war period, but the issues of sovereignty prevented the laws from protecting 
citizens from their own governments.2  The Nuremburg trials were the stepping 
stone into international law to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed 
under the laws of ‘crimes against humanity’, inside and outside their own states.  The 
trials could not prosecute individuals under the crime of genocide, despite being 
unofficially referred to in the trials, as in the time it was committed it was not 
                                                 
1 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 41-43. 
2 Ibid, pp.5-6. 
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illegal.3  But Raphael Lemkin’s drive for an international convention on genocide, 
and the Nuremburg trials, laid the foundation for the Convention. 
 
The topic of genocide was discussed from the very first meetings of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), beginning in 1946.  Resolution 96(I), 
mentioned in the Convention’s preamble, proposed that the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) study the possibilities of a convention to internationally 
criminalise genocide and to ‘…assur[e] international co-operation for its prevention 
and punishment,…’.4  ECOSOC invited the Secretary-General along with a group of 
international and criminal law experts to prepare a draft convention.5  After its 
review by the UNGA, the draft was revised by the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on 
Genocide.  The draft was again given back to the UNGA where the Sixth Committee 
revised it, passed it onto a drafting sub-committee of thirteen states, and it was 
approved by the Sixth Committee.6  Finally, on 9 December 1948, the revised draft 
was unanimously adopted as the Genocide Convention, and was to enter into force 
on 12 January 1951.7  In the process of writing the final Genocide Convention, there 
were many changes and omissions from original drafts and the original resolution 
96(I). 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid, p.25, and William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne, Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.38. 
4 United Nations,  The Crime of Genocide, (UN Doc. 96 (I), 11 December 1946), pp.188-189.   
5 Ibid. 
6 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, pp.25-26. 
7 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide’. 9 December 1948. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p-genoci.htm  (5 
March 2007), Title. 
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The official title of the Genocide Convention, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’,8 establishes three things: the international 
agreement of an international law, the international community’s obligation to act if 
the crime is attempted or committed, and lastly, the specificities of the crime or 
offence, against the law, as genocide.  The two words that the international 
community is obligated to act out are, ‘prevention’ and ‘punishment’.  To prevent is 
to stop something from happening, and to punish is to penalise, or the ‘retributive 
suffering’ usually in consequence to an action.  From this, it is understood that party 
states to the convention have agreed to stop and penalise the perpetrators of the 
crime genocide, wherever it may be in the world, not excluding their own sovereign 
states.  Or at least accept the work of the international community to prevent and 
punish genocide, again, wherever it may be.  This of course applies only once a state 
committing genocide has done all it can do to stop the genocide. 
 
The preamble recognising Resolution 96(I), restates:  ‘… that genocide is a crime 
under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and 
condemned by the civilised world’,9  Here, the UN, whose aim is, among others, to 
prevent future war, to reaffirm human rights, and ‘…to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom’,10 acknowledges that genocide is the 
antithesis of these aims.  Further the international community condemns or 
disapproves of the crime.  It continues: ‘Recognizing that at all periods of history 
genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and [b]eing convinced that, in order 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, loc cit, preamble. 
10 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’. 26 June 1945. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
(5 March 2007), Preamble. 
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to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is 
required’,11  It recognises that genocide has happened in the past, but in order to stop 
it from happening again in the future, that ‘international co-operation is required’, 
meaning that it is essential that two or more states work together to stop genocide.  
Lastly, the party states agree to the genocide ‘as hereinafter provided’, thus agreeing 
to act as the convention, or international law dictates.12
 
Article I affirms that genocide is an international crime both in times of peace and 
war in which the Contracting Parties undertake to prevent and to punish.13  Schabas 
states that, ‘…the Genocide Convention, not the Nuremburg Charter, first recognised 
the idea that gross human-rights violations committed in the absence of an armed 
conflict  are nevertheless of international concern, and attract international 
prosecution’.14  So from article I we see that any genocide perpetrated at any given 
time must be prevented and punished in like manner, although the Convention does 
not state any given time limit for punishing the crime, nor does it identify appropriate 
ways of preventing genocide.  Further, these parties must ‘prevent’ and ‘punish’ 
because of the term used ‘undertake’, which is defined as, ‘put[ting] oneself under 
obligation, to take upon oneself as a task, guarantee, [or] promise’.15  Using these 
synonyms in place of ‘undertake’, show the depth of the international law.  It not 
only illegalises genocide, but it also makes it a legal requirement for the international 
                                                 
11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Preamble.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, Article 1. 
14 Schabas, op cit, p.11. 
15 Frederick C. Mish (ed.), The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster 
Inc., 1989), s.v. undertake.  
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community to prevent and punish the crime and its perpetrators, again in line with 
international rules of intervention.    
 
Article II is the keystone to the Convention as it defines genocide.  The definition 
given has been contested as discussed in chapter one, but again this definition is the 
most important because it determines the genocide cases that are punishable by law.  
And if we, the international community, are to prevent genocide in the future, we 
must work within the legal means which we have.  The convention defines genocide 
as: 
 
‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.16 
      
Starting from the beginning, genocide is an act or group of acts, but these acts must 
be accompanied by the intent to destroy the group or groups.  Ratner and Abrams 
express that, ‘… unless this intent element is present, no act, regardless of how 
                                                 
16 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 2. 
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atrocious it might be, can constitute genocide’.17  Determining the intent of genocide 
is challenging, and as Kuper argues, brings in a ‘subjective element’.18  The term 
‘intent’ was debated in the process of developing Resolution 96(I) and the 
Convention, but remained for lack of a better word.  Evidence in the past has relied 
on written and oral orders, witness testimony’s, labelling of the target group as an 
enemy, and ‘systematic and destructive pattern of behaviour’ towards the target 
group.19  
 
The writers of the Convention determined that these acts committed with the intent 
to destroy a certain group, is not restricted to the whole group, rather it is open to the 
group ‘in whole or in part’.  It is unclear just how much of a ‘part’ of a group would 
figure as genocide.  A study in 1985 suggested that ‘in part’ would need a 
‘reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a 
significant section such as its leadership’.20   
 
The groups included in the final and official Genocide Convention are limited to 
national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups.  The inclusion and elimination of 
certain groups has been a highly contested point since its formulation.  There are two 
different types of national groups.  One that is created from the nation-state – a group 
of people with different ethnicities, religions, and so forth, are bound together in a 
nation-state, thus forming a nation of people.  On the other hand, some national 
                                                 
17 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, p.33. 
18 Leo Kuper, International Action Against Genocide (Revised) (London: Minority Rights Group, 
1984), p.4. 
19 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, p.34. 
20 United Nations, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide Prepared By Mr. B. Whitaker, (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985), 
p.16, para. 29. 
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groups are created before the existence of the nation-state, united by ethnicity, 
religion, background, history, or other features.  For example, citizens of New 
Zealand, would usually deem themselves as nationally New Zealanders, whereas, the 
Kurd population in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey, would consider themselves to belong to the 
nation Kurdistan.  Ethnical and racial groups are quite similar.  Race is a hereditary 
group that one belongs to, whereas one’s ethnic group is not limited to a hereditary 
group but also includes the same language, culture, and customs.  Both groups exist 
across borders.  Finally, religious groups include all groups ‘…united by spiritual 
ideals or beliefs, whether theistic, non-theistic, or atheistic in nature’.21
 
The other side of the debate are the groups that were excluded from the final 
Convention – none more debated than political groups.  Resolution 96(I), which was 
unanimously passed, included ‘…political and other groups …’,22 however in the 
process of writing the Convention, this was dropped to appease certain parties.23  It 
was cut because the Soviets disagreed, reasoning as Kuper explains, ‘genocide was 
essentially bound up with . . . racial theories that spread national and racial hatred 
and aimed at the domination of the so-called ‘superior’ races and the extermination 
of the so-called ‘inferior’ races.24  They were also argued to be voluntary groups, 
unstable and non-permanent in nature.25  In almost 60 years, this exclusion of 
political groups has been the means of allowing the ‘murder’ of millions of ‘people’ 
                                                 
21 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, p.32. 
22 United Nations,  The Crime of Genocide, loc cit. 
23 Kuper, op cit, p.3, and Schabas, op cit, p.45. 
24 Kuper, loc cit, p.3.  Despite the Soviets position, with their history of political persecution, it can be 
argued that they would not have undermined themselves by agreeing to such an inclusion.  The 
exclusion of ‘political and other groups’ from the Convention was held partly responsible for the 
United States long delay in ratifying the Convention, which took until 1988.  Ratner and Abrams, op 
ct,  pp.32, 38.  
25 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, p.32. 
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with the intent to destroy them because of political affiliation.26  The international 
community has been at a loss to prevent and punish their gross crimes because of this 
incomplete definition.  Other groups not included are economic, professional, social, 
linguistic, and gender groups.27
 
The first act of genocide with the intent to destroy a particular group is to kill 
members of the group.  Death is the total and final destruction of a person, thus being 
the ultimate and most serious case of genocide.  The next act listed is to ‘caus[e] 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’.28  Bodily harm would 
include biological experiments, deportation, enslavement, torture, and mutilation of 
the body.  Some accounts of genocide acts have included the mutilation of bodies 
after the physical death demonstrated as the ultimate power over the life and death of 
the person and the group at large.  However the bodily harm does not have to be 
permanent.   
 
Mental harm is far more ambiguous.  Its beginnings were presented by China with 
the idea that the use of narcotics on the target group constituted an act of genocide.29  
This argument has been debated; nevertheless, mental harm was ultimately accepted 
as an act of genocide.  The idea of mental harm has evolved to include rape and 
sexual violence, ‘physical injury to the mental faculties’, fear and anxiety.30  Mental 
harm could also be the act of afflicting any of these or other acts to persuade the 
target group to believe that they the perpetrators are the stronger and greater group. 
                                                 
26 Such cases as Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Indonesia have demonstrated this point only too well.   
27 Schabas, op cit, pp.134, 145, 147. 
28 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 2.(b). 
29 Schabas, op cit, pp.159-160. 
30 Ibid, pp. 161-162. 
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Article II(c), is the act of ‘[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its total destruction in whole or in part’.31  Inclusive in this 
category are inadequate food, water, medicinal, sanitation, and clothing supplies, 
inadequate housing, excessive physical labour, and forced lack of sleep.32  These 
conditions would ultimately bring about the death of the group, if the genocide were 
to continue for long periods of time. Ultimately though, these acts would need to be 
determined as an attempt to destroy the group ‘in whole or in part’, and separated 
from the unfortunate cycle of poverty that so often afflicts certain groups of society. 
 
Acts (d) and (e) both relate to destroying the future existence of the group.  The first 
is to ‘[impose] measures intended to prevent births within a group’, and the latter is 
to ‘forcibly transfer children in the group to another group’.33  Preventing births 
within a group would include the prohibition of sexual relations and separation of the 
sexes, prohibition of marriage, sterilization, and forced abortion.34  The case of 
former Yugoslavia showed that women were kept imprisoned for the purpose of 
impregnating them with the ‘dominant’ group.35  Lastly, the transferring of children 
to another group was in the Conventions inception, seen as an act of cultural 
genocide.  It survived because the transference of children from one group to another 
would inhibit the future viability of the group.36  
 
                                                 
31 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 2(c). 
32 Schabas, op cit, p.165. 
33 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 2, (d), (e). 
34  Schabas, op cit, p.172, and Ratner and Abrams, op cit, p.29. 
35  Schabas, op cit, pp.173-174. 
36 Ibid, p.176. 
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Aside from article II(e), the acts included in the genocide definition omit cultural 
genocide.  Cultural genocide consists of prohibiting the use of language, and 
destroying cultural institutions such as ‘historical or religious monuments, museums, 
and libraries’.37 It was originally part of earlier drafts of the Convention but was later 
taken out on the premise that cultural genocide aims to destroy the culture of the 
group and not the physical group itself; the latter being of most seriousness.38  It was 
also argued that the inclusion of cultural genocide would lead to the rise of 
illegitimate cases of genocide and it could hinder legitimate cases of assimilation.  If 
it was included, there was the fear that it would deter states from joining the 
Convention.39      
 
After defining what genocide is in article II, articles III and IV state who and what is 
punishable.  Acts punishable are:  (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; 
and (e) complicity in genocide.40  Acts (b) to (d) enforce the legal right to prevent 
genocide.  Punishment for the crime goes beyond issues of sovereignty and 
immunity for heads of states.  All perpetrators of genocide are to ‘…be punished, 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private 
individuals’.41  The fact that sovereign states wilfully agreed to this particular article 
allowing sovereign leaders to be held accountable, is contrary to the ‘spirit and 
                                                 
37 Ibid, p.63. 
38 Ratner and Abrams, loc cit. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 3, (a), (b), (c), (d), (e). 
41 Ibid, Article 4. 
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ideology of sovereignty’.42  The idea behind prosecuting individuals was in response 
to the failed Treaty of Versailles that had held the state of Germany punishable.43     
    
Articles V, VI, and VII relate to enacting the Convention within the domestic laws of 
the Contracting Parties, and to provide ‘effective penalties’.44  Those charged with 
any of the acts deemed unlawful in the Convention, are to be tried by either a 
domestic or international trial.45  Extradition for those charged is to be granted only 
under the  
domestic laws of the state in concern.46  Article VIII states that ‘[a]ny Contracting 
Party may call upon the competent organs of the [UN] to take such action under the 
Charter of the [UN] as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression 
of acts of genocide…’.47  This leaves the responsibility of the initial steps of 
prevention and punishment of genocide on all states party to the Convention. 
However, under the UN Charter, the UNSC is assigned the task of dealing with 
international security issues.48   
 
The final two articles that will be discussed are IX and XV.  The first being that any 
disputes ‘relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention is 
                                                 
42  Richard Falk, ‘Accountability for War Crimes and the Legacy of Nuremburg’, in Aleksandar Jokic, 
(ed.), War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing: A Reader (Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p.120. 
43 Ibid, p.121. 
44 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 5. 
45 Ibid, Article 6. 
46 Ibid, Article 7. 
47 Ibid, Article 8. 
48 See United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, loc cit, Chapter IV, para. 12.1, 12.2, Chapter 
V, para. 24.1. 
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to be dealt with at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).49  The latter article gives 
the opportunity for Contracting Parties to ‘…request a revision of the present 
Convention at any time…’.50  The Convention was written out and closely followed 
the acts and intents of the holocaust, but the trials of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia 
have demonstrated the need of expanding the meaning of the Convention.  Having 
the opportunity to modify it to best prevent and punish future genocides is a 
necessity.   
 
The Genocide Convention can also be confusing in terms of where it is placed in 
international law.  It is closely associated with international criminal law, 
international humanity law, and international human rights law.  From the time of its 
inception, the Convention declared genocide a crime, thus it falls under the umbrella 
of international criminal law.  Therefore, perpetrators are tried under the recently set 
up International Criminal Court (ICC).  Genocide is listed first among the ‘most 
serious crimes of international concern’.51  As a ‘war crime’, despite the 
Convention’s acknowledgement of it occurring in both times of peace and war, it 
comes under crimes against humanity.   
 
Furthermore, the Convention also comes under international human rights law as ‘a 
universal instrument relating to human rights’.52  But the larger scope of 
                                                 
49 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Article 9. 
50 Ibid, Article 15. 
51 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’, 17 July 1998. http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/criminalcourt.htm (5 
March 2007), Part II, Article 5.1(a).  Other crimes which come under the jurisdiction of the ICC are, 
Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, and the Crime of Aggression.  
52 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘International Law’ 1996-
2007. http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ (5 March 2007). 
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international human rights law includes political, social, and cultural rights, so even 
though the genocide convention excludes these groups, international human rights 
law doesn’t.53  However, the list of human rights in the International Bill of Human 
Rights, is not part of international law therefore abuse of human rights evades 
punishment. Moreover, a political genocide or ‘politicide’ would continue to evade 
prevention and punishment.  Finally, genocide has also achieved the status as a 
customary international law, which some would argue allows its definition to 
broaden.54
 
Lastly, it can be argued that those who signed and ratified the Genocide Convention 
have agreed to the intervention of another state’s affairs.  The very act of preventing 
and punishing perpetrators of genocide, and the Convention acknowledges 
‘constitutionally responsible rulers’, can only be accomplished by some form of 
intervention.  Too often the UN Charter is used to defend the right of ‘non-
intervention’55; yet, if a state is committing genocide, and if they fail to prevent or 
stop it, then if they are party to the Convention they have predetermined their 
acceptance of intervention within their own state.  They have accepted the obligation 
on all party states, to prevent and punish the crime wherever and whenever it may be.  
To argue otherwise would be hypocrisy.   
 
As can be seen, the Genocide Convention is the legal agreement within the 
international community to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.  Although the 
                                                 
53 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 10 
December 1948, http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm  (5 March 2007), Article 2. 
54 Ratner and Abrams, op cit, pp.40-41. 
55 See United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, loc cit, Chapter I, Article 2.  
 45
Convention is restrictive in some ways, it the only current tool which legally allows 
countries to intervene in another countries state of affairs, through the UN, to prevent 
or stop genocide, and ultimately save lives.  Through the convention, countries are 
under obligation to not only stop genocides from occurring within their own states, 
but also to genocides outside their own states.  Ultimately though, under the current 
system of the UN, member states are to inform the UN, but the final responsibility 
rests with the UNSC.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
Genocides have been occurring throughout history, but in the last hundred years, the 
will to prevent and punish them has built momentum around the international 
community.  First the Armenian genocide gained widespread recognition garnering 
enough support to attempt a trial of the perpetrators.  Although the attempt failed, it 
had set in motion the idea that states were responsible for their own citizens’ human 
rights.  Over 20 years later the international community again attempted to bring to 
justice those responsible for the holocaust.  The Nuremburg trials were ultimately 
successful.  With the atrocities of the holocaust and the success of the Nuremburg 
Tribunal, international leaders united to create the Genocide Convention in 1948.  Its 
definition and groups that are protected under it are limited, causing much debate 
over the years.  Much of the debate holds credibility and if introduced to the 
Convention, would protect more human lives.  However in order to prevent and 
punish genocide in the future, we must work within our current means, and instead 
push for the UNSC to work according to the mandate given to them. 
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Part Two: Since Then  
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Chapter Seven: Introduction 
 
Although the Genocide Convention was passed in 1948, it was not used until the 
1990s in the tribunal cases of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.  In that time there 
were numerous genocides, acknowledged by some, unrecognised by others.  
Cambodia was one of those genocides that evaded prevention and punishment for a 
long time.  It has only been in recent years that the Khmer Rouge regime under the 
infamous Pol Pot, has finally been acknowledged and justice is currently in the 
works.  This section looks at four different genocides: Cambodia, Rwanda, former 
Yugoslavia, and Darfur, Sudan.  Each of these have elements of the UNSC 
dismissing the seriousness of the crimes perpetrated, and holding back from 
appropriately calling in the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish the 
genocides.   
 
The Cambodian genocide (1975-1979) came at a time when the world was divided 
by the Cold War, and the US had overstretched itself during the Vietnam War.  
These reasons alone explain the inaction of the UNSC.  The UN remained relatively 
silent on Cambodian matters during the Cambodian genocide; it took the Vietnam 
invasion of Cambodia to finally get a response from the UNSC.    
 
The Rwandan genocide (1994) was fast and furious, capturing the attention of the 
world.  Unfortunately, the Rwandan genocide followed too soon after the Somalian 
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conflict which again had pushed the US to its extreme.  So the Rwandan genocide 
was left unabated, even with a UN presence that had come before the genocide.   
 
There were two separate genocides over a decade in former Yugoslavia (1990s).  
The first genocide was against the Bosnian Muslims by Serbs and Croats, followed 
by the Albanians in Kosovo, again by Serbs.  The international community, like in 
Rwanda, was present from the start of the conflict, but the UN treaded carefully.  
Russia and China were cautious of intervening, thus prolonging the first genocide.  
Again both states showed their reluctance to military intervention to stop the Kosovo 
genocide, and without a unified UNSC, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) initially stepped up to the military task of ending the genocide.   
 
Finally, Darfur, Sudan is embroiled in a genocide perpetrated by Khartoum and the 
Janjaweed.  The UN and international community has been present trying to 
negotiate with the different parties.  But more needs to be done.  Again, both Russia 
and China have been unwilling to go the distance to stop the genocide.  
 
All these genocides demonstrate that a divided UNSC allows genocide to happen.  
The veto power which the five permanent members hold can be threatened or used at 
any given time under any guise.  These genocides were all affected by the power of 
veto in one way or another, whether directly or indirectly.  Unfortunately, the veto 
power controls world affairs, and despite the international law of the Genocide 
Convention, clearly overrules.              
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Chapter Eight: Cambodia 
 
In post-colonial times, Cambodia has been affected by a number of conflicts and 
their consequences.  The ultimate conflict though was the Cambodian genocide 
during the period of Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979.  Like the genocides 
previously spoken of, this one was committed by the government of the time, the 
Khmer Rouge regime under the leadership of Pol Pot.  Other similarities include 
mass deportations and identification clothing.  However, targeted groups consisted of 
ethnic, religious, political, and territorial groups, plus suspected inside traitors.  The 
confusion of targeted groups coupled with then current world affairs meant that the 
international community’s response to prevent or punish the perpetrators has only 
just come into action.  This case study demonstrates the ambiguities of the Genocide 
Convention and also the weaknesses of the UN as a political entity swayed by the 
interests of the permanent members in the UNSC. 
 
Following WWII, Indochina was placed under French administration again from its 
Japanese invaders.  Yet, in the post-war era, the world came to be known by two 
phenomena: decolonization and the Cold War.  Cambodia was first affected by 
decolonization, heavily influenced by the anti-colonialism movement by its 
neighbour Vietnam.  Cambodia won its independence in the early 1950s, but despite 
this it continued to suffer from contending political movements.1  Communists were 
                                                 
1 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), p.146. 
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heavily suppressed during the late 1950s under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leading 
them to flee into the forests.2  Two elements helped the success of the Communist 
Party: the spill over of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s uprooting hundreds of 
thousands of people, and the highly increased number of educated citizens struggling 
to find work, increased the number of those willing to join the communists.3  Despite 
a short interlude of a military coup placing General Lon Nol as the Cambodian 
leader from 1970 to 1975,4 Khmer Rouge finally took control over Cambodia on 
April 17, 1975.5  Cambodia was transformed into Democratic Kampuchea.6      
 
Within a short period of time, Khmer Rouge, following Maoist China’s ‘Great Leap 
Forward’, was attempting to rapidly and radically transform the country even at a 
faster rate of its communist fore bearers.  The goal was to level the class system, 
introduce a state-planned economy without foreign influence, and focus on ‘… 
clear[ing] forests, build[ing] irrigation systems, and vastly increasing the rice crop 
yield’.7  Furthermore, they sought to clean the social system and create a ‘fully 
independent socially and ethnically homogenous Cambodia’.8  Thus the regime 
created a multiplicity of target groups leaving some citizens unwanted from the state 
for more than one reason.   
 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p.147. 
3 Ibid, pp.147-148. 
4 Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and 
Israel W. Charny Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. 2nd edn. (New 
York, London: Routledge, 2004), p.341. 
5 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, (UN Doc. A/53/850: S/1999/231, 
16 March 1999), Annex: Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established Pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 52/135,  p.7, para.9. 
6 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, pp.347-349. 
7 Weitz, op cit, p. 152. 
8 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, op cit, p.8, para.15. 
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The first action of the genocide was that of the forced evacuation of the capital 
Phnom Penh under the invented threat of the American bombing of the city.  Around 
two million were forced out with little respect to age or health.9  Hospital patients 
dragged out onto the streets were left to die, while thousands of others on the journey 
died due to lack of food, water, and medicinal supplies.10  The forced population 
movements were used to break down the middle and upper class system, a strong 
feature of urban areas. It trimmed away at the foreign presence and influence,11 and 
it disseminated the then split families into categorised groups to work on communal 
state-backed agriculture and infrastructure projects.  Phnom Penh served as the most 
dramatic example of forced population movements, but it was to become only one of 
many.  
 
The Group of Experts attribute the forced labour coupled with the inhumane living 
conditions as the ‘single largest source of deaths’ of the genocide.12  Seven days a 
week, the population was forced to work on these state projects working long hours 
with insufficient food.  The population faced ‘starvation, disease, and physical 
exhaustion, caused by overwork and inadequate food, medicine, and sanitation’.13  In 
addition, the Khmer Rouge overseers regularly killed thousands who struggled to 
keep up with the workload, often killing victims’ families as well.14    
 
                                                 
9 Ibid, p.10, para.20. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Forcing the foreign presence out of the country allowed the regime to carry out its genocide without 
threat of intervention.  The international community, for some time was left uncertain of the true 
nature of the crime.    
12 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, loc cit, para.23. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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The Khmer Rouge’s initial enemy targets to be killed off were former soldiers, 
police, and other officials from Lon Nol’s leadership.15  Not only were opposing 
political enemies targeted, but Khmer Rouge also cleansed itself from within 
intentionally purging Cambodian communists who had been trained in Hanoi, 
Vietnam.16  Similarly, those who had been educated in foreign states, aside from Pol 
Pot’s elite French-educated group who led Khmer Rouge, were also marked.  To 
create a unified, communist state, based on principles of a communal lifestyle 
directed from the state, meant that there could be no political or military opposition, 
no classes, no ethnic groups or religious groups, and incredibly, even the nucleus 
family was broken apart.  This gave the Cambodian people only one loyalty and one 
family: the state.  
 
The evacuation of Phnom Penh and other major cities and towns created the first 
distinguished national targeted groups of ordinary Khmer17 citizens and other ethnic 
groups.  Citizens from urban areas were labelled as ‘new citizens’, a threat because 
they were seen as being educated and westernised.  Citizens from rural towns, 
particularly from previously controlled Khmer Rouge areas of control, were then 
labelled as ‘old citizens’ and ‘… were regarded as true Khmer’.18  In time, ‘new 
citizens’ were afforded opportunities to progress as ‘deportees’, ‘candidates’, and 
                                                 
15 Edward Kissi, ‘Genocide in Cambodia and Ethopia’, in Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds.), 
The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p.311. 
16 Years earlier, the Cambodian, Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) had broken away from the 
Indochina Communist Party because of the Vietnamese domination. 
17 According to the Group of Experts report, including the Khmer Rouge’s own national group the 
Khmer as a protected group by the Genocide Convention, is a complex issue.  See United Nations, 
Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, op cit, p.20, para.65.   
18 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 233. 
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finally ‘full rights citizens’, although this position was not static.19  This was all part 
of the cleansing and re-education process to distinguish the willing from the 
unwilling in the new regime.  Moreover, their re-education included ‘… participation 
in mass meetings at which they listened to lectures and recounted their 
autobiographies for criticism’.20   
 
Behind the targeting of ethnic groups was the Khmer Rouge view of its past 
medieval Khmer glory.  Under colonial times the French had viewed the Khmer 
people as morally superior, ‘a sort of Aryan race amongst Asians’21, on the other 
hand, the Vietnamese were seen as an industrious people, and were thus sought after 
by the French.  In 1975 the Vietnamese population in Cambodia totalled 20,000, and 
by 1979 the Vietnamese population had been completely obliterated.22  The 
Vietnamese were in traditional terms, the biggest ethnic threat to a pure Khmer 
regime.  Even before the period of Democratic Kampuchea they had also been the 
targets of forced removal and massacres.23  Throughout the genocide, the Khmer 
Rouge government routinely made attacks on the Vietnam border.     
 
The Chinese and Muslim Cham, which along with the Vietnamese constituted the 
three largest ethnic minority groups in Cambodia in 1975, were also eliminated in 
large numbers.  Chinese citizens, as urban dwellers, were targets, as Kiernan argues, 
not because of their race but rather because of the conditions and work duties given 
                                                 
19 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.347, and Weitz, op cit, p.160. 
20 Weitz, loc cit. 
21 Ibid, p.164. 
22 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.348. 
23 Ibid, p.345. 
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to ‘new citizens’.24  From an original ethnic Chinese population of 430,000, it is 
estimated that approximately 50 percent were eliminated.25  The Muslim Cham, an 
ethnic group with a ‘distinct religion, language, and culture’ were attacked first 
through their associated symbols and customs being disallowed and destroyed, such 
as the Koran.26  Their strong communities were broken up and any rebellions were 
severely put down by Khmer Rouge troops.  The Muslim Cham 1975 population 
figured around 250,000, but was whittled down to 90,000 by 1979.27  Other minor 
ethnic groups included Thai with 8,000 from an original 20,000 perished, Lao with 
4,000 from 10,000, and Kola whose original 2,000 population was completely 
eliminated.28
 
Alongside the Muslim Cham, which is also considered a religious group, the regime 
sought to eradicate Buddhism, the most influential religion in Cambodia.  The 
Buddhist monks suffered severely from the orders of Pol Pot that monks were to be 
defrocked and disbanded, ‘… the most important to fight.  They had to be wiped 
out…’.29  Kiernan suggests that out of Cambodia’s 70,000 monks, less than 2,000 
survived.30 Aside from killing off the monkhood, they also destroyed temples and 
other religious sites and symbols. By 1977 there were no monasteries or monks; 
Buddhism had effectively been eliminated in a year.31 The Group of Experts 
                                                 
24 Ibid, pp. 345-6. 
25 Ibid, p.348. 
26 Ibid, p.346. 
27 Ibid, p.348. 
28 Ibid, pp.346, 348. 
29 Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and the Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge, 1975-79. 2nd edn. (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp.55,57. Quote taken 
from Heng Samrin 
30 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.344.  Taken from statistics that show 
that from 2,680 monks from eight monasteries, only 70 survived. 
31 Ibid, p.345. 
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affirmed that the Buddhist monkhood qualified as genocide of a religious group with 
evidence clearly demonstrating the Khmer Rouge’s intent to destroy them.32  
 
Finally in 1978, towards the end of the regime, the campaign of terror increased.  
The Eastern Zone bordering Vietnam, where conditions had fared reasonably well in 
the regime, was attacked by Khmer Rouge troops.  There were large scale 
deportations to the northwest with citizens subjected to wearing blue scarfs to 
distinguish them.  More horrific were the massacres that took place in the Eastern 
Zone and which continued with the easterners as they made their journey.33  Mistrust 
was also abounding within Khmer Rouge itself.  Tuol Sleng, the infamous prison in 
Phnom Penh, dealt with the torture and executions of former Khmer Rouge 
officials.34  According to Weitz, almost ‘… one-third of the original cabinet 
members of Democratic Kampuchea’ lost their lives in the purges.35
 
Different estimates have been given numbering the lives lost during the Cambodian 
genocide.  The UN gives an estimate of one million36; the Group of Experts state 
one-fifth of the population died;37 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) give three million;38  scholar Ben Kiernan suggests the 
commonly accepted 1.5 million39; whilst others like Edward Kissi and Patrick 
                                                 
32 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, loc cit, paras. 63, 64. 
33 Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.347, and Weitz, op cit, p.168. 
34 Weitz, loc cit.  
35 Ibid, pp.168-169. 
36 United Nations: Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995 
(New York: United Nations, 1995), p.63 
37 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, op cit, p.5, para. 1.1. 
38 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Introduction to the ECCC: Summary’, 26 
February 2007. http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/about_eccc.aspx  (5 March 2007).  
39 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.349. 
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Heuveline suggest 1.7 – 2 million40 and 1.17 – 3.42 million41 respectively.  The 
population prior to 1975 figures around 7.9 million.42  Lives were intently lost by 
large scale massacres and individual executions based on unfavourable 
autobiographies, failing to follow orders, or any other ‘suspicious’ reasons. 
Heuveline argues that one-third to over two-thirds of the total number of deaths ‘… 
were the result of direct violence…’.43  Other causes include disease, starvation and 
malnutrition, and death caused by the conditions of deportations and harsh labour 
conditions.44     
 
Norodom Sihanouk, former Prince of Cambodia, under house-arrest during the 
genocide, stated that the Khmer Rouge downfall was in their ‘superiority 
complex’.45 In January 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge 
government was forced into exile.  The genocide was brought to an end.  Where had 
been the international community during the genocide?  Some argue that the secrecy 
that shrouded the Khmer Rouge, trapping Cambodians within its borders, and sealing 
Cambodia off to the world, initially hid the genocide.46 By 1978, international 
awareness of the genocide was growing.  A Canadian official described the Khmer 
Rouge’s actions as: ‘systematically violat[ing] the fundamental human rights of its 
                                                 
40 Kissi, op cit, p.307. 
41 Patrick Heuveline in Weitz, op cit, p.186. 
42 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.348, and Weitz, op cit, p.186. 
43 Patrick Heuveline in Weitz, loc cit. 
44 Ibid, p.165. 
45 Prince Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980), p.85. 
46 Despite the secrecy within Democratic Kampuchea, the US administration was wary of the Khmer 
Rouge from when it took power.  US President Gerald Ford’s Administration had intelligence of a 
‘bloodbath’ occurring.  But as is discussed further, the Vietnam War had left the administration with 
no credibility.  Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New 
York: Basic Books, 2002), p.108.   
 58
citizens in that the repression and the killings are continuing’.47  US Senator 
McGovern went further to call it ‘flagrant genocide’ and suggested international 
intervention.48  On 21 April 1978, US President Jimmy Carter made an official 
White House statement using the term ‘genocide’.  He said:  
 
‘America cannot shirk in its duty to condemn the Cambodian Government … 
thousands of refugees from Cambodia accused their own Government of 
destroying hundreds of thousands of inhabitants as a result of the policy of 
genocide…we support international protests against the policy of this 
inhuman regime’.49     
 
Yet despite acknowledging the actions of the Khmer Rouge as genocide, nothing 
from the international community, bar Vietnam, was done to stop it.   
 
The Cold War can be blamed for the inaction of the UNSC, but this does not excuse 
it as the UNSC wasn’t inept at taking action towards other states.  The UNSC issued 
a total of 76 resolutions throughout the genocide mainly on matters concerning the 
Middle East, Africa and new membership; not one resolution concerned Cambodia.50  
The state was so politically overloaded that it cancelled out any action being taken.  
Three of the permanent members, the US, USSR, and China had been heavily 
                                                 
47 Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Jamieson, as quoted in United Nations, 
Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th Meeting, (UN 
Doc. S/PV.2108 (OR), 11 January 1979), p.15, para.152.  
48 William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience 
(London: André Deutsch, 1984), p.68. 
49  As quoted in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-third Session, 
Plenary Meetings, 9th Meeting, loc cit, para.153. 
50 See United Nations, Security Council: Resolutions. 2007. http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm 
(30 April 2007), for the full list of UNSC resolutions from 1975 – 1979.  
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involved in the Indochina region for the past decade.  The US had fought hard to 
“save” Vietnam from the spread of communism.  Vietnams’ war effort was 
supported by the Soviets.  Back in 1975 when Khmer Rouge first took control of 
Cambodia, Vietnamese Communists also took control of Saigon, Vietnam, driving 
the US out.  US policy of the time although unfavourable of Khmer Rouge itself, 
allowed the independence of Cambodia due to Cambodia’s stance of resisting 
Vietnam.51  Also the US was still suffering from anti-war sentiment with public 
opinion opposed to further intervention in the region.52  The US omission to act 
against the leaders of Khmer Rouge, in a sense provided support for the regime and 
possible US complicity.  On the other hand, Stanton argues that the UN was 
‘paralysed by the likelihood of [UNSC] vetoes by the communist powers … the 
Soviet Union and … China’.53         
 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early 1979 was not the desired intervention 
by the majority of the international community.  Vietnam argued it was an attack of 
self-defence, but it was also an attack that backed the new leadership of Cambodian, 
even Khmer Rouge dissidents.54  The genocide under the Khmer Rouge was over, 
but not without controversy.  On 15 January 1979, the UNSC voted on a draft 
                                                 
51 It is important to note that at this point the US was still to ratify the Genocide Convention. 
52 US media was rapidly shying away from stories of conflict and communism in Indochina.  Reports 
of the genocide were also not taken too seriously as they were seen as ‘unconfirmed reports’ from 
refugees, who had fled.  The Khmer Rouge’s response was to these reports were to claim they were 
criminals.  Scholars such as well known Noam Chomsky, challenged government intelligence and 
media reports as faulty and pretext to a US invasion.  See Power, op cit, pp.108-113.   
53 Gregory H. Stanton, ‘The Cambodian Genocide in International Law’, in Ben Kiernan (ed.), 
Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International 
Community (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993), p.155.  The intricacies of 
these three states concerning the Indochina region are: The US and USSR fought a proxy war against 
each other in Vietnam prior to Democratic Kampuchea, the US failed in its objective and 
consequently left the region.  The Khmer Rouge was opposed to the Vietnamese communists thus 
sought guidance from China.  The Sino-Soviet relationship was at that stage strained.      
54 Known as the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, headed by Heng Samrin. 
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resolution that called upon the “foreign forces” of Cambodia to withdraw.55  Further 
it reaffirmed principles of “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence”, and “non-interference” for all states.56  Finally Cambodian politics 
firmly entered the debates of the UNSC in which the Council was prepared to make a 
stand.   
 
Of the permanent members, the most vocal were the Soviets and China, both with 
diametrically opposing views.  The Soviet representative in the UNSC described the 
Khmer Rouge as a “criminal regime” who committed “monstrous crimes” against 
their own people.57  The Soviet Union took the stance to veto the draft resolution, 
unwilling to protect the repressive regime that had committed genocide, and declared 
the Khmer Rouge as no longer the legitimate government.58  On the other hand, the 
Chinese representative called the Soviet’s views as “despicable”, “preposterous”, and 
accused the USSR and Vietnam of trying to provide a “puppet organisation” as the 
new government of Cambodia.59  He even went as far as comparing the Vietnamese 
tactics to Nazi Germany during WWII, ‘[t]he only difference is that it is even more 
flagrant and ignominious than Hitler’.60  China was clearly strongly opposed to any 
action against the Khmer Rouge.  As a permanent member, such a strong opinion 
backed by great power such as the veto power is a threat to victims of genocide, for 
it can be the means of preventing necessary actions to stop genocide.   
                                                 
55 United Nations, Draft Resolution/ Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria and 
Zambia, (UN Doc. S/13027, 15 January 1979), p.1, para.2. 
56 Ibid, paras.1,3. 
57 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 
9th Meeting, op cit, pp.4, 14, paras.41, 146. 
58 Ibid, p.15, para.149.  Soviet representative stated that 2-3 million Cambodians had died.  However, 
it can also be observed that in was in the Soviet’s best interest to support Vietnam. 
59 Ibid, p.4, para.46; p.5 para.50. 
60 Ibid, p.10, para.100. 
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The US representative was the last permanent member of the UNSC to comment on 
the issue.  The US response was far more restrained stating that Khmer Rouge was 
legitimate inasmuch as the UNGA recognised them as such.  Further the 
representative stated that, ‘[r]egardless of what we think about the situation in 
Democratic Kampuchea [and I doubt whether the Council is prepared to make any 
judgements about what is going on] …We make no judgements one way or the 
other’.61   
 
Representatives from Cambodia62 and Vietnam were also permitted to speak.  Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian representative at that particular meeting falsely 
reported of Cambodia’s “economic upswing” and abundant agriculture that enticed 
the Vietnamese to invade.63  He also quoted statements from representatives from 
the US, Japan, Kuwait, Sweden, Colombia, and Australia, who all rebuked the 
Vietnam invasion.64  Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s comments were supported by the 
Chinese representative.65  Finally the Vietnamese representative, Mr Ha Van Lau 
defended his country by referring to the attacks on the Vietnamese border which had 
occurred during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.66  Speaking of the genocide 
he described the state of Cambodia as a ‘living hell’, thus the oppression had brought 
                                                 
61 Ibid, p.6, para.59. 
62 The Soviet’s wanted the UNSC to allow the new Cambodian government to speak, however the 
motion was denied. 
63 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 
9th Meeting, op cit, p.7, para.77. 
64 Ibid, pp.8-9, para.88. 
65 Ibid, p.10, para.97. 
66 Ibid, p.12, para.116. 
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about a struggle from within.67  Lastly, he claimed that the change had come at the 
delight of Cambodians.68    
 
Of course any attack upon another state is a cause for legitimate concern.  But in this 
particular case whereby the Khmer Rouge government had so appallingly treated 
their citizens to the extent that genocide had occurred, it is surprising that the 
majority of the members in the UNSC were more than willing to continue backing 
them as the legitimate government of Cambodia.  There is no doubt that members of 
the UNSC could have responded much better to the situation in 1979 then it did. The 
response was, and is so significant in terms of genocide prevention.  Those states that 
backed the Khmer Rouge fought on the grounds of its sovereign right of non-
intervention.  But the reality was that genocide had taken place under the Khmer 
Rouge regime which is also a matter of international concern and which the UNSC is 
primarily responsible for preventing and punishing if the state fails to take action to 
stop it.  The debate then becomes an issue between state sovereignty versus 
individual human rights. Both the Vietnam and the UNSC erred according to 
international law.  In a sense the UNSC was condoning the genocide and were 
prepared to forgo their responsibility according to the Genocide Convention.  
 
 Unfortunately, the international community would continue to support the Khmer 
Rouge leaders for over a decade.  They were internationally acknowledged as the 
only legitimate Cambodian government; moreover, they represented Cambodia in 
                                                 
67 Ibid, p.13, paras.130-132. 
68 Ibid, p.13, para.134. 
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the UN until 1992.69  Furthermore, trials for Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in 1979 by the 
newly established People’s Republic of Kampuchea, found both the accused guilty 
of genocide, despite both being absent from the trials.  However, the trials fell short 
of being taken seriously within the international community with the Group of 
Experts report describing the response at the time as mere show trials with no regard 
for due process.  Further, the outside forces within the international community that 
kept the Khmer Rouge in the UN also ensured that no action was taken against the 
Khmer Rouge.70    
 
Throughout the 1980s the UN continued to put pressure on the Vietnamese to 
withdraw.  Furthermore, the UN accused Vietnam of genocide within Cambodia.71  
British journalist William Shawcross, who was first agreeable to these claims, later 
revoked them as Western propaganda against Vietnam.72  He also claimed that ‘for 
the overwhelming majority of the Cambodian people the invasion meant freedom’.73  
During the mid-1980s, a small number of international organizations started to take 
                                                 
69 Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.350. 
70 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
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given that highlighted food shortages, but were clear to affirm that there was no famine. See pp.370-
373.     
73 Ibid, p.78. 
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the focus off the Vietnamese invasion calling for the investigation of crimes during 
Democratic Kampuchea.74   
 
After a decade of talks in Cambodia between the different factions75 supported by 
the UN, Vietnam finally withdrew in 1989 under the Paris Peace Agreements.76  The 
UN’s first mission in Cambodia was to run free elections in May 1993 under the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).77  It was now ‘the 
duty of the international community to prevent the recurrence of genocide in 
Cambodia’.78  Despite the growing public and political attention to make restitution 
with Cambodia, Pol Pot and his followers were still safely hidden in the outskirts of 
Cambodia.  The international community did not seek to bring him or others to 
justice.  The Khmer Rouge, which had maintained control of parts of Cambodia 
throughout the Vietnam occupation, was free to stand in the elections, although they 
eventually boycotted the elections and proved a disturbance in the lead up to the 
elections, putting fear into the Cambodians citizens, and killed both Vietnamese and 
UN peacekeepers.79      
 
The successful election was far from punishing the Khmer Rouge leaders and other 
perpetrators of the genocide.  The international community, now in open agreement 
of the genocide, advised the new Cambodian government that they would back any 
                                                 
74 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, pp.350-1. 
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76 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, loc cit, para.40. 
77 Ibid, para.41. 
78 UN Subcommission on Human Rights, 1991, cited in Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-
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attempts of justice only if Cambodia chose to go down that path.80  At first, the new 
coalition government outlawed Khmer Rouge on 7 July 1994,81 but finally on 21 
June 1997, Cambodia submitted a request for UN assistance for the trials of the 
Khmer Rouge acknowledging the assistance which the UN had provided for Rwanda 
and former Yugoslavia.82  Over twenty years had passed since the beginning of the 
Khmer Rouge regime. 
 
A Group of Experts was formed by the request of then Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan.  The Group of Experts found that Khmer Rouge had committed genocide, 
crimes against humanity, forced labour, torture, and crimes against internationally 
protected persons.83  The Cambodian and Thailand governments agreed to 
apprehend the criminals in their territory for the purpose of trials.  They 
recommended a completely international trial in March 199984; however the 
Cambodian government desired an international-assisted Cambodian trial.85  The 
disagreements between the UN and the Cambodian government concerning the 
national-international balance of the trials, and different factors of the draft law led 
the UN to withdraw from negotiations January 22, 2002.  It took until January 2003 
for negotiations to resume after much persuasion and support from the Human 
                                                 
80 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide – 1975-1979’, op cit, p.352. 
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85 Ibid, p.2, and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Chronology of Establishment of 
ECCC: Chronology from 1997-2005’. 26 February 2007. 
http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/backgroundECCC.aspx  (5 March 2007).    
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Rights Commission, Japan, France, and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), with the approval of the UNGA.86   
 
On 6 June 2003, the Agreement that established the trials was approved by both 
parties, the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia.87  Effectively called the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), it is a ‘hybrid’ court 
that is part of the Cambodian court system but uses both Cambodian and 
international law.88  The Cambodian government fought for the ‘hybrid’ court 
instead of the international tribunals of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, due to the 
need for national reconciliation and justice within Cambodia.89  The Group of 
Experts report found that although it would be desirable for trials to be held in 
Cambodia, felt that Cambodia’s legal foundation was too shaky. There was a lack of 
trained judges, lawyers, and investigators, and even amongst the trained, it was hard 
to find personnel without prejudice. And the culture lacked respect for due process, 
to actually have it there.  They had suggested a city and state within the Asia-Pacific 
region to maintain its significance in Cambodia.90  However, the Agreement 
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was conditional in that Cambodia had the responsibility for the trials with the help of the UN or 
otherwise, and that it needed to ensure international standards of justice.  
87 ‘Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Court of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea.’ 6 June 2003.  
http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf  (31 
January 2007). 
88 United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, ‘UNAKRT Mission and Scope’ 30 January 
2007. http://www.unakrt-online.org/01_home.htm  (31 January 2007). 
89 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Introduction to the ECCC: Summary’, 26 
February 2007. http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/about_eccc.aspx  (5 March 2007).  
90 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, op cit, pp.35-37 
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provided Cambodia with the UN assistance it needed to help meet international 
standards of justice within its own country.   
 
Since 2003 to the present time (May 2007), Cambodia, the UN, and the international 
community have been negotiating the costs of such trials, facility use, selecting and 
training international and Cambodian judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, and agreeing 
on international standards for the trials.91  Finally, in 2007, the ECCC is set to begin 
its first trials which are expected to last for three years.92  Its mandate under the 
Agreement is to try senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those most 
responsible for serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international 
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognised by 
Cambodia. 93  In particular, its jurisdiction includes genocide as defined in the 
Genocide Convention 1948, crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court 1998, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and other crimes in Chapter II of the law on the Establishment of the 
ECCC, 10 August 2001.94
 
Pol Pot died in 1998 thus escaping any international punishment for committing the 
international crime of genocide.  Ieng Sary, his deputy, was given a formal pardon in 
                                                 
91 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Chronology of Establishment of ECCC: 
Chronology from 1997-2005’, loc cit, and ‘Highlights’. 26 February 2007. 
http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/news.list.aspx  (5 March 2007). 
92 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘View FAQ: Why Has it Taken So Long?’ (26 
February 2007).  http://www.eccc.gov/kh/english/faq.list.aspx  (5 March 2007). 
93 ‘Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Court of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea.’, op cit, p.1, preamble. 
94 Ibid, pp.7-8, Articles 9, 12.1. 
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1996 for the sentence he was served in 1979.95  It is up to the ECCC to determine the 
status of the pardon, deciding if he is able to be tried for genocide again.96  Limiting 
the number of persons to stand accused is in respect of maintaining peace in 
Cambodian civil society. Too large a number of persons to be tried under the ECCC 
could get out of hand and disrupt the lives of many of those less responsible who 
have integrated back into Cambodian society.97  Further, it is also limited to the 
crimes during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.  Although there was 
other significant conflicts in Cambodia and amongst neighbouring states, before and 
after Democratic Kampuchea, focusing in on the genocide highlights its importance 
in magnitude of international crimes.98      
 
In respect for intervention, the Cambodian genocide came after the Genocide 
Convention.  Cambodia was party to the Convention,99 thus they understood that all 
signatory countries had the obligation to prevent or punish those responsible of 
perpetrating genocide.  Effectively, Cambodia opened itself up to international 
intervention if it did commit genocide.100  The UNSC had the ultimate responsibility 
to secure peace and security, but the political tension between the permanent member 
                                                 
95 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Royal Decree (Reach Kreat), 14 September 
1996, Phnom Penh’. 2007. 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/legislation/2/pardon_for_Ieng_Sary.pdf  (30 April 2007), 
Cambodia, Ieng Sary Pardon,  (Doc. NS/RKT/0996/72), p.1, Article 1. 
96 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘View FAQ: Why Has it Taken So Long?’, loc 
cit. 
97 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, op cit, pp.31, para.103. 
98 ‘Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Court of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea.’, loc cit. 
99 Although Cambodia became party to the Genocide Convention prior to the Khmer Rouge gaining 
power, all succeeding governments in Cambodia since the time that the Convention was signed and 
ratified were and are still required to uphold the Convention. 
100 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, loc cit, Title, Articles 1,4, and United Nations, ‘Charter of the 
United Nations’, loc cit, Chapters IV, V. 
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states overrode their obligation.  How is it possible that the international law to 
prevent and punish genocide was ignored by the powers-that-be?  Obviously the 
ultimate veto power of the UNSC permanent members is greater than its own good. 
 
Almost 30 years have passed since the end of the Cambodian genocide, 
unfortunately the Cambodia and the world still wait for the trials of those still alive 
from Khmer Rouge during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.  The world stood 
by as over a million Cambodians died from the policies of their own government.  
Overshadowed by other world events, the Cold War, Cambodia was betwixt and 
between the main powers thanks to its communist ideology and strained relationship 
with Vietnam.  The Cambodian genocide was a tragedy, and yet like the Armenian 
genocide, the wounds are still raw due to the lack of international action that 
persisted for over 20 years.    
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Chapter Nine: Rwanda 
 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide depicted the clearest case of genocide since the 
holocaust.  Over the short course of 100 days, between April and July, 800,000 men, 
women and children were slaughtered.  The UN had been aware of the impending 
genocide in Rwanda before it happened, and there was strong international 
consensus of its nature throughout its duration.  Both the UN Secretariat and the 
power of veto can be blamed for the omission of prevention and the initial delayed 
punishment of the genocide.  In the aftermath the Security Council determined the 
acts as genocide and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was 
organised for the punishment and justice of the genocide perpetrators.   
 
Historically, the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis can be directly linked to 
Rwanda’s colonial period.  From 1897, Germany and then Belgium administered 
over Rwanda.  Both Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language, culture, clan names, 
and customs.1 However, following common theories of the time on race, the 
colonizers, particularly the Belgians, favoured the taller and slimmer features of the 
Tutsi.  Theories were raised that placed the “superior” Tutsis as being conquers from 
Ethiopia or Egypt, nation-states closer to Europe.2  In truth, the Tutsi dominated 
leadership positions including the monarchy in pre-colonial times, nevertheless, 
Melson argues that the colonizers ‘… accelerated the process and gave it a racist 
                                                 
1 René Lemarchand, ’The Rwanda Genocide’, in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. 
Charny, Century of Genocide. 2nd edn, (Ney York, London: Routlegde, 2004), p.396. 
2 Robert Melson, ’Modern Genocide in Rwanda: Ideology, Revolution, War, and Mass Murder in an 
African State’, in  Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.327. 
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edge’.3  From the arrival of the colonizers, Tutsi were absorbed into a life of 
privilege and the idea of their superiority.  
 
Trapped in a cycle of subordination, it is clear the Hutus resented the Tutsi.  But 
following WWII, a new generation of colonial administrators and Catholic Church 
leaders sought to rectify the blatant inequality between the two groups, and to 
establish a system of democracy.  The momentum for the repealing of Hutu 
injustices led to the violent Hutu uprising in 1959, in which they gained control of 
the state.  By 1962, Rwanda was granted full independence.4  Between the 1959 
Uprising and 1994 genocide, Tutsis were the target of continual violence and 
oppression with masses of the population fleeing to neighbouring states.  In 1973, 
Jouvenal Habyarima, the army’s chief of staff, staged a coup inserting himself as the 
president of Rwanda, which brought further persecution for the Tutsi.5  Following an 
economic crisis in the 1980s, and bowing to international pressure, Habyarima 
announced political liberal changes to appease Tutsi, but this was ‘too little, too 
late’.6          
 
On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), based in Uganda and 
dominated by Rwandan Tutsi refugees and posterity, invaded Rwanda.7  
Unfortunately their attacks garnered the reprisal of deadly attacks on hundreds of 
Tutsis, and the RPF was forced back to the borderline.  During this time, the large 
scale mass-media propaganda campaign against the Tutsi began.  Lists of targeted 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid, p.331. 
5 Ibid, p.332, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice 
from World War I to the 21st Century (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p.180. 
6 Melson, op cit, p.333. 
7 Ibid. 
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individuals circulated, containing both Tutsi and moderate Hutu.  In 1990 radical 
Hutu espoused the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu”, to segregate the two ethnic 
groups.8  Hutu politicians were also reported to make such statements as ‘We have to 
act. Wipe [the Tutsi] all out’.9  The propaganda mixed with the already existent 
ethnic tensions, made ready the conditions for the genocide.   
 
In the ensuing years leading up to the genocide, the government of Rwanda and the 
RPF met in a series of talks to establish peace.  However, numerous agreed 
ceasefires were violated which eventually led to UN involvement.  In June 1993, 
both parties requested a force for overall security.  On 4 August 1993, the Arusha 
Peace Agreement set up the Neutral International Force (NIF).10  By October, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a peacekeeping force of 
2,548, was set up under Resolution 872 (1993) to monitor the Arusha Accords and 
the security situation for the upcoming elections.11  UNAMIR was poorly resourced 
with second-hand vehicles from UNTAC with less than a third of the 300 usable, and 
inadequate medical supplies.12  Despite the UN presence, tensions and conflict 
between the two ethnic groups continued and plans of the Tutsis extermination were 
designed.  On 6 April 1994, President Habyarima’s plane was shot down after 
returning from peace talks with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania.  Both he and the 
                                                 
8 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002), pp.338-9. 
9 Ibid, p.340. 
10 United Nations. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda. (UN Doc. S/1999/1257. 16 December 1999), p. 6. 
11 United Nations. Resolution 872 (1993). (UN Doc. S/RES/872 (1993). 5 October 1993).  Major 
General Dallaire, the UN Commander of the peacekeeping forces in Rwanda had initially asked for 
5,000 but was forced to reduce that number due to the US’s reluctance to be involved in another 
peacekeeping mission. Power, op cit, pp.340-1. 
12 Ibid, pp342-343. 
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President of Burundi who was accompanying him died.  This event signalled the 
beginning of the genocide.           
 
The genocide was fairly simple in comparison with the Cambodian case; there was 
really only one target, the Tutsi and any Hutu who sympathised with them.  However 
the list of perpetrators is bewildering.  The genocide was committed by militia, 
armed forces, and most alarmingly, civilians.  It began in Kigali as a “very well-
planned, organised, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror initiated principally 
by the Presidential Guard’ with ethnicity as one of the elements of the killings.13   It 
soon spread everywhere. The mass media, especially radio, was used effectively to 
“inform” citizens of current affairs.  The propaganda on Radio stations like 
government-backed Radio Milles Collines, accused all Tutsi as being against Hutu, 
claiming they were trying to empower themselves again.  The radio propaganda also 
invented Tutsi attacks on Hutu, encouraging Hutu to get the Tutsi before they the 
Tutsi got them.  Aside from the strong participation of the Rwandan army and Hutu 
militia, ordinary civilians turned against their neighbours, church congregations, and 
even family members.  Tens of thousands of ordinary citizens used ‘…machetes, 
clubs, hoes, or other farming implements…’.14  Different reasons have been given as 
to why so many of the general public became so cruelly involved, some conclusions 
are that they were following authoritative directives, even that given by the radio 
stations; and the historical misconceived ideas of Tutsi.15  Reasoning aside, the 
Rwandan genocide stands out for two reasons, its speed, and the participants.    
                                                 
13 Major-General Dallaire in ibid, p.349. 
14 Melson, p.334. 
15 Ibid.  As explained by Liisa Malkki, Tutsi were foreign invaders intent on controlling the Hutu and 
stealing their land.  
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Eight months before the genocide, on 11 August 1993, the Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions reported of 
massacres,16 death threats and “political assassinations”,17 and the sudden renewal of 
the death penalty to hundreds of prisoners18 attributed to human rights violations.  
The perpetrators were acknowledged as being the Rwandese Army Forces (FAR)19, 
local government officials, other government officials, political party militias, 
clandestine or “death squads”, private individuals, the RPF, as well as the lack of the 
rule of law, and the media propaganda.  Finally the Special Rapporteur ‘… 
question[ed] whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide’, and 
continued by saying, ‘It is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgement at this 
stage, …Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide on 15 April 1975’.  Futhermore, Article II of the Convention 
is quoted followed by,  
 
‘The cases of inter-communal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur 
attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their 
membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason.’20
     
                                                 
16 United Nations, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/ADD.1, 
11 August 1993), Addendum: Report by Mr. B. W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his Mission to 
Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, p.10, para.28. 
17 Ibid, para.29. 
18 Ibid, para.30. 
19 FAR had been through a rapid campaign process since October 1990 increasing the forces from 5, 
000 to 40,000.  The new recruits had been under trained causing further problems. See ibid, p.11, 
paras.33-36. 
20 Ibid, p.22, para.79. 
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The report clearly highlighted the impending genocide by describing the acts, target 
group (which conformed with the Genocide Convention), and the intent.   
 
The on-going conflict increasingly became a matter of concern for the UNSC.  
Resolution 846 (1993) on 22 June 1993, established the United Nations Observer 
Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) to ‘…monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to 
verify that no military assistance reache[d] Rwanda,…’.21  In addition, the above 
mentioned UNAMIR was established on 5 October 1993;22 and UNAMIR was 
provided an early deployment of the second battalion on 6 January 1994.23  Despite 
this, plans for far more vicious, systematic, and widespread massacres continued 
unabated.  Further the UNSC was determined that UN support for Rwanda was 
dependent on Rwanda’s contributions for establishing peace and security, and their 
implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.24   
 
Again, on 11 January 1994, under Canadian Major General Dallaire, Commander of 
UNAMIR, informed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN 
headquarters in New York, that he had been: ‘…put in contact with informant by 
very very [sic] important government politician.  Informant is a top level trainer in 
the cadre of interhamwe – armed militia of MRND’.25  The coded cable detailed how 
the aims of the MRND were to provoke RPF to start a civil war, provoke the Belgian 
                                                 
21 United Nations, Resolution 846 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/846 (1993), 22 June 1993), p.2, para.3. 
22 United Nations, Resolution 872 (1993), loc cit. 
23 United Nations, Resolution 893 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/893 (1994), 6 January 1994), p.1, para.1. 
24 For the official UNSC view see ibid, p.2, para.3.  For examples of comments by member states see 
United Nations, Security Council, 49th Year: 3326th Meeting, Thursday 6 January 1994, New York 
(UN Doc. S/PV.3326, 6 January 1994), p.11, (Mr. Merimee, France), and United Nations, Security 
Council, 49th Year: 3358th Meeting, Tuesday 5 April 1994, New York (UN Doc. S/PV.3358, 5 April 
1994), p.6 (Mr. Merimee, France, and Mr. Inderfurth the US). 
25 Dore Gold, Tower of Babel: How the United Nations has Fuelled Global Chaos (New York: Crown 
Forum, 2004), pp.240-1, para. 1. 
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troops to withdraw, assassinate deputies.26  The informant also confirmed a direct 
link between the chief of staff RGF and president of MRND for financial and 
material support.27  More directly concerning an intended genocide, the cable 
continues: ‘…Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in 
Kigali.  He suspects it is for their extermination.  Example he gave was that in 20 
minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 [sic] Tutsis’.28   
 
Both the report and cable detailed above gave the UN the information needed to plan 
a prevention strategy to the genocide.  On the contrary however, Dallaire was 
ordered not to take action in investigating the matter further but to take the 
information to the US, French, and Belgian embassies.  Any action taken would go 
beyond the mandate given to UNAMIR.29  The orders were given from within the 
secretariat not the UNSC; the different sources of information detailing the 
beginnings of the genocide were not shared between the separate UN agencies 
highlighting the poor communication between the Secretariat and UNSC.  The 
collective reports given prior to the genocide clearly show what was to follow, 
unfortunately the pieces of the puzzle were pieced together too late. The 
consequences as we know it were dire, nearly a million people died. The US was, as 
stated before, reluctant to get involved due to failing peacekeeping missions in 
Somalia and Bosnia.  But there was also the hope that the peace process would 
prevail.   Prevention to the stop the “crime of all crimes” was overruled by the US’s 
                                                 
26 Ibid, para. 2. 
27 Ibid, para.4. 
28 Ibid, para.6. 
29 Ibid, p.139. 
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fear of intervention attempting to stay away from the ‘Mogadishu line’ and remain 
neutral.   
 
In mid-February, the UNSC issued a statement asserting that the UNSC was 
concerned by the delays in Rwanda in establishing a transitional government 
according to the Arusha Peace Agreement.30  It stated that these delays were having 
adverse effects to the humanitarian situation in Rwanda.31  On the 5 April 1994, the 
day prior to President Habyarima’s death, the UNSC, by a unanimous vote, decided 
to limit the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate, as a response to the lack of progress in 
Rwanda.32   
 
As of 6 April 1994, Rwanda experienced the crime of all crimes – genocide.  On 7 
April, the UNSC was quick to release a statement of their disturbance of the tragic 
deaths of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda.33  It also acknowledged that, ‘there 
[had] been considerable loss of lives, including the deaths of Government leaders, 
many civilians and at least ten Belgian peace-keepers as well as the reported 
kidnapping of others’.34  However such recognition of the escalating violence did not 
necessarily mean that the UNSC or individual member states sought ways to swiftly 
stop the violence.  The US continued to be unwilling to act as the genocide played 
out.  First, the Clinton Administration was unwilling to term the events as genocide 
on the basis that once it was termed as such, adequate action would need to be 
                                                 
30 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/8, 17 
February 1994), p.1. 
31 Ibid.  
32 United Nations, Resolution 909 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/909 (1994), 5 April 1994). 
33 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/16, 7 
April 1994), p.1. 
34 Ibid. 
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taken.35  Britain supported this view.36  Thus the UNSC was stalled in any attempts 
to action the Genocide Convention due to the powers of two permanent member 
states.  Further, after Belgian soldier casualties, the Belgians withdrew from 
UNAMIR with the support of the US who called for a full UN withdrawal.37  
Instead, the force was reduced to a minimum level to 503 before the end of April, 
233 more then the UNSC had decided.38  In conjunction with this reduction, 
UNAMIR’s role was also adjusted to ‘…act as an intermediary between the parties 
to help establish an agreement’, and to assist in humanitarian operations.39  The 
Belgians and the UN were playing right into the heart of the Hutu desires.    
 
One week on from Resolution 912 (1994), the UNSC again released a statement that 
defined the massacres in Rwanda as “systematic” and ‘…in areas under the control 
of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of 
Rwanda’.40  It also made reference to the fact that killing members of an ethnic 
group with the intention of destroying in whole or in part was a crime under 
international law.41  It also recognised that the possibility of the conflict spilling over 
into other neighbouring States was a big threat.42  The UNSC had enough 
information (and willingly stated this information), to strengthen its involvement to 
stop the genocide, nevertheless UNAMIR would continue to struggle for some time.   
 
                                                 
35 Power, op cit, pp.359-361. 
36 Ibid, p.361. 
37 Ibid, p.367. 
38 Ibid, p.369. 
39 United Nations, Resolution 912 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994), p.2, para.8 
(a),(b). 
40 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/21, 30 
April 1994), p.1.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Dallaire pushed for more help from the UN requesting an additional 5,000 troops, 
and a new mandate, transitioning it from peacekeeping (Chapter VI) to peace 
enforcement (Chapter VII).43  In the middle of May, the US finally agreed to a 
version of Dallaire’s proposal.  Resolution 918 (1994) provided UNAMIR with up to 
5,500 troops; it accepted that the troops could take action for self-defence, defence of 
humanitarian relief, or at risk civilians; and the resolution also placed an arms 
embargo in Rwanda.44  But troops from other countries were not forthcoming, whilst 
the US was busy arguing the costs of equipping and maintaining such a force.  It 
took until July for the 50 armoured personnel carriers to arrive in Rwanda.  
Meanwhile, France took the initiative to set up a “safe zone” in the southwest45 until 
UNAMIR II arrived.46  But it was neither the French, nor UN who stopped the 
genocide, but rather the RPF.  The RPF seized all but the French zone, and on 19 
July the ‘RPF government of national unity was sworn in’.47  Hutu fled into 
                                                 
43 Power, op cit, pp.377-378. 
44 United Nations, Resolution 918 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994), pp.3, 
paras.4,5; p.4, para.13.  The resolution provided an interesting statement from the Rwandan 
representative, Mr. Bicamumpka.  In his comments he stated that the international community had the 
Rwandan conflict all wrong in which he then blamed the Tutsi and RPF for the current situation.  He 
argued that the Tutsi had dominated the Hutu for four centuries and were trying to disrupt Rwanda’s 
democracy and regain power.  He questioned whether the atrocities were animal instinct or the 
instinct to survive.  Further he claimed that the interim Government was trying to pursue a cease-fire 
and was using the radio as a tool to broadcast peace.  Although he agreed with enlarging UNAMIR 
(for the purpose of stopping RPF), he voted against Section B of Resolution 918 (1994) in favour of 
an arms embargo on Uganda instead.  The New Zealand representative, Mr. Keating, followed by Sir 
David Hannay from Britain remarked on their regret for comments made by the Rwandan 
representative, particularly because his “interim Government” did not represent a legitimate State, and 
the “shameful distortion of the truth.”  See United Nations, Security Council, 49th Year: 3377th 
Meeting, Monday 16 May 1994, New York, (UN Doc. S/PV.3377, 16 May 1994), pp.2-6, 11-12. 
45 United Nations, Resolution 929 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994).  “Operation 
Turquoise” was only ever intended to be an interim solution which needed to be completely neutral to 
avoid worsening the situation or undermining UNAMIR’s position.  Its goal was purely humanitarian 
and was to cover all costs for the operation.  However the risks meant that Brazil, China, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan abstained from voting.  See United Nations, Security Council, 49th 
Year: 3392nd Meeting, Wednesday 22 June 1994, New York, (UN Doc. S/PV.3392, 22 June 1994). 
46 UNAMIR had been expanded under Resolution 925 (1994).  United Nations, Resolution 925 
(1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/925 (1994), 8 June 1994). 
47 Power, op cit, p.380. 
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neighbouring states at an alarming rate, estimated to be around 2 million.48  Finally 
the Clinton Administration provided the aid needed in the region, albeit in the form 
of humanitarian relief and not peacekeeping.       
 
Had the veto not been in existence for cases such as genocide, then the US and to a 
lesser extent, the British, could not have withheld the UN from intervening sooner in 
the Rwandan genocide.  It has been argued that if Dallaire had been given the 
number of troops requested, tens, even hundreds of thousands could have been 
saved.49  Throughout it all Rwanda had sat on the UNSC as a non-permanent 
member, their position remained unchallenged.  The 1999 Independent Inquiry for 
the UN states that ‘[t]he international community did not prevent the genocide, nor 
did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun’.50  It attributes the failure of the 
UN in preventing the genocide to:  
 
‘…a lack of resources and political commitment … [and] … a persistent lack 
of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness 
… affect[ing] … the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the 
Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the 
necessary troops for [UNAMIR].  Finally, although UNAMIR suffered from 
a chronic lack of resources and political priority, it must also be said that 
                                                 
48 Madeline H. Morris, ‘ Justice in the Wake of Genocide: Rwanda’, in Belinda Cooper, (ed.), War 
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serious mistakes were made with those resources which were at the disposal 
of the United Nations.’51    
 
The UN’s failure was demonstrated through the lack of military and political 
intervention.  Aside from the obvious military weaknesses, top level political 
discussions with Rwandan leaders were not entered into, and media propaganda 
continued unabated despite considerable condemnation by the UNSC and its 
members. 
  
In September 1994, the new government of Rwanda requested the UN to establish an 
international tribunal to prosecute criminals for the crime of genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.  The UNSC was finally able to agree that the Rwandan 
conflict had indeed been genocide, meeting the criteria of the Genocide Convention.  
Following a report by a Commission of Experts on the genocide, on 8 November 
1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was mandated by the 
UNSC to bring justice to the afflicted country.52  The Rwandan representative voted 
against UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), and China abstained from voting.53   
 
Although Rwanda still wanted an international tribunal, they disagreed with seven 
points. Firstly they wanted the tribunal to cover crimes from before 1994 seeing that 
plans, actions and acknowledgements of genocide had occurred prior to 1994.54  
Secondly the composition and structure was inadequate particularly in that it was to 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 United Nations, Resolution 955 (1994), (UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1996), 8 November 1994). 
53 United Nations. Security Council, 49th Year: 3453rd Meeting, Tuesday 8 November 1994, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.3453, 8 November 1994).  China abstained due to the dissatisfaction of Rwanda.  In 
order for ICTR to be successful it needed the full support of Rwanda. p.11. 
54 Ibid, p.14. 
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share the Appeals Chamber and Prosecutor with the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal 
(ICTY).55  Thirdly genocide was not given priority amongst the international crimes 
which the ICTR was to prosecute, therefore punishing those who committed crimes 
of genocide could be neglected.56  Fourth, there were other countries present who 
had been involved in Rwanda’s civil war; Rwanda did not want them to be allowed 
to propose their own candidates for judges.57  Fifth, those persons who were found 
guilty of crimes under the ICTR could be imprisoned outside Rwanda.  This meant 
that Rwanda lost the power to decide in what to do with the detainees.  Further there 
could be the risk of some countries allowing impunity by letting prisoners go free.58  
Six, the Statute didn’t allow for capital punishment.  Capital Punishment is allowed 
under Rwanda’s Penal code, which meant that those most responsible for crimes of 
international humanitarian law could under the ICTR only receive a maximum of life 
imprisonment whereas those less responsible would be seen to by the domestic 
courts and thus could receive the death penalty, creating a disparity between the 
two.59  Finally, for the sake of national reconciliation and justice, Rwanda wanted 
ICTR to be seated in Rwanda and felt that the Statute was too hesitant on the 
matter.60  
 
Under article II, ICTR was given power to prosecute crime of genocide according to 
the crimes and acts of genocide established in the Genocide Convention.61  The 
                                                 
55 Ibid, p.15. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, pp.15-16. 
59 Ibid, p.16.  Capital punishment was omitted from the Statute partly due to the movement to 
eliminate the death penalty internationally, and to ensure acceptance by the different members of the 
UNSC.  See comments from New Zealand (Mr. Keating), p.5, and the US (Mrs. Albright), p.17.   
60 Ibid.  
61 United Nations, Resolution 955 (1994), op cit, Annex: pp.3-4, Article 2, paras.1-3. 
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ICTR also dealt with gross violations of Crimes Against Humanity, and Violations of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II.62  
All individuals, whether Government leaders or subordinates, the committer of the 
crime, or as a superior knowing of such crimes and having failed to prevent and 
punish the perpetrators, could be prosecuted under the ICTR.63  The tribunal’s 
jurisdiction was to prosecute the above mentioned crimes within the time period of 1 
January to 31 December 1994, and to all persons committing the crimes within the 
territory of Rwanda, or Rwandan citizens committing these same crimes in the 
neighbouring States.64  As previously mentioned, the ICTR was to share the 
Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber with ICTY.65  And lastly, the ultimate penalty was 
limited to imprisonment.66            
 
Like the Cambodian tribunal, the ICTR took time to set up.  The first accused was 
brought to Arusha, where the ICTR was established, in May 1996.  The first trial 
began in January 1997.  Accused persons consisted of government and local leaders, 
interhamwe leaders, military personnel, journalists67, church leaders, doctors, 
businessmen, even a singer.  Two of the most important cases were: Jean Kambanda, 
former Prime Minister of Rwanda; and Jean-Paul Akeyesu.  Kambanda was the first 
head of state to be convicted of genocide; he was also the first to give a guilty plea 
                                                 
62 Ibid, Annex: pp.4-5, Articles 3-4. 
63 Ibid, Annex: pp.5-6, Article 6, paras. 1-4.  
64 Ibid, Annex: p.6, Article 7. 
65 Ibid, Annex: p.9, Article 12 para.2; Article 15, para.3. 
66 Ibid, Annex: p.13, Article 23. 
67 Including journalists and other media personnel distinguished between freedom of expression and 
the promotion of ethnic hatred. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘The Tribunal at a 
Glance’, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm  (6 March 2007), para. 8. 
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for the crime.68  The case for Akeyesu who was convicted of committing and 
publicly inciting genocide,69 helped to give greater definition for the Genocide 
Convention.70  In general the ICTR helped to establish that: ‘rape and sexual 
violence may constitute genocide in the same way as any other act of serious bodily 
or mental harm as long as such acts were committed with the intent to destroy a 
particular group targeted as such’.71    
 
Prosecuting the large number of accused persons has been costly and timely, thus the 
UNSC requested all investigations by 2004, all trials by 2008, and all appeals by 
2010.  The ICTR has had to establish procedures to speed up the trials, and to focus 
solely on the most responsible leaders.  By 2008, the ICTR should have completed 
trials for 65-70 persons.72  Despite the logistical difficulties which the ICTR has 
faced, internationally punishing the crime of genocide has been fairly successful.    
 
The Rwandan genocide was the clearest case of genocide since the holocaust.  It fit 
the definition of the Genocide Convention perfectly.  Yet international intervention 
to prevent or halt the genocide was not forthcoming due to the lack of political will 
by individual member states that possessed the power to determine Rwanda’s fate.  
The thousands of lives who were killed, were sacrificed because in the eyes of some 
                                                 
68 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Achievements of the ICTR’, 
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm  (16 May 2007). 
69 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Jean-Paul 
Akayesu (Case No. ICTR. 96-4-T, 2 October 1998)’, 1998, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm  (16 May 
2007). 
70 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Achievements of the ICTR’, loc cit. 
71 Ibid. 
72 United Nations. Letter Dated 29 May 2006 from the President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring 
States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994 Addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
(S/2006/358, 1 June 2006), p.2. 
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states, the US in particular, the UN was overstretched in peacekeeping and the 
failures it was experiencing in those missions severely reduced their will to be 
involved in yet another operation.  Had genocide been classed as an international 
crime above the rights of the permanent members’ individual decisions, tens of 
thousands of lives could have been saved.  It is a case whereby the Genocide 
Convention was overruled by the political will of individual member states.  The 
international community must be held responsible for the lack of action in the 
Rwandan genocide, but most of all, the incalculable power of veto given to the 
individual permanent member states of the UNSC.   
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Chapter Ten: Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) 
 
Since WWII, Europe, despite the ever hanging threat from the Cold War, had 
escaped the present perils of war.  But in the communists’ demise throughout 
Europe, the tensions that followed were never greater than that in the Balkans.  
During the 1990s there were two genocides within the war zone of former 
Yugoslavia: Bosnia followed by Kosovo.  The links between the two were the Serbs, 
and more particularly their leader, Slobodan Milosevic, although Croatia also played 
its part in the genocide of Bosnian Muslims.  The conflict went for a period of almost 
a decade; far too long for the acts of genocide that were committed.  The veto and 
further threats of using the veto were used.  On the other hand, the UN was able to 
set up a tribunal similar to that of the ICTR.  From beginning to end the international 
community had a huge role to play in the genocide of former Yugoslavia.  In contrast 
to Rwanda, former Yugoslavia maintained stronger international political will and 
attention needed for action against the genocide, despite its length.  But the necessity 
of NATO to intervene in Kosovo without a UNSC mandate reveals again the need to 
exclude the power of veto for certain crimes such as genocide.       
 
The most recent conflict in the Balkans can be seen as an outburst of historical 
tensions.  The area, ethnically diverse, has also been contested for centuries between 
Roman Catholic powers, the Muslim Ottoman Empire, and the Orthodox Church.  
Prior to WWI it was termed the ‘powder keg’ of Europe. And it lived up to its name, 
providing the location for the start of WWI.  After the war, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were united as one state, 
 87
Yugoslavia.1  Later in WWII, a key historical event occurred when a Croatian group 
called the Ustase sought to eliminate Serbs in Croatia and Serbia; Serbian Chetniks 
were guilty of the targeting Croatians in the same way.2  Still, after the war, the 
states of Yugoslavia were again united under the communist leadership of Josip Broz 
Tito.  Tito’s strong rule was devoted to the unity of the diverse federal state.  
However, there were always differences, most noticeably between the stronger states 
within Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, as each state vied for power and dominance.   
 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
Yugoslavia started to unravel with the passing of Tito in 1980.  By 1991, both 
Slovenia and then Croatia declared their independence from the federation.  
Slovenia’s territorial position in the north was far enough removed from the rest of 
Yugoslavia that its transition to independence was fairly peaceful, with only 10 days 
of conflict and less than 50 deaths.3  In Croatia, on the other hand, there were clashes 
between Croats and ethnic Serbs who represented 12 percent of the population.4  The 
Serbs feared their new status and position in a Croatian republic, and there were also 
feelings of resentment that Slovenia and Croatia had chosen to breakaway from the 
federation.  Serbian leader Milosevic, who had climbed into power in the late 1980s, 
                                                 
1 Since its formation as one state, it has been known under different titles, however, for consistency 
and brevity, I have chosen to refer to it solely as Yugoslavia. 
2 Jacques Semelin, ‘Analysis of a Mass Crime: Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Robert 
Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.358. 
3 Martin Mennecke and Eric Markusen, ‘Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Samuel Totten, 
William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, Century of Genocide. 2nd edn, (New York, London: 
Routlegde, 2004), p.416. 
4 Ibid. 
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strongly advocated nationalism, particularly the idea of the Greater Serbia.5  The 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and government, dominated by Serbs, supported and 
armed the Serbs in Croatia.6  On 25 September 1991, the UN responded by imposing 
an arms embargo on all states of former Yugoslavia.7    
 
The conflict in Croatia killed approximately 10,000 people8 and displaced 700,0009; 
it lasted seven months.  Tactics used in the conflict included destruction of towns and 
cities, civilian massacres, and the then newly-phrased ‘ethnic cleansing’.  Despite the 
Serbs obvious intent to hold onto areas with Serbian populations, Bosnia-
Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, supported by Croatia, Slovenia, and the 
international community.10  It was hoped that by Bosnians independence being 
acknowledged internationally, it would deter the Serbs from further fighting the state 
and those that backed it.  But the timing couldn’t have been worse with the Serbs 
prepared to take the fighting all the way.  Bosnia was ethnically divided into three 
main groups: Croatians (17%), Serbians (31%), and Bosnian Muslims (44%).11  
Residents, who had once classified themselves as Yugoslavs, were compelled to re-
identify themselves into one of the three groups.12  The Muslims were especially 
                                                 
5 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to 
the 21st Century (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p.146. 
6 Ibid and Mennecke and Markusen, loc cit. 
7 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 713 (1991), (UN Doc. S/RES/ 713 (1991), 25 
September 1991), p.43, para.6. 
8 Mennecke and Markusen, loc cit.. 
9 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002), p.247. 
10 Independence to Bosnia was given after an independent referendum in which 99.4 of voters chose 
independence.  Nevertheless, the majority of Bosnian Serbs had boycotted the referendum. Power, p. 
248.  
11 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th 
edn, (New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore, Madrid, 
Mexico City, Munich, Paris, Cape Town, Hong Kong, Montreal: Longman, 2003), p.152. 
12 Ibid, p.151. 
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vulnerable with no protective states nearby.  The heightened intensity of another 
republic, even Serbia’s neighbour, transformed the war into genocide. 
 
The two Serbs of the Bosnian presidency followed the independence by declaring 
part of Bosnia as a separate Bosnian Serb state.  Again the JNA alongside Bosnian 
Serb forces transformed themselves into the Bosnian Serb Army with around 80,000 
troops and enough arsenal and army vehicles to match.13  The arms embargo was 
still in place leaving non-Serbs practically defenceless.14  Within days of Bosnia’s 
independence, the Bosnian Serb Army executed non-Serbs from pre-determined lists 
and destroyed non-Serb cultural and religious sites.  The primary aim of the Serbs 
was to “ethnically cleanse” the Serb areas of all non-Serbs.  
 
Contrary to public perception, Serbians were not the sole perpetrators of the ethnic 
cleansing and genocide campaign that existed in Bosnia, although they perpetrated 
the majority of the crimes.15  The conflict occurred between all three Bosnian 
groups, plus ‘…regular army and paramilitary troops from Croatia and Serbia, 
mercenaries, [UN] troops, and NATO soldiers’.16  However, the Bosnian Muslims 
were the ethnic cleansing target of both Croats and Serbs.  Methods of the 
genocide17 included massacres and executions on civilians, political leaders, 
intellectuals, and other professionals.  There were cases of different sides 
                                                 
13 Power, op cit, p.249. 
14 Limiting the arms embargo to just the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 
to Bosnian-Serb controlled areas in Bosnia was discussed within the Security Council on several 
occasions.  The Croatian and Bosnian representatives felt that such a move was justified as a measure 
of self-defence.  But the issue was far too controversial to be seriously considered.  
15 Mennecke and Markusen, op cit, p.417. 
16 Ibid, p.416. 
17 See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ‘“Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia” (IT-
02-54)’, 2007, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/cis/smilosevic/cis-slobodanmilosevic.pdf  (23 April 
2007), Slobodan Milosevic, pp.1-2. 
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withholding humanitarian supplies from whole villages and towns.  Inhumane 
detention camps were maintained by Bosnian Serbs.  There occurred mass-forced 
population transfers.  Systematic rape was used to impregnate women, mostly 
Muslim, as a tool of over-bearance over one’s ethnic group.18  Schabas asserts that 
sexual violence, if used to afflict serious bodily and mental harm, and/or to prevent 
the births within a group, fall within the context of the Genocide Convention 
constituting it as an act of genocide.19  Men were forced to castrate each other, and 
family members were forced to rape their own family members.20  As each group 
seized disputed territory villages, towns, and cities were obliterated, removing by 
force any remaining local residents.  UN troops were also held hostage.21  The 
torture, inhumanity, degradation, and killings were deceptively slow, unlike the gas 
chambers of the holocaust, but the intent was the same.            
 
The UNSC progressively became more involved in the conflict, although not 
speedily enough to curb the conflict.  In February 1992 the UNSC established the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).22  Their initial mandate was ‘…to 
create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall 
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis’.23  As the conflict continued their mandate was 
expanded and the force size was increased.  By the end of May 1992, the UNSC 
                                                 
18 United Nations, Letter Dated 93/02/09 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, (UN Doc. S/25274 (1993), 10 February 1993), Annex I. Interim Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992).  
19 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.164-5, 172-3. 
20 Peter Maas, ‘The Prison Camps’,in Henny H. Kim (ed). War Crimes.  (San Diego, California: 
Greenhaven Press, 2000), pp.101-111. 
21 Nye, op cit, p.152. 
22 United Nations, Resolution 743 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/743 (1992), 21 February 1992), p.9, 
para.2. 
23 Ibid, para.5.  UNPROFOR was given the right to use force while acting in self-defense under 
resolution 836.  See United Nations, Resolution 836 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/836), 4 June 1993), p.3, 
para.9.    
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imposed further restrictions on the former Yugoslavia, including economic 
sanctions; trade embargoes; sport, science, technical, and cultural participation and 
exchanges; and transport restrictions.24   
 
After months of debate, in 1993 the UNSC assigned the capital Sarajevo and other 
Muslim areas including Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac, within Serb-
controlled territory, as safe areas to be protected by the UNPROFOR for thousands 
of refugees.25  Shawcross highlights the fatal flaws of the safe areas: ‘Resolution 824 
made no mention of disarming the populations of the safe areas’ and as Kofi 
Annan26 stated that UNPROFOR had ‘“resource limitations” and only intended it to 
deploy some twenty to thirty soldiers to each town “as a symbol of the United 
Nation’s commitment to the well-being of its inhabitants.  The idea would not be to 
protect the town but to raise the political price for any aggression”’.27  Not only that, 
but the Serbs controlled the access of necessary supplies getting through into the safe 
areas.28  
 
Despite great media and public attention, Bosnia was not adequately dealt with by 
the international community.  Preceding the UN’s involvement was the European 
Community’s (EC) inability to resolve the conflict.  It took a year for the UN to get 
involved.29  Then the EC and UN were split between mediation and peacekeeping 
                                                 
24 United Nations, Resolution 757 (1992), (UN Doc. S/RES/757 (1992), 30 May 1992).  
25 United Nations, Resolution 819 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/819 (1993), 16 April 1993), p.2, para.1, 
and United Nations, Resolution 824 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/824 (1993), 6 May 1993), p.2, para.3.   
26 Kofi Annan was at this stage head of the UN’s peacekeeping department.  
27 William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless 
Conflict (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p.81. 
28 Mennecke and Markusen, op cit, p.419. 
29 In UNSC meetings in February 1994, as the US and Russia were stepping up their participation in 
the conflict, Sir David Hannay, the UK representative in the UNSC, remarked on the stronger role the 
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respectively.  The UNSC produced countless resolutions including those previously 
mentioned, and in addition the prohibition of crude oil, petroleum, coal, iron, steel, 
rubber, tyres, and land and air vehicles, including their motors; the involvement of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); the establishment of the Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF); and the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY), among 
others.30  Furthermore, the international community sought regular negotiations with 
the different factions. In January 1993, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which 
essentially divided Bosnia on ethnic lines, and sought for immediate cessation of 
hostilities, was rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament.   But despite the constant 
efforts of the international community, the ground troops were never much more 
than a peacekeeping force.  Air strikes from NATO which had been authorised by 
the UNSC were the only credible force to stop the conflict.31 But its air strikes did 
not credit an immediate end to hostilities.    
 
Within the UNSC permanent member states, the US, China and Russia were the 
weak links.  However, once the US overcame its reluctance to get involved, it 
became zealously involved through NATO.  On the other hand though, China was 
concerned that the UNSC was increasingly overstepping its duties.  It was also wary 
                                                                                                                                          
UN was finally playing.  He also welcomed the involvement of the US and Russia.  Mr. Sacirbey 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, also commented on the lateness of the wider international community 
involvement.  He said that the ‘lack of response forced Bosnia and Herzegovina to resign to the to 
their abandonment by the Western Powers’ and continued that ‘late is better than never and a little is 
preferable to nothing when human lives are directly at stake.’ See United Nations, Security 
Council,49th Year: 3336th Meeting, Monday 14 February 1994, New York, (UN Doc. S/PV.3336, 14 
February 1994), pp.8-10, 26.  
30 United Nations, Resolution 787 (1992), (UN Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), 16 November 1992), p.3, 
para.9. United Nations, Resolution 836 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/836 (1993), 4 June 1993), p.3, 
para.10. United Nations, Resolution 998(1995), (UN Doc. S/RES/998 (1995), 16 June 1995), p.3, 
para.9, and United Nations, Resolution 827 (1993), (UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993), p.2, 
para.2.  
31 The limited force that UNPROFOR were allowed to exert, NATO’s air strikes, and the RRF, were 
controversial within the UNSC.  
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of the use of force and the UNSC invoking Chapter VII of the United Charters.32  
Russia and then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had agreed that the 
conflict was an internal matter, demonstrating the high chance of the Soviet to veto 
any intervention.33  Although, like the US, Russia too became involved in the 
conflict as it became to play a strong part in the negotiations.  But both Russia and 
China continue to abstain from numerous resolutions, and Russia vetoed draft 
resolution S/1994/1358, which criticized the blocking of humanitarian assistance, 
and reinforced previous sanctions.34  Russia argued that because of the increasing 
cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), such a resolution could 
be devastating to the peace process, thus they vetoed.35   
 
Towards the end of the conflict, as NATO increased its air striking campaign, Russia 
called an emergency UNSC meeting on 8 September 1995.36  Russia felt that NATO 
and the RRF were undermining negotiating efforts, exceeded their mandate, and 
were no longer neutral.  It was also concerned over procedures that allowed the 
bombing to continue.37  Russia and China would remain the hardest member States 
to convince of the need for strong action to end the genocides in the Balkans.   
 
The fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 was one of the most notable massacres in the 
course of genocide.  The UN effort was failing and individual states were reluctant to 
                                                 
32 See for example, United Nations, Security Council 49th Year: 3367th Meeting, Thursday 21 April 
1994, New York, (UN Doc. S/PV.3367, 21 April 1994), p.55. 
33 Maogoto, op cit, p.147.  
34 United Nations, Security Council 49th Year:3475th Meeting,  Friday 2 December 1994, New York. 
(S/PV.3475, 2 December 1994). 
35 Ibid, p.9.  
36 United Nations, Security Council, 50th Year: 3575th Meeting, Friday 8 September 1995, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.3575, 8 September 1995),p.2. 
37 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
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provide additional troops and arms, leaving the Serbs with the upper-hand. From 
July 13 to 19, around seven thousand Muslim boys and men inside Srebrenica were 
taken by bus to execution sites where they were shot dead by Bosnian Serbs.38  To 
add insult to injury, Srebrenica was then protected by a contingent of Dutch UN 
troops who were politically and physically unable to stop the Serbs.  A further failure 
of the UN occurred two months after the fall of Srebrenica, and constituted the 
largest act of genocide in the conflict.  Croatian forces retook Serb-controlled areas; 
with Croatia ‘… [l]ooting and burning tens of thousands of Serbian homes and 
killing civilians, the Croatian units forced more than 150,000 Croatian Serbs to flee 
their ancestral homelands …’.39         
 
In November 1995, the war finally came to an end with the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Accords by Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, in which they all agreed to ‘fully 
respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, 
and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other 
State’.40  The end had physically been achieved by the intervention of NATO, who 
since 1994 had staged air attacks.  These attacks, however, lasted consistently for 
three weeks from 30 August 1995, directly onto the Serb military.41  Sixty thousand 
NATO peacekeepers, under the Implementation Force (IFOR) were to keep the 
peace according to the Dayton Peace Accords.  Throughout the course of the conflict 
and subsequent genocide which lasted for more than three years, around 250,000 
                                                 
38 Mennecke and Markusen, loc cit. 
39 Ibid, p.416. 
40 The Avalon Project, ’Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia  
and Herzegovina’, (1998),  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/bosnia/day01.htm  (8 March 
2007), Article 1. 
41 Power, op cit, p.440. 
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people died.42  Maogoto argues that the UN’s ‘…principle of non-intervention-
delayed and weakened the initial response’.43  Certainly, the Bosnian genocide and 
war had outlived the Rwandan genocide. 
 
The UNSC, since 1993, established the ICTY under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
as suggested by the commission of experts, which was to end the crimes and bring 
justice to those responsible.44  An international tribunal was deemed to be the most 
desirable justice system due to the then current nature of former Yugoslavia.  
Maogoto also argues that by establishing the ICTY, ‘the Security Council hoped to 
deflect criticism for its reluctance to take more decisive action to stop the bloodshed 
in former Yugoslavia.45  The mandate given was for all breaches of humanitarian 
law since 1991. Genocide was included under article IV of its statute.46  The ICTY 
was established in The Hague.   
 
However, the tribunal faced many challenges in its early stages.  It was the first of its 
kind since Nuremburg, and with the conflict still in action, took time to set up.  
Harder still was gaining recognition and cooperation from the states of former 
Yugoslavia and the international community.  Gaining sufficient funds and staff was 
a struggle.  The ICTY prosecutor took office on 15 August 1994. The first 
indictment occurred on 4 November 1994, with the winning custody of accused 
                                                 
42 Semelin, op cit, p.361. 
43 Maogoto, loc cit. 
44 Establishing the tribunal was an achievement within the UNSC as not all members, including 
permanent members, were in initial agreement with the idea of having a international tribunal. Also, it 
crossed over the limits of state sovereignty.  When the Commission of Experts was prematurely 
terminated on 30 April 1993, it has been argued that members of the UNSC regretted the 
Commissions’ findings.  
45 Maogoto, op cit, p.144. 
46 United Nations. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993). (S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993). 
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persons following in an extremely slow manner.47  NATO was given the mandate to 
apprehend war criminals, but there was reluctance by many troops to do so.  Hence 
there were few prosecutions at the beginning.48  The first arrest came in June 1997 
by UN peacekeepers in Croatia.49  This act helped to boost arrests. 
 
As the ICTY continued to struggle, the message to the Serbs was that the UN and 
international community were too soft to effectively stop their nationalistic plans.  
Serbian leader Milosevic continued to enjoy his position, as the international 
community remained aloof about prosecuting top leaders.  It was feared that 
prosecuting top leaders could dissolve the peace process.  Milosevic, within his own 
state, however, was losing the popularity that he had earlier enjoyed.  Aside from 
other corrupt tactics which he employed to stay in power, pushing for ethnic 
cleansing in the province Kosovo was his most extreme.   
 
KOSOVO 
 
Serbs considered Kosovo as historically significant to their ideology.  Despite the 1.7 
million Albanians who constituted 90 percent of the population, the republic of 
Serbia maintained it as its own province.50  The Kosovo-Serbian population had 
been in decline since the 1960s, with 200,000 – 300,000 emigrating, some by force, 
by the mid-1980s.51  When Milosevic came to power he sought to rectify the 
                                                 
47 Maogoto, op cit, p.159.  The example given is that by mid-1997 there were more than 70 persons 
indicted, but only eight in custody.  
48 Ibid, pp.156-7. 
49 Ibid, p.158. 
50 Power, op cit, p.445.  Serbia had limited sovereignty over Kosovo. 
51 Aleksa Djilas, ‘A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic’, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993, Vol 72. No.3, 
p.82 
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situation and politically marginalise the Albanians.  Remaining Kosovo Serbs 
welcomed changes that would alleviate their political, economic, and social 
struggles.  In 1989, Milosevic reversed the autonomy of Kosovo leading to the 
subordination of Albanians.52  To the Albanians despair, when the international 
community was focused on resolving the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the troubles 
in Kosovo were not addressed.  Kosovo had even been observed as a trouble spot 
prior to the conflicts that ravaged in other parts of former Yugoslavia. The result was 
the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which sought independence.   
 
In March 1998, the KLA attacked several Serbian policemen, the consequence of 
which brought a violent backlash by the Serbs.  The conflict between the two parties 
continued back and forth.  The Serbians tactics were not confined to attacking the 
KLA solely, but included killing KLA relatives and destroying whole villages.53  
Almost immediately the UNSC established an arms embargo within FRY and 
Kosovo, and allowed the ICTY to begin gathering information for related crimes in 
Kosovo.54  However, approximately 3,000 were killed and a further 300,000 were 
expelled by the end of 1998.55  The world’s attention was again back on former 
Yugoslavia.   
 
Despite the UNSC involvement from the very beginning of the conflict, there were 
divided opinions within the Council that would continue to the conflicts end.  Within 
the permanent members, France, Britain, and the US favoured a strong, rapid 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Power, loc cit. 
54 United Nations, Resolution 1160 (1998), (UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998), 31 March 1998), p.2, 
para.8; p.4, para.17. 
55 Power, loc cit.  
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response to the situation to avoid the ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the subsequent mistakes 
made by the UNSC in Bosnia.56  While China and Russia were from the outset, 
determined that the situation was an internal matter and did not constitute a regional 
or international threat.57  Moreover they wanted the UNSC to deal with the conflict 
only once the FRY had requested such involvement.58 Resolution 1160 (1998) that 
established the arms embargo and the ICTY involvement was reluctantly agreed to 
by Russia whereas China abstained.59    
 
Richard Holbrooke, one of the significant negotiators from the previous conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia, was once more required to broker a deal with Milosevic.  
Milosevic accepted to pull back some of his forces and allow 2,000 unarmed 
international verifiers.60  If they complied with this, then NATO would hold back 
from air strikes.61  The air strikes from NATO were more than just an 
unsubstantiated threat as members of NATO were forthright in claiming that 
preparations were underway for military operations if necessary.62  Russia and 
China, vehemently opposed any use of force determining that NATO was acting 
irresponsible.  Both states even abstained from Resolution 1203 (1998) which 
                                                 
56 See United Nations, Security Council, 53rd Year: 3868th Meeting, Tuesday 31 March 1998, New 
York, (UN Doc. S/PV.3868, 31 March 1998),pp.4,12-14. 
57 Ibid, p.10. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See United Nations, Resolution 1203 (1998), (UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998), 24 October 1998), 
pp.2-3.  The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a Verification 
Mission in Kosovo, (p.2, para.1); NATO established an Air Verification Mission (p.3, para.3).  Power, 
op cit, p.446.  One month earlier the UNSC established resolution 1199 that established an European 
Council Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions.  Again China abstained due to, as it said, the 
lack of concern for the legitimate right for the FRY.  Once more it called the conflict an internal 
matter with no threat to international peace and security.  See United Nations, Resolution 1199 
(1998), (UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), 23 September 1998), p.3, para.4 (b).  And United Nations, 
Security Council, 53rd year:3930th Meeting, Wednesday 23 September 1998, New York, (UN Doc. 
S/PV.3930, 23 September 1998), pp.3-4.      
61  Power, loc cit.  
62 United Nations, Security Council, 53rd year:3930th Meeting, Wednesday 23 September 1998, New 
York, op cit, p.4.      
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established the verification missions.63  However, had the resolution contained a 
‘…carte blanche with respect to the use of force…’, it seems they were prepared to 
veto it.64
 
Early in 1999, some of the major leaders of the international community were 
prepared to stop another ‘Srebrenica’ and further spreading of instability in the 
Balkans.  After continued failure to stop the Serbians, NATO began aerial bombing 
on 24 March 1999.65  Unlike the air attacks in the previous conflict, these air attacks 
did not come with the prerequisite UN mandate.  Permanent members of the UNSC, 
the US, Britain, and France, were prepared to engage in the attacks to avoid the time 
spent in gaining Russia and China’s commitment in a UNSC resolution.  From the 
beginnings of the 1990s conflict, as stated before, Russia had been reluctant to get 
involved in what it considered an internal matter.  China too was opposed to 
“interfering”, both were especially against the air campaign.  But the other three 
permanent member states were unwilling to face an almost certain veto by Russia 
and China.   
 
An emergency meeting was held on the day the air strikes began.  Both Russia and 
China gave their outrage to the ‘open aggression’.66  Their greatest concern was that 
it was in violation of the UN Charter, international law, and without the authorisation 
of the UNSC.67  They also agued it was unjustified, and detrimental to the ‘multi-
                                                 
63 United Nations, Security Council, 53rd Year: 3937th Meeting, Saturday 24 October 1998, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.3937, 24 October 1998), pp.11-12, 14. 
64 Ibid, pp.12,14.  
65 United Nations, Security Council, 54th Year: 3988th Meeting, Wednesday 24 March 1999, (UN Doc. 
S/PV.3988, 24 March 1999). 
66 Ibid, p.3. 
67 Ibid, pp.2,12. 
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polar system of international relations’.68  China further called it interference in an 
internal matter.69  And finally, Russia rebutted the statement by the Netherlands 
representative that UNSC prior approval was not gained due to ‘…one or two 
permanent members’ rigid interpretation of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction,…’.70  The Russian representative argued that there had been no 
discussions inside or outside the UNSC chambers on matters of using force in 
Kosovo.71  However, statements in earlier meetings both Russia and China freely 
made comments on their disapproval of the use of force and acknowledged their 
reservations in the verification mission, as discussed above. 
 
  On the other hand, the US, France, and Britain argued their position in favour of the 
NATO attacks in response to the lack of compliance by the Serbs, and the 
deteriorating humanitarian situation. The US representative argued that NATO had 
taken the ‘necessary’ move at the ‘greatest reluctance’.72   The French representative 
referred to the lessons of Bosnia and stated that the international community could 
not abandon the people of Kosovo.73  Lastly, the British representative exclaimed 
that all other means had been frustrated.74  He refuted arguments that the attacks 
were illegal by saying that the action was legal because it was preventing a 
humanitarian catastrophe.75  Since then, however, their illegal “war” on the Serbs 
has been popularly acknowledged as legitimate in the face of genocide.   
 
                                                 
68 Ibid, pp.2-3.  
69 Ibid, p.12.  
70 Ibid, p.8. 
71 Ibid, p.13. 
72 Ibid, p.4. 
73 Ibid, p.9. 
74 Ibid, p.12. 
75 Ibid. 
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On 26 March 1999, Russia, along with India and Belarus, submitted a draft 
resolution that demanded NATO to stop all force against the FRY.76  China and 
Russia were the only permanent members who supported it.  Twelve states abstained 
including all three remaining permanent members, thus the resolution was not 
adopted owing to the consensus of the majority.77  France, Britain and the US 
continued to maintain their position that NATO’s actions were not illegal and were 
an exceptional measure. The US representative stated that:  
 
‘The United Nations Charter does not sanction armed assaults upon ethnic 
groups, or imply that the international community should turn a blind eye to a 
growing humanitarian disaster.  NATO’s actions are completely justified’.78
 
The differing views within the Council had even the FRY representative claim in his 
own hypocrisy that NATO’s unlawful aggression was ‘outperforming even the 
Nazi’s’.79  Serbia even went as far as to file proceedings against the members of 
NATO, on 29 April 1999, to the ICJ.80  Their aim was to stop the air attacks, and 
they sought ICJ jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.  It took 
one month for the ICJ to dismiss the cases citing no prima facie jurisdiction.   
 
 
                                                 
76 United Nations, Draft Resolution by Russia, India, Belarus.  (UN Doc. S/1999/328, 26 March 
1999).   
77 United Nations, Security Council, 54th Year: 3989th Meeting, Friday 26 March 1999, (UN Doc. 
S/1999/328, 26 March 1999), p.6. 
78 Ibid, p.5. 
79 Ibid, p.11. 
80 International Court of Justice, ‘Press Release 1999/33: Legality of ‘Use of Force’ (Yugoslavia v. 
United States of America)’, 2 June 1999, http://www.icj-
cji.org/docket/index.php?pr=371&code=yus&p1+3&p2=3&p2=3&p3=6&cases=114&k=25  (15 May 
2007). 
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The Serb response to the NATO bombing was to ‘[expel] virtually the entire 
Albanian population at gunpoint.  In a carefully coordinated campaign, ‘…[the JNA] 
… surrounded Kosovo towns and villages and used massive artillery barrages to 
frighten the local inhabitants into flight…’.81  Men, women, and children were 
separated; younger men were routinely killed; identification papers were 
‘systematically’ destroyed; homes and villages were destroyed; and more than 1.3 
million was forced by foot or by train, out of their homes, and approximately 
740,000 fled Kosovo.82   
 
NATO’s air attack lasted for 78 days,83 ending in June 1999, before finally 
succeeding in forcing Serbia out of Kosovo.  Kosovo Albanians were able to return 
to their homes.  Kosovo Serbians who remained became victims to the same crimes 
they had themselves perpetrated – ethnic cleansing. Several hundred Serbs were 
killed and more than 100,000 fled.84  On 10 June 1999, the UNSC authorised the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)85 which has around 50,000 
international troops, 4,000 international police officers, and 16,000 UN 
administrative staff.86  Their task has been to keep the peace, ensure the withdrawal 
                                                 
81 Power, op cit, p.449. 
82 Ibid, p.450. 
83 One fatal casualty of the NATO air strikes was the ‘collateral damage’ of China’s embassy which 
was destroyed in the campaign.  China was outraged at what it considered was an intentional attack.  
Russia further used the occasion to claim that NATO was attempting to use Kosovo in order to change 
the world order.  See United Nations, Security Council, 54th Year: 4000th Meeting, Saturday 8 May 
1999, New York, (UN Doc. S/PV.4000, 8 May 1999), pp.2-4,12. 
84 Martin Mennecke, ‘Genocide in Kosovo?’, in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. 
Charny, Century of Genocide. 2nd edn, (New York, London: Routlegde, 2004), p.451. 
85 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). (S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999).  
86 Mennecke, loc cit.  
 103
of Serb forces and the disarming of the KLA, and to work as a transitional 
administration.87  Kosovo’s future is still uncertain.   
 
The international community has been divided on the issue of calling the Kosovo 
conflict genocide.  Certainly the intent of the Serbians was to rid Kosovo of all 
Albanians, but they fell short of trying to destroy them.  The ICTY has indicted 
individuals for crimes against humanity, although so far there have been no persons 
indicted for the crime of genocide in Kosovo.88 Whether or not it was genocide in 
the strictest sense, does not change the realities of Serbia’s intent in the conflicts of 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.  Indeed the Serbians committed a campaign of 
extreme nationalism and was prepared to intentionally exterminate or expel all non-
Serbs.        
 
Almost 14 years since the ICTY was first established, it continues to prosecute 
perpetrators of genocide and other serious crimes within the former Yugoslavia since 
1991.89  The most significant of cases was that of Slobodan Milosevic who was 
finally indicted for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war, on 22 
November 2001. The ICTY recognised his role as leader to influence those under 
him either by act or omission.  Altogether he faced 66 charges.  Unfortunately on 11 
                                                 
87 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), op cit, pp.3-4.  China abstained from the 
resolution stating: ‘In essence the “human rights over sovereignty” theory serves to infringe upon the 
sovereignty of other states and to promote hegemonism under the pretext of human rights.  This 
totally runs counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter’.  See United 
Nations, Security Council, 54th Year: 4011th Meeting, Thursday 10 June 1999, New York,  (UN Doc. 
S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999), p.9.     
88 Mennecke, op cit, p.452. 
89 Individuals from all three ethnic groups, Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnian Muslims, have been 
indicted by ICTY.  
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March 2006 after four years of his trial, and with only a few months remaining, 
Milosevic was found dead in his cell. 
 
So far, as of 5 February 2007, the ICTY has indicted 161 persons, sentenced 48, 
acquitted 5, and referred 11 to national jurisdiction. Ten were deceased or passed 
away during proceedings, 25 had their indictments withdrawn, and 61 are currently 
in various stages of proceedings.90 Six other Serbian leaders are currently at large. 
Most notable among them are Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the military 
leaders who planned the Srebrenica massacre.  They are assumed to still be 
somewhere in the former Yugoslavia, but as “heroes” of Serbia they have been able 
to effectively remain free.  Like ICTR, the UNSC has also requested the ICTY 
complete all investigations by 2004, all trials by 2008, and all appeals by 2010.      
 
Furthermore, in another attempt to bring justice for the genocide in Bosnia, the 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed proceedings against the former FRY, at 
the ICJ on 20 March 1993 and 14 December 1995.91  It was Bosnia’s claim that the 
FRY had violated the Genocide Convention ‘…by destroying in part, and attempting 
to destroy in whole, national, ethnical, or religious groups within the, but not limited 
to the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular 
the Muslim population …’.92  In addition, they accused FRY93 of conspiring, 
                                                 
90 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘ICTY at a glance: Key Figures of 
ICTY Cases’, 5 February 2007. http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm  (21 February 2007). 
91 International Court of Justice, ‘Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro).’, 26 February 2007, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf  (April 2007). p.4, 
para.1. 
92 Ibid, p.20, para.1. 
93 At the time of filing the proceedings, the accused state was known by the title the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.  In late 2000 it changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro and has since then divided  
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inciting, aiding, and abetting, and furthermore failing to prevent and punish the acts 
of genocide.94  The FRY, eventually Serbia, repudiated such claims and initially 
responded by claiming Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for the crimes of 
genocide, although these claims were later withdrawn.95  Further they argued that the 
ICJ had no jurisdiction over the matter as the convention deals holds individuals 
responsible whereas the ICJ concerned matters between states.96   
 
On 26 February 2007, the ICJ gave its verdict on the, ‘Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’.97  First the ICJ 
found that the case was within their legal jurisdiction under Article IX of the 
Genocide Convention as it was a dispute between states.98  In what has been deemed 
controversial, based on the information it had, the ICJ found that Serbia had not 
committed, conspired, or been complicit in the acts of genocide.99  However it did 
find that Serbia was guilty of failing to prevent the genocide that occurred in 
Srebrenica.100  Further that Serbia had failed to transfer Ratko Mladic to the 
ICTY.101      
 
                                                                                                                                          
into two separate states: the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro.  The Republic of 
Serbia has accepted full rights and obligations to continue as the former state.  See Ibid, p.29, para.67.   
94 Ibid, p.20, paras.2-4. 
95 Ibid, p.22, para.3. 
96 Ibid, p.168, para.1. 
97 Ibid, p.1.  
98 Ibid, p.168, para.1. 
99 Ibid, pp.168-169, paras.2-4.  There was not enough evidence to find Serbia guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt that it had committed these crimes. 
100 Ibid, p.169, para.5. 
101 Ibid, p.169, para.6. 
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The genocides that were part of the former Yugoslavia conflict did garner much 
international support.  The international community was active in mediation and 
negotiations, UN resolutions to stop the conflict, and by NATO air attacks that put 
fighting to an end both times.  But the measures for the most part were weak and 
only encouraged further conflict.  Decisive action was needed at the beginning, like 
that in Kosovo.  But all forceful action needed to be supported by all the members of 
the UNSC permanent member states.  Russia and China proved to be the weak links, 
delaying action, and Russia further used their veto power.  The Bosnian genocide 
lasted for three years due to these delays; the Kosovo genocide lasted just over a year 
because NATO was prepared to speedily stop the conflict by air attack without a 
UNSC mandate.  The veto, which could have stopped the Kosovo intervention and 
prolong the conflict, was bypassed.  The lesson learnt from the Balkans is that if the 
international community is to effectively prevent and punish genocide, then the veto 
should be permanently excluded for cases of genocide.       
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Chapter Eleven: Darfur, Sudan 
 
The key case of genocide for this thesis is the Darfur, Sudan genocide.  All the 
previous cases of genocide discussed, have shown that without immediate 
intervention by the international community, genocide can only worsen.  Since 2003, 
genocide has been occurring in Darfur, and with particular permanent member states 
unwilling to agree to the action necessary to stop it, it will undoubtedly continue.  
This particular genocide demonstrates clearly that veto power politics from 
permanent UNSC members is a problem and must be stopped in order to prevent 
genocide.  It is a case that shows that ‘never again’ is undoubtedly occurring again 
and again and again.  It shows that despite progress made with the Genocide 
Convention, the international-collective will to punishing perpetrators of genocide 
from countries such as Cambodia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia, is now 
redundant against the power of the veto.   
 
The Sudan is the largest state in the African continent and has been plagued by 
conflict since its independence from Egypt and France in 1956.  Its civil war lasted 
38 years, longer than any other in the world.  The Darfur genocide is a new and far 
more ferocious conflict, displaying many of the same characteristics of the civil war.  
Up until January 2003, Sudan’s conflict was characterised by a strong north-south 
divide.  The country is divided into two main racial groups: Arabs in the north, who 
constitute 40 percent of the population, and Africans in the south, who make up the 
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other 60 percent of the population.  The population can again be divided into three 
religious groups: 60 percent are Muslims in the north, of both Arab and African race, 
and in the south, animist and African Christians comprise 25 and 15 percent 
respectively.1   
 
Since its independence, Arab Muslims in the north have controlled the countries 
economic resources and dominated politics.  The fight for equality saw the human 
rights abuses and humanitarian casualties to millions inflicted by the government 
itself.2  Finally, in July 2002 the Sudan government and south rebel groups agreed to 
a six year transition period whereby the south became an administration authority 
without Islamic Sharia law.  At the end of the period, the south will decide, by 
referendum, to stay part of Sudan or become independent.  Regrettably, the region of 
Darfur in the west was not included in the talks.       
 
The conflict between the African Muslims and the Arab Muslims came as a result of 
the governments ‘…prolonged discrimination against the Sudanese Blacks in Darfur 
and due to the fact that repeated pleas for economic assistance had been ignored. 
…[and] was guilty of oppressing the Sudanese Black population’.3  Prior to the 
outburst, tensions between the two groups, usually through the nomadic Arabs 
                                                 
1 Oxfam, ‘Sudan People and Society’, 2007. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/coolplanet/kidsweb/world/sudan/sudpeop.htm  (31 January 2007). 
2 From 1983, figures reveal that two million died and four million were displaced due to the civil war.  
The government has been responsible for ‘aerial bombing of civilian targets, looting of cattle and 
grain, destruction of villages, extrajudicial executions, and abduction of women and children’.  See 
Unitarian Universalist Sevice Committee, ‘Background – Sudan’s History of Conflict’ 
http://www.uusc.org/darfur/article20040716_2.html  (31 January 2007).  
3 Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, ‘Research Note: The US Government Darfur Genocide 
Investigation’. Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.50, No.2, 2005, p.280, in EBSCOhost 
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.waikato.ac.nz:2048/ehost/pdf?vid=4xhid=119&sid=92143357-
bde1-40bd-ae95-8b62ec57a2d8%40sessionmgr107 [accessed 4 December 2006]. 
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encroaching on the sedentary African tribal land for the purpose of grazing their 
livestock was dealt to with minimum violence.  In March 2003, fighting began 
between Sudan’s armed forces and the ‘Janjaweed’ (devil’s on horseback), 
government backed militia, versus Darfur’s initial rebel groups, Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA), and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).4  But, the governments 
target was not solely the rebels. Instead targets have included millions of Darfur 
civilian residents, particularly the rebels’ own ethnic groups – Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa.5  Currently, during the four years of the genocide, around 400,000 people 
have been killed, and 2.5 million have been forced to flee their homes.6  Moreover, 4 
million require humanitarian assistance for their complete survival.7  The Sudanese 
armed forces and the Janjaweed, under the Sudan government, has been responsible 
for carrying out a ‘scorched earth policy’,8 burning and destroying hundreds of 
villages, committing mass rape and other sexual abuse to thousands of women and 
girls, and killing thousands more.   
 
In late 2006, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland stated 
that, ‘Large new militias are being armed as we speak while none are being unarmed 
…’.9  The conflict has not only worsened in the Sudan, but has now spread into 
neighbouring states Chad and Central African Republic (CAR).  Chad has been the 
                                                 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Salah Sarrah, ‘Sudan, Chad Agree to Bolster Peace Deal – Adviser’, The Washington Post, 21 
February 2007, in http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/21/AR2007022101498.html [accessed 22 February 2007]. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Totten and Markusen, loc cit. 
9 Jan Egeland as quoted in United Nations, ‘Annan Awaits Sudan Letter on Hybrid UN Force for 
Darfur; UN Aid Chief Warns of ‘Abyss’, UN News Centre. 22 November 2006, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20706&Cr=Sudan&Cr=1 [accessed 27 November 
2006]. 
 110
destination of over 200,000 Darfur refugees whose lives are again at risk.10  At the 
international level, the relations between the three states have worsened.  The 
international community now has the arduous task of stopping the genocide and 
resolving the inter-state tensions before they escalate.  On 15 February 2007, the 
three states agreed to the rights of sovereignty of each state, to stop supporting any 
rebellion within their own states, and to stop the use of propaganda against each 
other.  They also agreed to increase their cooperation with each other, the UN, and 
the African Union (AU).11  Only time will tell if the three states can keep to this 
agreement.    
 
The first hurdle to prevent and punish the genocide has been to appropriately define 
the Darfur conflict as genocide.  So far, the Darfur conflict has been recognised as 
genocide not only by international humanitarian organisations, human rights 
activists, and scholars, but by the European parliament, and by some individual 
states, most notably the US since 2004.12  But some states have been reluctant to 
define it as such, recognising only the crimes against humanity and war crimes that 
are also occurring in Darfur.  A 2005 UN International Commission of Inquiry found 
clear links between the government forces and the militias, that together they 
‘…conducted indiscriminate attacks, including the killing of civilians, torture, 
enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual 
                                                 
10 United Nations, ‘As Rebels Advance to Chadian Capital, Annan Condemns Attempts to Seize 
Power by Force’, UN News Centre. 25 November 2006, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20727&Cr=Chad&Crl=  [accessed  27 November 
2006]. 
11 Sarrah, loc cit.  
12 Totten and Markusen, loc cit. Both the US congress and the Bush Administration have confirmed 
the conflict as genocide. 
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violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur’.13  Further they 
found that, ‘These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and 
therefore may amount to crimes against humanity’.14  It concluded that the 
Government of Sudan (GOS) had not pursued a policy of genocide as the GOS 
lacked the intent of genocide.15  This report has been the source that has stopped 
states from calling the conflict genocide.16
 
Contrary to that one report, there have been numerous reports that shed additional 
light on the subject.  For instance, in the 2004 Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial 
summary or arbitrary killings, Ms Asma Jahangir stated that: ‘A large number of 
people whom I met had a strong perception that the government was pursuing a 
policy of ‘Arabisation’ of the Sudan, and in particular the Darfur region, allegedly, 
those of Arab descent seek to portray themselves as ‘pure’ Muslims as opposed to 
Muslims of African ethnicity’.17   
 
Numerous other reports indicate that the three ethnic groups – Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa – as mentioned above, have been specifically targeted.  With the 
combination of reports there can be no denial that the conflict constitutes genocide 
according to the Genocide Convention.  UN officials have also repeatedly compared 
it to the genocides of Rwanda and Bosnia.  But terms aside, the reality is the Darfur 
                                                 
13 United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (UN Doc. S/2005/60, 1 
February 2005), p.3.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p.4. 
16 For example see United Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of Al Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. (UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.1714, 18 August 2005), paras. 39, 44.  
17 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions.  Extra judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: 
Addendum, Mission to the Sudan. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.2, 6 August 2004), p.11, para.24.  
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conflict has been going on for four years too long and the international community 
must take accountability for that. 
 
According to Totten and Markusen, because the US dared to call the conflict 
genocide, it has moved the UN to action.18  But without the unanimity of the five 
permanent member states, definitive action most probably will not be taken.  Russia 
and China have avoided using the term genocide.  Not only that but they have sought 
to resolve the conflict by political measures that, according to Russia, have not yet 
been exhausted.19  Both countries have been reluctant to even support numerous soft 
resolutions, such as sanctions.20 They, and other states like Algeria, have even gone 
so far as to call the determined approach of the West as culturally insensitive to 
African ways of conflict resolution.21  Other states have even said that the reports of 
the crimes occurring in Darfur are over exaggerated.22  So in regards to the 
compromises that have to be given within the UNSC, negotiations continue. 
 
 Negotiations have led to ceasefires throughout the genocide; so far none have been 
effective.  There have been repeated calls for President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to 
disarm the militias, allow greater access and security for humanitarian workers, and 
of course to negotiate a peace settlement.  On 8 April 2004, progress was made with 
the Ceasefire Agreement which led to a 7,000 strong African Union Mission in 
                                                 
18 Totten and Markusen, op cit, p.289.  
19 United Nations, Security Council60th Year:5153rd Meeting, Tuesday, 29 March 2005, New York  
(UN Doc. S/PV.5153, 29 March 2005). 
20 Example of abstentions from either one or both states include: UNSCR 1556 (2004), UNSCR 1564 
(2004), UNSCR 1590 (2005), UNSCR 1591 (2005), UNSCR 1706 (2006).   
21 United Nations, Security Council60th Year:5153rd Meeting, Tuesday, 29 March 2005, New York, 
loc cit.  
22 See United Nations, Human Rights Council 4th Special Session: Summary Record of the 2nd 
Meeting, Tuesday 12 December 2006, New York (UN Doc. A/HRC/S-4/SR.2, 22 January 2007), p.5, 
para.16.  
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Sudan (AMIS).23  The mission is the AU’s first peacekeeping mission; and in respect 
of its great effort, it has struggled in its tasks.   
 
Within the UNSC the five permanent members have again been divided in how best 
to resolve the conflict.  On 11 June 2004 the UNSC established the United Nations 
Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS).24  This was in response to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was then currently in progress for the end 
of the Sudan’s north/south civil war.  Later, once the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement had been concluded, the UNSC established the United Nations Mission 
in the Sudan (UNMIS) which consisted of up to 10,000 military personnel and an 
appropriate civilian component including 715 civilian police personnel.25  However, 
the UNSC felt that examples of UNAMIS, UNMIS, and the parties of the former 
conflict would be encouraging to the Darfur conflict.      
 
But encouragement and the AMIS mission was not enough, and on 30 July 2004, the 
UNSC imposed an arms embargo in the Darfur region, to all non-government 
entities, individuals, and the Janjaweed.26 China and Russia abstained from voting 
for the resolution.  They felt that the measures were not helpful to the progress made 
in the diplomatic efforts.  China in particular felt that the role of the UNSC was to 
                                                 
23 African Union Mission in the Sudan, ‘Chronology’, http://www.amis-sudan.org/briefing.html  (6 
March 2007), and ‘Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and Management of 
the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Area of Sudan (CFC)’, 25 May 2004, 
http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/darfur-soma.pdf  (31 January 2007).  
24 United Nations, Resolution 1547 (2004), (UN Doc. S/RES/1547 (2004), 11 June 2004). 
25 United Nations, Resolution 1590 (2005), (UN Doc. S/RES/1590 (2005), 24 March 2005, p.3, 
para.1. 
26 United Nations, Resolution 1556 (2004), (UN Doc. S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004), p.5, para.7.  
In the preamble, the resolution defined the conflict as ‘…acts of violence especially those with an 
ethnic dimension…’.  p.2. 
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assist the GOS in its primary responsibility to end the conflict.27  China and Russia 
were to abstain again with further military and economic sanctions, even prohibiting 
the entry of individual persons within other States.28  Both countries were again firm 
that in their view sanctions could easily be detrimental to the situation.  The Russian 
representative argued that diplomatic measures were no way exhausted.29   
 
Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005 referred the Darfur conflict to the Prosecutor of 
the ICC.30  This time Russia voted for the resolution and the US abstained; China 
also abstained.  Both China and the US although in favour of seeing justice in either 
a Sudanese national or hybrid court, were honest enough to share their general 
reservations for the ICC.31  
 
By January 2006, Mr. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for the Sudan, said concerning the Darfur peace talks: ‘all parties have lost all sense 
of urgency and do not really care about deadlines’.32  He reported that UNSC 
resolutions had been brushed aside.33  Moreover he seemed to rebuke the UNSC for 
their lack of action stating that hope has its limits and that Darfur needed more than 
                                                 
27 United Nations,  Security Council, 59th Year: 5015th Meeting, Friday 30 July 2004, New York, (UN 
Doc. S/PV.5015 (2004), 20 July 2004), pp.4,7. 
28 United Nations, Resolution 1591 (2005), (UN Doc. S/RES/1591 (2005), 29 March 2005), pp.3-5, 
paras.2-6. 
29 United Nations, Security Council, 60th Year: 5153rd Meeting, Tuesday 29 March 2005, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.5153 (2005), 29 March 2005), pp.5-6.  
30 United Nations, Resolution 1593 (2005), (UN Doc. S/PV.1593 (2005), 31 March 2005), p.1, para.1. 
31 United Nations, Security Council, 60th Year: 5158th Meeting, Thursday 31 March 2005, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.5158 (2005), 31 March 2005). 
32 United Nations, Security Council, 61st Year: 5344th Meeting, Friday 13 January 2006, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.5344 (2006), 13 January 2006), p.4. 
33 Ibid, p.5.  
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lip service.  He urged the UNSC to change tactics.34  But the UNSC was not to 
change.       
  
In March 2006 the Peace and Security Council of the AU requested AMIS to 
transform into a larger and more mobile UN operation with a stronger mandate.  On 
5 May 2006 the GOS and some of the rebel groups and other parties signed the 
Abuja Peace Agreement, otherwise known as the Darfur Peace Agreement.  The 
Agreement was pursued strongly by both the US and Britain. After the Agreement, 
on 16 May 2006, the UNSC authorised AU’s request.35  The resolution was 
unanimously approved, but both China and Russia were adamant that such a UN 
peacekeeping operation needed the GOS approval.36 Since then the GOS has been 
promising to accept the UN mission, but so far has not yet done so.  At one stage, the 
GOS sought to implement its own military force in Darfur, in complete violation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement.37   Ironically, as mentioned above, the UN has 
missions in southern Sudan.   
 
On 31 August 2006, under resolution 1706, the UNSC expanded UNMIS mandate 
for Darfur pending on the GOS consensus.38  The resolution also increased military 
personnel to 17,300, civilian police personnel to 3,300, and up to 16 formed Police 
                                                 
34 Ibid, pp.4-5. 
35 United Nations. Resolution 1679 (2006). (S/RES/1679 (2006), 16 May 2006), p.2, para.3. 
36 United Nations, Security Council, 61st Year: 5439th Meeting, Tuesday 16 May 2006, New York, (UN 
Doc. S/PV.5439 (2006), 16 May 2006), pp.2-3.  Despite being a ‘speedy’ resolution, China voted in 
favour of the resolution in respect of the AU.   
37 United Nations, Security Council, 61st Year: 5528th Meeting, Monday 18 September, New York, 
(UN Doc. S/PV.5528 (2006), 18 September 2006), p.6. 
38 United Nations, Resolution 1706 (2006), (UN Doc. S/RES/1706 (2006), 31 August 2006), p.3, 
para.1. 
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Units.39  Russia and China abstained from voting.  They agreed in principle to the 
resolution but objected to the timing of it and the lack of consent by the GOS.  
Again, pursuing the political path to ensure total agreement by the GOS has only led 
to more atrocities.40  All the while, AMIS continues to struggle along in its 
overwhelming task as deadlines continue to be extended to appease the GOS.41        
 
Not long after the Darfur Peace Agreement, in the months of July through to 
September 2006, attacks on humanitarian workers heightened as 21 humanitarian 
vehicles were hijacked, 31 convoys were ambushed and looted, 6 humanitarian 
workers were killed, and a further 2 AU military observers were also killed.42  The 
violence has been so extreme as to drive some humanitarian groups out of Darfur.  
Moreover, attacking humanitarian workers is a war crime.   
 
In terms of justice, under UNSCR 1593 (2005), the newly established ICC was given 
authority over the conflict.43  It has been its task of undergoing an independent 
inquiry into persons most responsible for the international crimes in Darfur.  It has 
found it a challenge to identify specific individuals. It is also to investigate the 
Sudan’s national proceedings for persons accused of the same crimes, to ensure that 
they are genuine and that there is justice given to the victims.  Its investigations have 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p.3, para.3. 
40 United Nations, Security Council, 61st Year: 5519th Meeting, Thursday 31 August 2006, (UN Doc. 
S/PV.5519 (2006), 31 August 2006), pp.5,8-9. 
41 The most recent UNSC resolution  extended the UNMIS mandate until 31 October 2007 as it 
continues to work in south Sudan and waits for its transition in the Darfur region.  See United 
Nations, Security Council 1755 (2007), (UN Doc. S/RES/1755 (2007), 30 April 2007), p.3, para.1. 
42 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor. ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to the UN Security Council Pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005)’. 14 December 2006. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMO_20061214_en.pdf   (31 January 2007). 
43 United Nations, Resolution 1593 (2005). (UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005), 31 March 2005).  
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found that in the Special Courts of the Sudan there have been six cases so far with 
less than 30 suspects.  Eighteen of those have been low ranking military officers and 
the rest have been civilians.44  Its national judicial investigation committee has not 
completed any investigations or prosecutions and its Special Prosecutions 
Committee, although it is currently investigating one incident for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, it has also acquitted many individuals charged with war 
crimes.45  The GOS provided a report in November 2006 of reported prosecutions of 
cases that involved the police forces and regular armed forces.  There are indications 
that fourteen individuals have been arrested for violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights abuses.  The end result of the ICC’s mandate 
from the UNSC is to ensure genuine justice from either national, international, or a 
combination.46   
 
Recently, on 27 February 2007, the prosecutor finished its investigations.47  
Following this, on 27April 2007 the ICC issued its first warrant of arrests for 
individuals involved in the Darfur conflict, these were: Ahmad Muhammad Harun 
(Ahmad Harun), and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb).48  Both 
                                                 
44 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to the UN Security Council Pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005)’. Op cit, p.3. 
45 Ibid.   
46 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor. 14 December 2006.  Fourth Report of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005). http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_ReportUNSC4-
Darfur_English.pdf 22 February 2007., p.10 
47 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Darfur, the Sudan: Prosecutor’s 
Application under Article 58(7). Summary’, 27 February 2007, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP_Summary-Darfur-20070227_en.pdf   (15 March 2007). 
48 International Criminal Court, ‘Pre-Trial Chamber I: Situation in Darfur, Sudan.  In the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Haran (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman 
(“Ali Kushayb”): Public Doc. Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun’ 27 April 2007, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-2_English.pdf  (15 May 2007), and ‘International Criminal 
Court, ‘Pre-Trial Chamber I: Situation in Darfur, Sudan.  In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
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have been accused of Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes.  Ahmad Harun 
was the former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan, and 
currently holds the position of Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs.  Ali 
Kushayb is a leader of the Janjaweed.49      
 
As the genocide continues, more people are systematically killed, raped, forced to 
flee their homes, or die from starvation and disease because of their ethnicity.  As 
former Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in one of his final speeches:  
 
‘There is more than enough blame to go around [concerning Darfur] … It can 
be shared among those who value abstract notions of sovereignty more than 
the lives of real families, those whose reflex of solidarity puts them on the 
side of governments and not of peoples, and those who fear that action to stop 
the slaughter would jeopardize their commercial interests.’  
 
Further, he said of countries in the global south that they too ought to be blamed for 
‘caricaturing responsibility to protect as a conspiracy by imperialist powers to take 
back the hard-won national sovereignty of formerly colonized peoples”.  He stated 
that this was “utterly false’.50
 
                                                                                                                                          
Muhammad Haran (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”): 
Public Doc. Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb’, 27 April 2007, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-3_English.pdf  (15 May 2007). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights News. ‘Annan Blasts Global Failure on Darfur Horror: States 
Must Respect Rights in 'War on Terror'. (New York, December 8, 2006).  
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/07/global14793.htm 22 February 2007. 
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President al-Bashir who has been allowed to keep his position has played the UN 
well, appeasing all sides of the debate.  Throughout the four years, he and his 
government have disagreed to defining the conflict as genocide, sided with Russia 
and China that Darfur was best dealt with by Africans who better understood the 
situation, also agreeing with them that UNSC resolutions would only give the rebels 
the upper-hand and worsen the situation, then thanked the US and Britain for their 
efforts in the Darfur Peace Agreement.  They have also claimed, on numerous 
occasions, that they have a great track record of cooperation with the UN and other 
organisations.  However, their cooperation has been half-hearted to say the least.  
Four years of conflict is the proof of that.  Four years of the UN, humanitarian 
organisations, and others being denied access or given restricted access to Darfur, is 
testament to that.  The GOS is still considering giving access to 3,000 UN 
peacekeepers to support the AMIS mission.51  For four years the Sudan’s 
sovereignty remains, despite committing the international crime of genocide. 
 
As all the previous genocides have shown, gaining military victory over its 
perpetrators seems the only way to stop genocide.  In Armenia, Turkey was defeated 
by the great powers; the holocaust came to an end as the Allied Powers claimed 
victory; Pol Pot’s ‘killing fields’ were ended by the invasion of Vietnam; the RPF 
seized control over the majority of Rwanda; and in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, air attacks by NATO ended both genocides.  Each case also showed 
that once genocide has begun the time for talks and negotiating are over, as the 
                                                 
51 United Nations, ‘Sudan: Talks Continue On UN-African Force as More Killings Reported in 
Darfur’, UN News Centre, 18 February 2007, in 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21637&Cr=sudan&Cr1=  (21 February 2007). 
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perpetrators are set on their goal to exterminate, in whole or in part, a group of 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.   
 
The fact that the UNSC has allowed the genocide to continue for as long as it has, 
committing itself to negotiations, and not taking decisive action until the GOS agrees 
to it, clearly shows the flaws of the UNSC.  When the Darfur Peace Agreement was 
signed, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, suggested a NATO force to 
assist with the UN mission.52  And the US has since suggested of further, stronger 
action if the Darfur genocide continues.  But the US, and NATO needs to tread 
carefully to avoid further retribution since the Kosovo conflict.  So until Russia and 
China are willing to agree to more than just soft political resolutions, obtaining an 
adequate mandate to stop the genocide now, even by using force, and even without 
the GOS agreement, seems futile.  Again, if there were no vetoes for cases of 
genocide history might not have cared for Russia and China’s limited cooperation to 
stop the Darfur genocide.   
 
So as the Darfur genocide continues, the world learns the pain of the veto.  The 
Sudan has a long history of conflict since its independence. Just as the north-south 
conflict was coming to a close, the genocide of Darfur was just beginning.  The 
problems in Darfur stemmed from the GOS neglect of the region.  Rebel groups 
sought violent means to bring those issues to the attention of the GOS.  The 
retribution by the GOS has been lethal.  For four years the people of Darfur have 
been systematically killed, raped, forced to flee their homes and more, by the 
                                                 
52 United Nations. Security Council 61st Year: 5434th Meeting, Tuesday 9th May 2006, New York (UN 
Doc. S/PV.5434, 9 May 2006), p.6. 
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Janjaweed and the Sudan’s armed forces.  The state has been in denial of the crime 
of genocide.  They have made it difficult for the UN and other international 
organisations to help the people in need, and stop the genocide.  But the UNSC has 
the ultimate responsibility for peace and security in this world.  Because of the 
reluctant states, Russia and China, the UNSC response thus far has been weak.  
Evidently, that power that they each hold – the veto – is partially responsible for the 
continuing genocide in Darfur.  
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Chapter Twelve: Conclusion 
 
The 1948 Genocide Convention has laid relatively idle since its inception into 
international law.  This has not been because of the lack of cases of genocide, but 
rather from the reluctance to of the international community to involve itself in 
preventing and punishing genocide.  As this section has clearly shown, genocide has 
unfortunately only continued since the Convention.  As primarily responsible for 
matters of international peace and security, the UNSC carries the blame in behalf of 
the international community.  This section has discussed four genocides and the 
reactions by the UNSC. 
 
First, the Cambodian genocide in the late 1970s was the first genocide after the 
establishment of the Genocide Convention.  Surprisingly, it had little impact in 
international affairs and was almost forgotten about.  In effect, the Cold War which 
divided the world into a bi-polar system was a significant factor in this.  As 
discussed, the Soviets and the US were at odds with each other.  Both states had been 
present in the Indochina region prior to Democratic Kampuchea, fighting for 
political dominance in Vietnam.  By the end, the US was by popular opinion through 
with intervening in the region.  The USSR which had led the communist ideology 
was also unable to involve itself in condemning the genocide as the Khmer Rouge 
espoused communism.  China was the last major party to be involved in the region at 
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that time.  The Khmer Rouge used China’s model of communism as its exemplar.  
And as China was trying to establish itself as a vying communist power to the USSR, 
going against Cambodia was not in its interest. 
 
In 1994 Rwanda was tormented by a horrific and speedy genocide.  But preceding 
the Rwandan genocide the UN had been involved in some failing peacekeeping 
operations, most notably Somalia and the then continuing former Yugoslavia 
conflict.  The US in particular was reluctant to get involved to face another 
“Mogadishu line”.  In Rwanda’s hour of need, the UNSC reduced its troops on the 
basis that Rwanda had not been compliant enough with the UN’s help.  This action 
only helped to serve the perpetrators of the crime.  The slow response of the UNSC 
left the RPF to forcibly stop the genocide itself, 
 
The former Yugoslavia where there were two genocides in the 1990s showed the 
weakness of the UNSC and its inability to gain a timely, unanimous, strong motion 
to adequately prevent, stop, and punish genocide.  Initially the EC was tasked with 
solving the conflict, but it was too great for them alone.  Reluctantly the UNSC 
became involved.  The US was hesitant at first, but it was Russia and China that 
were to be the hardest to appease.   
 
In both Bosnia and Kosovo, Russia and China expressed their dislike to the use of 
force, China in particular who often found it hard to accept resolutions which 
referred to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Both countries favoured political 
solutions in the strictest sense.  Further, in the case of Kosovo, they both felt that it 
was an internal matter outside the jurisdiction of the UNSC.  Although they both 
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reluctantly agreed to the initial air strikes by NATO in the Bosnian conflict, they 
strictly opposed further military action by NATO, and called the NATO air strikes 
during Kosovo a violation of international law.  Quite simply they favoured 
sovereignty over human rights, even that of genocide.    
 
Finally, Darfur, Sudan, has been inflicted by genocide since 2003.  It came at the 
conclusion of the long Sudan civil war.  Like Rwanda it began with rebel groups 
trying to gain equality for the Darfur region.  However, the retribution has been and 
continues to constitute genocide.  Official reports have shown that there is complicity 
between the government forces and the militias.  Killings, rape, destruction of 
villages and so forth have been systematic and widespread, and the target has been 
civilians.  The Darfur crisis has had a huge spill over into neighbouring states 
worsening the security of the region.  Again the UNSC response has been slow and 
largely ineffective.  China and Russia continue to favour sovereignty and endless 
diplomacy.  One year on, UNMIS continues to wait to takeover from AMIS as the 
GOS continues to delay its approval UN peacekeepers in Darfur, and Russia and 
China refuse the UNSC from action without the GOS approval.   
 
The common denominator in preventing and punishing genocide is the views, 
opinions, and national interests of the permanent members of the UNSC.  These 
States hold the key in preventing genocide.  As the UNSC has been assigned the task 
and responsibility of ensuring international peace and security, including genocide as 
a threat to international peace and security, then the UNSC has to act within that 
responsibility to prevent genocide.  But as the permanent members opinions and 
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views can interfere with that responsibility it then becomes imperative that 
something changes to ensure future prevention of genocide.   
 
Thus in order to unlock the chains that lock the UNSC from preventing genocide, 
and subsequently saving thousands and millions of lives, the power from the few has 
to be laid aside in times of genocide.  The power of veto must not be allowed in 
times of genocide.  And although vetoes have rarely been used in cases of genocide, 
the power that each of the permanent members hold goes against the need of 
preventing genocide.  By the very opinions of the permanent members, resolutions 
are created in order to appease these members, in view of having them voted for or at 
least not to be vetoed against.  Again, the right of veto must be withdrawn from the 
UNSC permanent members in time of genocide.  This will enable the Genocide 
Convention to be used in a timely manner for its intended purposes.  It will also 
ensure the security of numberless human lives that might otherwise be afflicted by 
genocide.      
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Part Three: Changing for a Better Future 
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Chapter Thirteen: Introduction 
 
Thus far, this thesis has shown the history of the international community’s will to 
prevent and punish genocide by creating the Genocide Convention to criminalise it.  
Accordingly, any attempt to create another holocaust is to be prevented and 
punished.  Contrary to this, however, numerous genocides have occurred since the 
Convention.1  Of the numerous genocides that have occurred, only a handful has 
been internationally recognised as such.  And for the few which have been widely 
recognised as genocide, the Convention failed to make the mark intended on 
preventing and stopping the genocides until it has become too late. 
 
Although the Convention is international law, the principle of non-intervention still 
remains in force.  The decisions of the UN, in particular the UNSC, legally stand in-
between withholding the principle of non-intervention and fulfilling the obligations 
of the Convention.  As the cases of genocide in this thesis have shown, overriding 
the principle of non-intervention is a task that the UN enacts so reluctantly.  Thus 
that ultimate tool, the veto, needs to be changed in cases of genocide.  Part III looks 
at how and why the veto power was instituted into the UNSC and the debate over it.  
In particular, this section examines the veto power discussions in terms of genocide 
                                                 
1 The 1985 Whitaker Genocide study includes: the German massacre of the Hereros (1904), Ukranian 
Pogroms of Jews (1919), Tutsi massacre of Hutu in Burundi (1965, 1972), Paraguayan massacres of 
Ache Indians (prior to 1974), Iranian killings in Baha’is.  See United Nations, Revised and Updated 
Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Prepared By Mr. 
B. Whitaker, (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985), p.7, para. 22.    
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prevention and punishment.  Finally this section concludes that the power of veto 
needs to be barred in cases of genocide.  It does not seek to discuss a permanent end 
to the veto in general; rather it focuses solely on changing the power of veto for the 
particular case of genocide.     
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Chapter Fourteen: Veto History 
 
The UN was established at the conclusion of WWII mirroring the world views and 
structure at that time.  In less than half a century the world had been involved in two 
horrible and indescribable great wars.  Tens of millions died and millions more were 
physically or mentally affected; cities, towns, and villages were destroyed.  After 
WWI the people of the world placed their faith in the League of Nations to avoid 
another world war.  But twenty years on the world was again embroiled in a bitter 
war.  The League of Nations had failed.  Despite this, the Allies sought to re-
establish another intergovernmental organisation ‘to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war’.1  This chapter deals with the origins of the veto, discussing 
the formation of the UNSC, and the logic of giving each permanent member 
exclusive veto rights. 
 
The structure of the UN, though modelled after its forerunner – the League of 
Nations, was modified to avoid second failure.  One of the weaknesses of the League 
was the rule of unanimity amongst all member states in the case of any intervention.2  
The UN was to avoid such a principle and instead allow veto power only to the 
permanent members of the UNSC.  Since its inception it has been a matter of great 
                                                 
1 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’. 26 June 1945. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
(5 March 2007), Preamble. 
2 The Avalon Project, ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’.  (1996). 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm  (8 March 2007), Article 5. 
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debate.  Protests surrounding the veto were quelled by the permanent members’ 
insistence of the veto or no UN.      
 
On 30 October 1943, the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, US, and Britain, and the 
Chinese Ambassador, signed the Moscow Declaration which recognised the need of 
establishing ‘a general international organization, based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such 
states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security’.3  
These same four states met in Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington D.C, and later in 
Yalta, in the Crimea, to plan the organisation structure.  Finally in the famed San 
Francisco Conference, April 1945, member states to the United Nations Declaration4 
convened for final discussions and to establish the United Nations.  Compromises 
were made on all sides to get the UN established, with the veto being singled out as 
the make or break point of the UN. 
 
The USSR, US, Britain, China, and France, were self-selected as the permanent five 
of the ultimate UN body, the UNSC.  These five states held the economic and 
military power to establish themselves as such.  Ten other states are selected every 
two years on a non-permanent basis.  Under the Charter of the UN, the UNSC have 
the primary responsibility of international peace and security.  Members of the UN 
conferred this responsibility upon the UNSC, ‘in order to ensure prompt and 
                                                 
3 Moscow Declaration, Clause 4, as quoted in United Nations, History of the Charter of the United 
Nations: Moscow and Tehran. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/moscowteheran.shtml (Jan. 
26, 2007).  The UN also works to improve issues of human rights, international environment, health 
related issues such as AIDS, refugees, poverty, food, trafficking, terrorism, landmines, 
telecommunications, international travel, and so forth.   
4 The United Nations Declaration, 1 January 1942, affirmed that the signatories would give their 
utmost support to the war effort, with the joint goal of peace.    
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effective action by the [UN]’.5  The UNSC was bound to ‘…act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’.6  
Under Chapter V, Article 27 of the Charter, every member of the UNSC has one 
vote.  Decisions of the UNSC are divided between procedural matters and all other 
matters.  The former needs only nine affirmative votes, whereas the latter not only 
requires nine affirmative votes, but the affirmative unity of the five permanent 
members. Hence, without directly using the term, the veto was established.7  Almost 
dividing the UN before it began, the Soviet Union had originally pushed to have a 
universal veto which included procedural matters.  The other members disagreed 
with this stance opting for freedom of speech.  It seemed unreasonable that the veto 
could bar important issues being discussed, effectively stopping the UNSC from 
accomplishing its role.  Finally the USSR agreed to the more limited veto.8  
 
Reasons behind the veto are varied.  Firstly, it was to ensure that the Major Powers 
would cooperate not only in the present, but in the future.  Without their position in 
the UNSC and their power to veto there was no guarantee that these states would 
retain the unity they then shared.  The UNSC and veto was a preventative tool to 
future large-scale war between these states.9  This was presented to the smaller states 
as their essential safeguard.10  Also, these states argued that they deserved the veto 
because they were the main troop contributors for the UN.  This was a protection to 
their national interests, ensuring that they did not get involved in any unwanted 
                                                 
5 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, op cit, Chapter V, Article 24, para.1. 
6 Ibid, para.2.  
7 Ibid, Chapter V, Article 27, paras. 1-3. Any members who are party to a dispute are required to 
abstain from voting. 
8 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (United States of 
America: Westview Press, 2003), pp.202-220. 
9 Anjali V. Patil, The Veto: A Historical Necessity, 1946-2001 ([n.p.]: [n.pub.], 2001), pp.90-92.  
10 Ibid, p.100.  
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conflicts.11  Finally, the UK delegate at the San Francisco meeting offered the 
response to the ‘… criticisms on the ground of democracy and institutions’: ‘The 
delegates who will sit on the future Security Council representing the Permanent 
Members will, in fact, represent probably more than half the population of the world, 
and account has to be taken of that fact’.12  
 
As the permanent members of the UNSC, the Major Powers ‘gained enormous 
power and responsibility’.13  Patil argues that the international community should be 
grateful for the permanent members bearing such a burden of responsibility.14  The 
smaller states that were involved in the founding discussions of the UN fought the 
veto till the very end.  One of the strongest voices in the negating debate was the 
Australian delegate who argued that it wasn’t a veto of five, but a veto of one, 
meaning that only one member could dictate the decisions of the other five members.  
He continued by asserting that this disunity went against the UN aims.15 In the end, 
the five permanent members gave the smaller states an ultimatum: either accept the 
veto or lose their participation in the UN.16   Averse to destroying the UN before it 
even began, the veto was accepted by many of the smaller states.   
 
Despite the permanent members’ assurance to the contrary, the veto has most 
certainly been used deceptively throughout its history.  During the Cold War, the 
veto had the effect of ‘paralysing the Security Council’.17  Its dominance within 
                                                 
11 Schlesinger, op cit, p.193. 
12 Patil, op cit, p.96. 
13 Ibid, p.92. 
14 Ibid, p.713. 
15 Australian delegate, in ibid, p.100.  (Un Doc. UNCIO, Document 956, III/I,p.6-7)  
16 Schlesinger, op cit, p.223. 
17 Ibid, p.284. 
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international affairs has continuously pushed the debate for UN reform.  
Furthermore, there have been millions of lives affected by conflict in some way or 
another, who bear witness to the failings of the veto.  But the veto does have its 
place.  With the veto the Major Powers were able to join together in the greatest 
international security organisation thus far.  In spite of its failings, the UN has also 
achieved much good in the world, protecting and caring for those who might not 
have been otherwise cared for.  In truth, The UN was never intended to be a perfect 
body; but it can and must improve.  The veto cannot and should not ever be used for 
those in the worst of circumstances, even genocide.  The choice of veto over cases of 
genocide should never have been allowed.  The permanent five have the opportunity 
now to rectify that.        
 
The UN was created at the end of WWII with the aim of achieving future peace and 
security.18  The sensitivity of international relations required such an international 
organisation.  Its fore runner, the League of Nations, had taught the establishing 
members of the UN that unanimity amongst all members was detrimental to the 
organisation.  Thus it was decided by the five Major Powers that only they would 
have the power of veto.  In that sense it would quickly and efficiently lead to the 
actions needed for international peace and security.  The other member states 
abdicated this power and responsibility to the permanent five.  Effectively, the five 
permanent members refused to participate in the UN if the veto was taken away from 
them.  The arguments in favour of them having the right of veto are acceptable 
however, there is room for improvement.  Changing the power of veto for cases of 
genocide must now be addressed.   
                                                 
18 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, op cit, preamble. 
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Chapter Fifteen: Discussion of the Veto’s Reform 
 
The history of the veto has not been altogether favourable.  Debate over the right of 
veto which began even before its inception has only continued through the years.  
Throughout the Cold War the veto was used as a tool of power politics, which 
paralysed much of the work of the UN.  This only confirmed to the sceptics that the 
veto needed to be eliminated.  But at the end of the Cold War there was renewed 
hope that the veto would be used wisely and in keeping with the aims of the UN.  
However, the veto remains problematic as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Darfur 
testify.  For the past decade the UN has been working towards reform, giving 
opportunity to change the veto.  There have been different proposals relating to the 
changes within the UNSC and to the veto.  This chapter considers the different 
proposals, with special focus on the arguments, given for changing the veto for 
genocide, war crimes, and other humanitarian and human rights abuses.     
 
Supporters of the veto argue that for over sixty years now, the UNSC has maintained 
its responsibility of international peace and security.  In that sense the veto need not 
be changed.  They would even argue that problems concerning the veto have 
stemmed from smaller states’ manipulation of the larger states.1  But the incredible 
power of the veto, even without its actual physical use, has permitted cases of 
genocide, war crimes, and so forth to occur.  Today the continuing genocide in the 
                                                 
1 Anjali V. Patil, The Veto: A Historical Necessity, 1946-2001 ([n.p.]: [n.pub.], 2001), p.709. 
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region of Darfur, in the Sudan, is testimony to the need to the change of power and 
right of veto.  Formally it was the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo that gave 
the foundation to the argument of excluding vetoing rights for genocide, war crimes, 
and others.  This option seems the most realistic in the debate over UNSC veto 
power reform.   
 
Since late l996, the UN has been embarking on reforms to make it ‘leaner, more 
efficient and more effective, more responsive to the wishes of its Members, and more 
realistic in its goals and commitments’.2  This has included changes in leadership 
and management structure, budget and planning, staff selection and training, and 
reorganisation of offices.  Although all the changes implemented will help to make 
the UN more effective and current to international relations now, UN reform would 
be incomplete without reform within the UNSC.   
 
Under the Charter the UNGA has the authority to discuss questions ‘relating to the 
functions and power of any organisation of the UN and to make recommendations’.3  
In November 1993, the UNGA established the Open-ended Working Group on the 
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters of the Security Council.4  One of the major 
topics that was and continues to be discussed is the membership of the permanent 
members.  The membership of the five permanent members is viewed as outdated, as 
UN membership has quadrupled since its creation.  Enlarging the number of the 
                                                 
2 United Nations, ‘Reference Reports and Materials: Reform at the United Nations. Chronology’, 
2006. http://www.un.org/reform/chronology.shtml  (28 February 2007). 
3 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’. 26 June 1945. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
(5 March 2007), Chapter IV, Article 10. 
4 United Nations, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council: Draft Resolution (UN Doc. A/48/L.28, 24 November 1993), p.2, para.1. 
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UNSC permanent members according to regional representation has been argued.5  
States that have been mentioned as part of a new UNSC permanent membership 
include Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India.6  If the UNSC does enlarge, this could 
potentially complicate the power of veto.  
    
Giving the veto power to any new permanent members seems most unlikely despite 
calls for greater equality.  To ensure greater fairness in the decisions of the UNSC, 
there is one view that holds that there should be a specific number of positive votes 
in the UNSC that could overrule a veto.  Or on the other hand, a two-thirds majority 
in the UNGA would also be able to overrule a veto.  Another suggestion has been 
that if a veto is used then it would require an explanation.7  This would hopefully 
deter member states from using the veto. However, an explanation would only need 
to be used if a veto was actually used.  Any threat of using a veto, which has huge 
consequences to even discussing certain situations and their remedies, would not 
require an explanation. 
 
The most drastic of the veto proposals has been for its complete elimination.  This, 
however, seems like an unrealistic possibility as any changes to the UNSC need to be 
approved by the UNSC itself.8  Therefore, any permanent member could veto such a 
drastic change.  There is almost no doubt that the permanent members would 
                                                 
5 United Nations, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on Question of Equitable Representation 
on the Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security 
Council (UN Doc. A/60/47 (SUPP), 1 January 2006), Annex II, p.10, para.11. 
6 United Nations, General Assembly Official Records 60th Session: 48th Plenary Meeting, Thursday, 
10 November 2005, New York (UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, 1 January 2005), p.13, para.21. 
7 United Nations, Draft Report: Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related 
to the Security Council (UN Doc. A/AC.247/2005/L.1, 1 August 2005), Annex II: The Question of the 
Use of Veto, pp.10, 13. 
8 Ibid, p.10.  
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disapprove of completely abolishing the veto.  Ironically, it is the veto which stands 
against changing the veto.  The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has pushed for the 
gradual elimination of the veto.9  This has been a popular view of most member 
states of the UN.  Gradual elimination proposals include only vetoing actions under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or there should be regulations placed upon its use.10  
It has also been argued that in cases of genocide or other humanitarian cases and 
human rights abuses, the veto should not be allowed.11  Such arguments have come 
from many different members within the UN with the same view point that the veto 
should be disallowed in cases of genocide. 
 
On 22 April 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed his views on the 
matter in what has come to be known as the “Blair Doctrine”.  His statement 
recognised the view that ‘…UNSC reforms need to reflect the propriety of 
intervention to stop genocide’.  Furthermore he suggested that possible 
improvements included ‘…rethinking the veto enjoyed by the Council’s five 
permanent members’.12  Such a view from one of the permanent members 
themselves gives hope of the possibility that such a change could be instituted within 
the UNSC.   
 
                                                 
9 United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 54th Session: 81st Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, 
16 December 1999, New York (UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, 16 December 1999), p.14. 
10 United Nations, Improving the Working Methods of the Security Council: Draft Resolution/ Costa 
Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (UN Doc. A/60/L.49, 17 March 2006), 
Annex: Use of the Veto, p.4, para.13. 
11 Ibid, para.14. 
12 British Prime Minister Tony Blair as quoted in Michael J. Glennon, ‘Oblivious to Barbarism of the 
Most Horrific Sort’: The Charter Does it Fit?’, UN Chronicle, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, in United Nations 
Chronicle Online Edition http://www.un.org/Pubs/Chronicle/1999/issue2/0299p32p.htm [accessed 28 
February 2007].     
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Arguments that seek to get rid of the veto in its entirety, or change the membership 
and voting system of the UNSC, are at this stage idealistic.  Hopefully the pursuit of 
changing just one aspect of the veto, and for the necessity of changing the veto for 
defenceless lives caught up in genocide which is the worst of all crimes, might prove 
successful. As argued within the UNGA, optimal positions for UNSC reform should 
be put away and replaced by realistic goals.13  Grand ideas of change are time 
consuming and could conceal and eventually eliminate discussion for reasonable 
‘stepping-stone’ change. 
 
For the prevention of genocide, the only necessary change in the power of veto is for 
it to cease as a right in times of genocide.  For the UN to work better as a unit to 
maintain international peace and security there is a need for overall reform.  Some 
suggestions have been given for the reformation of the UNSC, among them have 
been different proposals given for changing or eliminating the power of veto.  
Membership in the UN has changed drastically with around four times the number of 
states than the UN’s original membership.  The veto power is inequitable against 
such a large membership.  But nominating any drastic change to the veto, such as 
eliminating it entirely, is not realistic.  However, preventing genocide does require 
some change with the veto.  Therefore, it is not only necessary but reasonable to 
propose that the veto be restrained from use in times of genocide.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 50th Session: 59th Plenary Meeting, Tuesday, 
14 November 1995  (UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, 14 November 1995), p.11. 
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Chapter Sixteen: Preventing Genocide through Changing the Veto 
 
There are many different avenues for both stopping and preventing genocide.  
Understanding the reasons and psyche of genocide is important in trying to prevent it 
in the future.  But mediating misunderstandings between different groups of national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds does not always prevent it.  Genocide is an 
unfortunate reality.  The Genocide Convention alone is not going to stop genocide 
from occurring.  The cases of genocide discussed in this thesis testify of that.  But 
the Convention is the mechanism whereby the international community can stop 
genocide. 
 
For genocide to occur now, in the period whereby it has become an international 
crime, there needs to be a certain degree of reluctance by the international 
community to intervene.  Prior to the Convention, genocide was ruled by the intent, 
numbers of the target group or groups, and the time they, the perpetrators had before 
there was strong enough resistance to stop it.  But the international community was 
ruled by sovereignty and any outside attempts to stop genocide was considered 
illegal.  Now, international law allows international intervention of other states to 
stop genocide, only if the UNSC authorises it.  This of course is secondary to the 
state committing genocide which is required to prevent and punish the genocide first.  
Failing to do so allows the UNSC the justification to intervene.   
 
Once the obligation for preventing and punishing genocide falls on the UNSC it 
becomes imperative that they undertake their obligations at a fast pace.  The UNSC 
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is given the responsibility for international peace and security in behalf of all the 
member states of the UN.  This was designed in order to provide necessary actions to 
maintain international peace and security at a quick and efficient level.  Taking 
action against genocide should not, therefore, take months or even years to address, 
let alone prevent and eventually punish.  First, there needs to be an independent 
process to determine if a case is genocide.  Then decisive action needs to be taken 
from day one.  The instant genocide begins, the time for negotiations ends.     
 
As can be seen from the cases presented in this thesis, the veto can not only control 
whether the UNSC intervenes to prevent or punish genocide, but it also can stop 
other international actors from doing so as well.  Genocide may well be an 
international crime, but as the case of Kosovo illustrates, a veto used or even 
threatened to be used by any permanent member of the UNSC to intervene, means 
that any actor that chooses to legitimately override the UNSC decision is in effect 
acting illegally.  Hence one of the greatest crimes is allowed to occur, in a sense 
legally, because of the power of the veto.  Therefore, the veto is clearly one of the 
greatest obstacles in preventing and stopping genocide. 
 
There is an unquestionable need then to change the power of veto for the sake of 
preventing and stopping genocide.  Of course, one would want to impede genocide at 
its origins, resolving the differences between groups before they affect the social, 
economic, and political lives of ordinary citizens.  But for some communities, 
genocide is seen as the only desirable option.  The international community is legally 
bound to stop genocide, but this obligation needs a stronger directive.  Withholding 
the power of veto from cases of genocide would send a strong message to those who 
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would think of committing genocide: that the international community has no more 
legal restraints to prevent and punish genocide, thus guilty parties should expect the 
UNSC to stop genocide in a timely and efficient manner.   
 
Once the right to the veto has been withheld in cases of genocide, it will then become 
imperative that the international community appropriately identify cases of genocide 
as genocide.  The UNSC already has a good history of establishing independent 
inquiries that investigate cases of genocide.  Or alternatively, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could provide such investigations.  The ICRC 
has the legal mandate from the international community, under the Geneva 
Conventions and the ICRC mandate which had quasi-legal status, to work as an 
impartial, neutral, independent, voluntary service ‘to undertake tasks incumbent 
upon it in Geneva Conventions to work for the faithful application of international 
humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts and to take cognisance of any 
complaint based on alleged breaches of that law’, and ‘to work for the understanding 
and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof’.1  Also under it statute, 
‘[t]he ICRC may take any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a 
specifically neutral and independent institution and intermediary, and may consider 
any question requiring examination by such an institution’.2  Hence, the ICRC 
already plays a significant role implementing and developing international 
humanitarian law, it would be appropriate that they could be considered as for the 
                                                 
1 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Statutes of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’, 2007, http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/icr-statutes-080503  (9 March 2007), Article 4, 
para.1. (a),(c),(g).  
2 Ibid, Article 4, para.2. 
 142
role of determining cases of genocide.  It would then be important for the UNSC to 
acknowledge such reports and take necessary action.  The voting within the UNSC 
for action, without a veto, would then rely on an affirmative majority to proceed.  
Actions to prevent and punish genocide could therefore proceed without interference 
of power politics.   
 
This chapter has discussed the reasons for selecting the change of veto rights and 
power as a means to stopping and preventing genocide.  Understanding the reasons 
behind genocide continue to serve as a necessity in helping to prevent genocide long 
before it begins.  However, once genocide has begun, and if it is clear that stopping it 
is beyond the given state, then it becomes the duty of the UNSC to intervene.  But as 
history has shown, the veto stands in the way of the UNSC adequately fulfilling its 
task.  Thus it is the veto that needs to be changed in order to prevent and stop 
genocide.  The only change that is necessary for the veto to do this is to withhold the 
veto in cases of genocide.    
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Chapter Seventeen: Conclusion 
 
This section has discussed the debate concerning the veto.  Debate over the power 
and right of the veto has been around since it was first integrated as a tool for the 
exclusive rights of the permanent members.  Smaller states at the founding meetings 
of the UN fought tirelessly against the veto.  The five Major Powers desired the veto 
as security for their national interests and for security against each other.  It was and 
continues to be a great responsibility to ensure international peace and security.  
These points were stressed at the founding meetings as the five Major Powers tried 
to convince the smaller states that it was in their best security interests that the five 
permanent members of the UNSC should hold such power.  Plus, it was a better 
option than the former League of Nations veto power which was given to all member 
states.  After much contention over the veto, the Major Powers were to insist that it 
was either the veto or their withdrawal from inclusion in the UN.  Thus the veto was 
accepted as an exclusive right of the five UNSC permanent members. 
 
But the veto was to cause problems during the Cold War.  Under the new world 
order at the end of the Cold War, there were expectations that the power politics of 
the veto would come to an end.  But it was in the very cases of genocide, in Rwanda, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, that highlighted that the UNs much-needed reform.  The reform 
was widespread, but it would be incomplete without changes to the UNSC and the 
power and right to veto.  There have been different proposals put forth to changing 
the veto.  However, thoughts of eliminating the veto any time soon are too idealistic.  
In order to prevent and stop genocide there need only be a restraining of the use of 
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the veto in times of genocide and other war crimes.  Focusing in on one reasonable 
and necessary change to the veto takes into consideration the need for this particular 
change to occur as soon as possible.  Other more debatable changes will undoubtedly 
be time consuming and could end up being unsuccessful.     
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Conclusion: ‘Never Again’ 
 
After the tragic holocaust, the international community in disgust said ‘never again’.  
Unfortunately, over time that same urgent feeling to prevent and punish genocide has 
withered away. Worst still, genocides that have occurred since the Genocide 
Convention’s creation in 1948, have been given free rein by the threat or the actual 
use of the veto.   This thesis has discussed future international prevention of 
genocide through changing the power of veto.   
 
Genocide is considered the ‘crime of all crimes’, owing to the fact that people are 
intentionally targeted for elimination based on their national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious grouping.  It is a crime that has been committed throughout history; and 
modern technology has significantly increased the gravity of genocide.  The case of 
the Armenian genocide in Turkey during WWI was the first known genocide that 
brought together international condemnation and an attempt by outside states to 
prosecute those responsible for the crime.  Despite its failings it set a precedent for 
future international punishment. 
 
Arguably the greatest genocide of our time was the holocaust during WWII.  The 
Nazi’s systematically and methodically killed numerous ‘inferior’ groups – the 
gypsies, Poles, Slavs, Russians, the physically and mentally disabled, and most of 
all, six million Jews.  At the end of WWII the victors of war sought for the 
punishment of the perpetrators of the genocide.  Thus the international community 
set up the Nuremburg Tribunal.  None of the perpetrators could be tried for genocide 
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because at the time that they committed the offences it was immoral but not illegal.  
So they were tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity.     
 
In 1948 the Genocide Convention was established which would finally include 
genocide as an international crime.  The Convention is limited in its definition of 
genocide, but it provides the legal mechanism for preventing and punishing it.  First 
and foremost, a state committing genocide is required to prevent and punish 
genocide. That failing, it then becomes the task of the UNSC, who is responsible for 
international peace and security. 
   
From April 1975 to January 1979, the people of Cambodia came under attack of a 
vicious new social structure that required a pure, undefiled, Khmer nation in the new 
communist state.  Under the leadership of Pol Pot, foreigners were forced to leave, 
leaving behind the truth of the new regime.  An estimated 1.5 million died in the 
genocide that targeted several ethnic, religious, and even national groups.  The 
regime continued with little acknowledgement from the international community.  
The Cold War was in its prime with the Vietnam War just ending. The US public 
wanted out of the Indochina region; China remained supportive of the Khmer Rouge.  
These two states alone threatened any intervention to stop the genocide.  But the 
Soviets also had a political interest to initially stand by the Khmer Rouge.  The veto 
was never used, but had the UNSC discussed the possibility of intervening, it is more 
than likely that it would have been used.  
 
In 1994 the world stood by again as another genocide occurred, this time in Rwanda.  
It took only 100 days for 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu to be slaughtered in the 
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ruthless bloodbath perpetrated by Hutu government officials, the armed forces, 
militia, the media, and countless civilians.  The UN had been involved in Rwanda 
prior to the genocide, but to save peacekeeping from another ‘Mogadishu’ the states 
with peacekeeping troops were prepared to leave.  The US actively supported such 
action desiring to drastically downsize the UN peacekeeping force.  The right to veto 
which the US had, stopped the UNSC from addressing the genocide appropriately.   
 
From 1991 to 1999, two genocides occurred in the Balkans.  First in Bosnia, which 
lasted until 1995, and then again from 1998 to 1999 in Kosovo.  In the former 
genocide, Bosnian Serbs and Croatians perpetrated genocide against Bosnian 
Muslims.  The Serbs were most responsible for the crimes committed.  Again, in the 
latter genocide, it was the Serbs who were responsible for the genocide against 
Kosovo Albanians.  Although there was some reluctance by the US initially to be 
completely involved in stopping the Bosnian genocide, it was Russia and China who 
stalled the process.  Again, their unfavourable position to military intervention meant 
that NATO was forced to stop the genocide without a mandate by the UNSC; 
consequently their invasion was illegal.  This action bypassed any threat or use of the 
veto which had prolonged the Bosnian genocide. 
 
The final genocide is most important to any current arguments to change the veto to 
help prevent and punish genocide.  Currently in Darfur, Sudan, there are clear links 
between the Sudan’s armed forces and militias both seeking to eliminate the 
‘inferior’ African Muslims.  This genocide has been going on for the last four years.  
An increasing number of organisations and states have called it genocide, most 
notably the US.  But Russia and China are reluctant to follow suit.  Hence, without a 
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name there is no imperative to stop the carnage.  They have been supportive of 
allowing the GOS to prove itself and therefore are reluctant to support even soft 
resolutions.  But four years is too long. Thus we see that the power politics of the 
veto, in cases of genocide, must come to an end.      
 
Finally the veto, which has been debated over since its inception, has been under 
review along with other UN reforms.  But UN reforms would not be complete 
without a change in the right and power of veto.  The cases of genocide discussed in 
this thesis clearly show the negative impact that the veto has had in preventing and 
punishing genocide.  Amongst several proposals for changes to the veto, one stands 
out as being the most reasonable and realistic. It also happens to be the required 
change needed for faster genocide prevention and punishment.  The proposal is to 
withhold veto rights from cases of genocide and other related crimes. 
 
This thesis has argued that one major aspect of preventing, stopping, and punishing 
genocide is to change the veto power of the five permanent members of the UNSC so 
that they are unable to use it in cases of genocide.  It has shown that interests of even 
one of these five states can prevent or prolong the ‘crime of all crimes’ being 
committed.  This reform of the right and power of the veto is necessary to prevent 
delays in appropriate action to halt genocide.  It is necessary in keeping the Genocide 
Convention relevant.  It is necessary in saving lives, as the imperative of saving lives 
stands supreme.  
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Annex 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
 
Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General 
Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948  
 
Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII  
 
The Contracting Parties ,  
 
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime 
under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and 
condemned by the civilized world,  
 
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on 
humanity, and  
 
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, 
international co-operation is required,  
 
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided :  
 
Article I  
 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace 
or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent 
and to punish.  
 
Article II  
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In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such:  
 
( a ) Killing members of the group;  
 
( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
 
( c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
  
( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
  
( e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
  
Article III  
 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
  
( a ) Genocide; 
  
( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
  
( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
  
( d ) Attempt to commit genocide; 
  
( e ) Complicity in genocide. 
  
Article IV 
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Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall 
be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals. 
  
Article V  
 
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective 
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.  
 
Article VI  
 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall 
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with 
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.  
 
Article VII  
 
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as 
political crimes for the purpose of extradition.  
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.  
 
Article VIII  
 
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to 
take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate 
for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III.  
 
Article IX  
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Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of 
a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be 
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to 
the dispute.  
 
Article X  
 
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.  
 
Article XI  
 
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on 
behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which 
an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.  
 
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
 
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any 
Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an 
invitation as aforesaid.  
 
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.  
 
Article XII  
 
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to 
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all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that 
Contracting Party is responsible.  
 
Article XIII  
 
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been 
deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a procès-verbal and transmit a copy 
thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States 
contemplated in article XI.  
 
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date 
of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.  
 
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become 
effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification 
or accession.  
 
Article XIV  
 
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the 
date of its coming into force.  
 
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such 
Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration 
of the current period.  
 
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.  
 
Article XV  
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If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention 
should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from 
the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.  
 
Article XVI  
 
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any 
Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-
General.  
 
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of 
such request.  
 
Article XVII  
 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United 
Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following:  
 
( a ) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI;  
 
( b ) Notifications received in accordance with article XII;  
 
( c ) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance 
with article XIII;  
 
 
( d ) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV;  
 
( e ) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV;  
 
( f ) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.  
 
Article XVIII  
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The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the 
United Nations.  
 
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the 
United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.  
 
Article XIX  
 
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations on the date of its coming into force. 
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